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MOTION THAT JUSTICE JIM JONES BE DISQUALIFIED FROM
SITTING ON THIS APPEAL
Justice Jim Jones' long time law clerk Yvonne Dunbar joined APPELLEES lawfirm a
short while ago and it is Telford's belief that this action tainted the fair consideration of Appellant's
motion to augment the appellate record before Justice Jim Jones given Justice Jones violated
the express mandates of IAR 30 (a), which provides:
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment ... the clerk's
record ... but the moving party must establish by citation to the record
or transcript that the document was presented to the district court.
Justice Jim Jones improperly denied APPELLANT's motion to augment this appellate record
with the records which were concealed from the clerk's record;
inculpitory against APPELLEES.

all of said records which were

Telford argued in her motion to augment the appeal record

(before briefing was commenced), that her affidavits in the clerk's record made reference to the
exhibits in the attached Addendum which Telford contends were deliberately gutted from the
clerk's record to Telford's substantial injury.

Furthermore, Telford provided justice Jones with the

transcript of the October 9, 2012 hearing where Telford complained once again about clerical
misconduct relating to her court files.
exhibit "1"

The hearing transcript is attached to Holli's Addendum as

thereto and shows that Holli submitted original declarations into the record with

attached exhibits, but that the clerks set aside Holli's original affidavits,

not placing a file stamp

on these documents, and which has now caused Telford's affidavits not to be considered. Read
Hearing transcript at exhibit "1" to the attached Addendum for Telford's complaint about clerks
gutting her trial record to prejudice Telford's appeal.
Nevertheless in the transcript,

Judge Dunn prejudicially

did not allow Plaintiff's

exhibits admittedly attached to Plaintiff's original affidavits to be admitted into the court record, in
spite of Judge Dunn's October 3, 2011 Order referring solely to Telford's affidavits and attached
exhibits when disposing of the Telford's claims. Justice Jim Jones should have corrected the
abuse of discretion by Judge Dunn and admonished the clerk. Instead, Justice Jones condoned
this official misconduct - which has allowed the APPELLEES to continue to perpetrate a fraud
upon this court . Telfordi therefore now asks that Justice Jones be prohibited from sitting on the
panel deciding this appeal based on an apparent bias against TELFORD.

1

FURTHERMORE, to

achieve justice in this appeal, Holli asks that the panel overturn Justice Jim Jones order denying
augmentation and consider the exhibits in the attached Addendum so that Appellees may not
continue to perpetrate a fraud upon this court.
1. Moreover, immediately after Justice Jones conclusively denied Appellant's motion to
remand, Justice Jim Jones ordered Holli to forthwith submit her Opening brief, leaving Holli little
to no time to prepare her brief, in light of the gutted record.
iii

OBJECTIONS TO APPELLEES STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Holli Telford hereby objects to various parts of Appellees "Statement of
Facts" which blatantly mischaracterizes the facts and evidence presented to the trial
court below.

Furthermore, Justice Jim Jones when he singly heard Appellant's motion to

augment this appeal record based on District Court clerk Diane Skidmore concealing
pertinent trial records below, violated IAR 30 with respect to part of the rule that provides:
(a)

Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment ... the clerk's
record ... but the moving party must establish by citation to the record
or transcript that the document was presented to the district court.

Holli argues that she can cite to the incompetent clerk's record created by clerk
Diane Skidmore and to parts of the October 9, 2012 hearing transcript attached as exhibit
"1" to the Addendum hereto, and show how inculpitory records against the Appellees
were intentionally concealed from

in

order to obstruct this appeal and Holli's entitlement to proceed on her claims against the
defendants as a matter of law in the state of Idaho.

Holli will redress each objection in

turn, and in conclusion, ask this court to enter a default sanction against Appellees for
the numerous misrepresentations they made to this court in their response brief.
Before Holli attacks the Appellees mis-representations, Holli wishes to address
the Appellee's efforts to corruptly taint this appeal by referring to the void contempt orders
against Holli Telford Lundahl in their footnote 2, page 1 of their Response Brief:
First and foremost, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider these contempt
orders because they were neither presented too,
below.

Secondly,

nor passed upon by the trial court

the contempt orders are presently before another court for

determination as to their validity, albiet against a relative of Holli's.

The Constitutional

defects in these contempt orders remain the same no matter who the contempt orders are
applied against,

accordingly Holli attaches as exhibits "2" and "3" to the Addendum

herein, her relative's "electronically recorded motions" seeking to declare 2 of the primary
contempt orders upon which all others are predicated,

void ab initio.

THE CONTEMPT ORDERS CITED TO BY COUNSEL ARE
VOID AB INITO AND THEREFORE CANNOT SUPPORT ANY
CLAIM THAT HOLLI IS A SERIAL VEXATIOUS LITIGANT
1

On February 20, 2013 in re Idaho Supreme Court appeal no. 39497 - 2011,
Appellant Holli

orally argued before this Court the constitutionality

Administrative Rule 59, the vexatious litigant statute.

of Idaho Court

Hollli argued that the rule as

applied to her, effectively sanctioned a "Star Chambers Court".

Specifically under this

administrative Rule : there was no court file or record ; there was no docket record,
there was no transparency to monitor this alleged official proceeding;

the notice

procedures under the rule were constitutionally defective because the State was
entertaining an independent action under the rule and service of the OSC (which
constituted a complaint under Idaho law),
the state of Idaho;

should have required personal service within

the hearing procedures provided under the rule should have been

mandatory and not permissive;

an ADJ cannot base his contempt order on a

discretionary jurisdictional ruling which as a matter of law under rule 41 must

be

dismissed "without prejudice" and thereby meet the definition of "adversely and finally
determined against the litigant'',

and : if the ADJ bases his ruling on other federal and

state orders finding a litigant vexatious, the court must first ensure that underlying order
is not void ab initio and subject to collateral attack.
Not only did Holli attack the constitutionality of Rule 59 as applied to her, she
also attacked the jurisdiction of the Idaho Supreme Court to hear the proceeding on the
merits in light of the fact that ADJ Nye had been disqualified without cause, ADJ NYE had
been disqualified for cause, ADJ Nye never acquired personal jurisdiction over Holli by
valid service of process,

and the fraud committed in the trial court by Oneida County

District Court Clerk Diane Skidmore in gutting the entire lower court record as instructed
by ADJ NYE, nullified in whole the entire administrative proceedings.
Additionally,

Holli argued in her briefs that the Idaho Supreme Court was

required to remand her the case back to an impartial tribunal to hear the merits of Holli's
collateral attacks on the referenced federal and state contempt orders -

because the

Idaho Supreme Court could not sit as a fact finding body without committing
structural error.

Structural errors are fundamental defects in the trial mechanism that

affect the entire "framework within which the trial proceeds." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 310 (1991).
error occurs".

"Where an appellate court acts as a fact finding body, structural

Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 652-653, 66 S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 916

(1946); Accord in Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 213, 220; The Abbotsford, 98 U.S. 440, 445;
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Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, supra, 31; Terre Haute & Indiana Ry. Co. v. Struble, 109 U.S. 381,
384, 385;

Fishburn v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 137 U.S. 60, 61; Ayers v. Watson,

137 U.S. 584, 597 ("An Appellate Court cannot decide facts which are in the province of
the court or jury below." );

United States v. Shugart, 25 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 05/06/1994)

(An appellate court is not a fact-finding body.)

1

Accordingly,

Holli was not required to

provide the Idaho Supreme court with her motions attacking the void contempt orders,
unless they were relevant to the "for cause bias" of ADJ NYE.
Moreover, the contempt orders are not only being unconstitutionally applied
against Holli, but they are also being unconstitutionally applied against relatives of Holli who were clearly not named parties in the actions resulting in the void contempt orders.
For example,

the Idaho Federal contempt order cited by counsel, i.e. Holli Lundahl

NAR Inc., 434 F. Supp.2d 855,
contempt order, 2003 UT 11,

857 (D. Idaho 2006)

v.

and the Utah Supreme Court

were recently applied against a relative of Holli's in a

collection action pending in the Wyoming federal court.

Marti Lundahl procured from

Holli, the identical motions Holli filed with ADJ NYE respecting two of the primary void
contempt judgments ( but which ADJ NYE directed District Court Clerk Diane Skidmore
to gut and purloin from the vexatious litigant record), and Marti changed these motions
slightly to reflect defenses by a third person.

2

Attached as exhibits "2" and "3" to the

Addendum hereto, are 2 of these motions which show how the Idaho federal contempt

1. Viewed another way, the Court cannot pass on questions of fact. See Hormel v.
Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 ( 1941 )( "A reviewing or appellate court may not consider questions
of law neither pressed or passed upon below, where injustice might otherwise result). Accord,
Young v. United States, 394 F.3d 858, 861 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005) ("[The] general rule [is] that a
"Permitting
federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.").
appellate courts to decide facts would allow the appellate courts to sit as advocates and
constitute structural error." Dickinson v. Porter, 31 N.W.2d 110, 126 (Iowa 1948). Examples
include: "proceeding before a biased judge", see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927);
2. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, fn 5 (1989) : Persons who have no right to
appeal from a final judgment -- either because the time to appeal has elapsed or because they
were never parties to the case -- may nevertheless collaterally attack a judgment on certain
narrow grounds. If the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, or if the judgment is the
product of corruption, duress, fraud, collusion, or mistake, under limited circumstances it may be
set aside in a collateral proceeding. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 69-72 (1982);
Griffith v. Bank of New York, 147 F.2d 899, 901 (CA2) (Clark, J.), cert. Denied, 325 U.S. 874
(1945). This rule not only applies to parties to the original action, but also allows interested third
parties against whom the judgment is being enforced,
to collaterally attack the
judgments.

3

judgment, the

9th

circuit contempt judgment, the Utah Supreme Court contempt judgment

and the NAR attorneys fees judgment are all void ab initio.
Also in several of the cases cited by APPELLEE's counsel,

Holli is a

defendant or respondent in the cases while Holli was in bankruptcy. See Los Angeles
Homeowners Aid v. Holli Lundahl; and Lundahl v. Quinn. Any disposition in those cases
would have been void ab initio as in violation of the automatic stay.

The Petition before

the US Supreme Court is a forgery signed in Holli's name, and furthermore, shows on it's
face that no notice was given before entry of the contempt judgment.
v. Hawkins,

Finally in Lundahl

this judgment was predicated solely upon the void Utah Supreme Court

Contempt judgment and hence is void if the underlying judgment is void.
Finally, counsel asserts in his footnote, that Holli was declared incompetent to
stand trial in her criminal case 2:06 CR 693 by reference to exhibit "4" attached to Holli's
Addendum.
reasons.

In fact, Holli was temporarily held incompetent to stand trial for medical
Specifically,

a Utah jail nurse criminally manipulated Holli's blood pressure

readings to reflect normal -

in order to support

a claim that Holli was faking her

cardiovascular injuries sustained in 1995 when Holli was assaulted at the hands of Eli
Lilly and company and Lilly's co-compliciters.

3

On June 23, 2008, Holli was taken to a

federal court hearing to discuss her physical health. A number of witnesses familiar with
Holli's health problems were in the courtroom.

At this hearing, this jailhouse nurse

testified that Holli suffered from hypochondriasis because Holli

did not have any

hypertension or atrial fibrillation (Side effects of Holli's drug and assault induced heart
attack on September 27, 1995 at the HCA hospital in Orange County, California. Refer
back to exhibit "4" of the attached Addendum for reference to this hospital.).

Holli stood

up at the close of the Nurses' testimony and called the nurse a blatant perjurer. Holli also
demanded to have her blood pressure taken electronically in open court.

The Judge

ordered the Marshals to removed Holli to the hallway because of her outburst.

Holli's

blood pressure was electronically measured by the US Marshal- a former paramedic.
The US Marshal returned back to the courtroom and reported Holli's blood pressure at
190/115.

The Judge subsequently ordered that Holli be direct (life) flighted to the

Federal Medical Center "FMC" in Carswell, Texas. The Court immediately remanded
3.
In addition to manipulating Holli's blood pressure readings, this nurse also bate and
switched Holli's heart medications ordered by Holli's primary doctor causing Holli the suffer a CVA
almost one month before the June 23, 2008 hearing.

4

Holli to the custody of the BOP for this purpose.

4

A subsequent examination by a Government subsidized cardiologist, was
taken.

Attached hereto as exhibit "5" is the cardiologist's redacted report on Holli. He

diagnosed Holli with Diastolic Congestive heart failure,
gallops associated with atrial fibrillation.

severe hypertension and

S4

The BOP conclusively determined Holli as

physically disabled via cardiovascular disease through

reports issued by multiple

independent specialty medical providers on contract with the BOP. The

Secretary of

Health and Welfare also made her separate affirmative determination that Holli was
permanently physically disabled through assault related conduct in 1995,
cardiovascular disease.

resulting in

In United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Company,

384 U.S. 394 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court held that "(w)hen an administrative
agency is acting in a judicial capacity and

resolves disputed issues of fact

properly before it, res judicata and collateral estoppel bars are properly imposed
against any attempt to subsequently attack the final administrative decision.

When the Prosecutor got confirmation of the final "agency determinations"
regarding Holli's physical and mental health

5

,

and after Judge Downes in an interlocutory

3. The docket record in re USDC - Utah case no. 2:06-CR-693 shows that the
Wyoming Judge several times throughout Holli's 3 year criminal litigations - directed the BOP
and it's Medical arms, here the FMC in Carswell Texas, to determine Holli's health status resulting
from the assaults inflicted at the HCA hospital located in Orange County, California on September
29, 1995 and thereafter. The BOP in conjunction with the SSA did determine Holli's health status
under the sole discretion of their own contracted physicians - given Holli was detained against her
will.
5.
During the criminal litigation, Holli repeatedly denied having been examined by
a sole practitioner psychologist Vicky Gregory. Holli claimed that she was on the phone in her
pod with several persons in an intercom phone call when her phone call was interrupted because
of a visit by a "Vicky Gregory". Holli informed the court as noted through court records, that she
was transferred to the programs pod to meet with Vicky Gregory and when Holli learned of the
purpose of Gregory's visit, to countermand the competency reports twice issued by the
Psychology Department at Carswell Texas, Holli refused the examination, returned to her cell,
and resumed her phone call with family members and friends.
After Judge Downes issued his November 2008 decision, the Prosecutor
contacted the witnesses Holli was in phone contact with on August 22, 2007 during the time Vicky
Gregory had allegedly examined Holli for the period of 1% hours. The Prosecutor discovered that
Gregory's testimony was false. In addition, Gregory claimed in her [fabricated] report that Holli
had gotten volatile with Gregory during the alleged 1 % hour examination and thus had to be
physically removed from the interview room. Such an aggressive maneuver by an inmate at the
jail would have resulted in disciplinary action against the inmate. Given there was no incident
report made either orally or in writing against Holli, the Prosecutor concluded that Vicky Gregory
had lied in her report to benefit the complaining witness Eli Lilly.

5

order entered in November of 2008

tried to USURP the specialized decision making

authority of the BOP and SSA by self imposing his own rule regarding Holli's competency
adverse to the "twice-made" agency determinations,

and after the Prosecutor had

investigated Holli's charge that Vicky Gregory never examined Holli and had fabricated a
report against Holli,

and because the Prosecutor could find no evidence that Holli had

committed any of the crimes charged by Lilly or Judge Tallman in the Idaho federal
contempt judgment,

the Prosecutor exercised his executive authority and voluntarily

moved to dismiss all criminal charges and actions against Holli without prejudice as if the criminal cases had never been brought . The Prosecutors actions were
intentionally taken to moot all of Judge Downes'

prejudicial and "now proven false"

interlocutory orders finding Holli to be a hypochondriac and/or suffering from a
persecutory complex involving Eli Lilly.

6

Accordingly based on the aforesaid record, APPELLEES may not cite to any
"now determined false findings" made by Wyoming federal judge William Downes during
Holli's former criminal litigations, to taint this appeal.

OBJECTIONS TO THE PATENTLY FALSE STATMENTS
OF FACT MADE BY APPELLEES
1.
Property.

APPELLEES falsely assert that Holli attempted to buy the Texas

Response Br. @ 1.

Objection:

This statement is patently false. Holli did purchase the

Texas property. See exhibit "6" attached to Addendum hereto.

All of the records in

exhibit 6 were presented to the District Court at C.R., Vol. I, pp. 141-142, Aff. Of Telford,

3.
When the charges were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, the
dismissal order mooted every single interlocutory order entered in the criminal case as if
the interim orders had never been entered.
See WRIGHT v. WRIGHT, 22994 (APP. 1997),
No. Docket No. 22994 (Idaho App. 05/08/1997) (A plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of an action can
be seen as having the effect of an absolute withdrawal of the plaintiff's claims and leaving the
defendant as though the defendant had never been a party citing Cook v. Stewart McKee & Co.,
157 P.2d 868, 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945) citing 5 JAMES WM. MOORE, et al., FEDERAL
PRACTICE Section 41.05[6] (2d. Ed 1982); Also see Rawlinson v. Wallerich, 132 P.3d 204, 2006
WY 52 (Wyo. 04/20/2006) (voluntary dismissal without prejudice rendered the case "a nullity, as if
the suit had never been filed"); Accord in Williams v. Clarke, 82 F.3d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1996);
Beck v. Caterpillar, Inc., 50 F.3d 405, 407 (7th Cir. 1995) ("suit voluntarily dismissed rendered
moot every interlocutory order because case treated as if never filed.) ; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env., 523 U.S. 83, 100 n.3 (1998)
6

para(s) 9 - 11 referring to attached exhibits 3, 4 and 5. (District Clerk Diane Skidmore
gutted the exhibits from Holli's Affidavit. Holli complained about this gutting act at the
hearing to augment the record.

Refer back to exhibit "1" attached to the addendum,

Transcript of the 10-9-2012 hearing, pages 6-9.).

Moreover, Judge Dunn considered all

of these records in his October 3, 2011 Decision as shown at C.R. Vol. 11, pp. 303-304,
footnotes 18-36.) Therefore the records in exhibit "6" to the Addendum attached hereto,
are properly before this court.
Moreover, all affidavits submitted by HOLLI in C.R., Vol. I, pp. 126 - 170
were in support of her cross motions for summary judgment against the Defendants,
AND NOT ONE OF HOLLI'S AFFIDAVITS WERE OPPOSED BY THE APPELLEES.
See Sprague v. City of Burley, 710 P.2d 566; 109 Idaho 656 (ID, 1985) (We affirm the
district court's ruling granting partial summary judgment to the City because "a party
defending a motion for summary judgment may not rest on its pleadings, but must offer
affidavits or other evidentiary materials which demonstrate that an issue of fact remains."
Theriault v. A.H. Robins Co., 108 Idaho 303, 698 P.2d 365, 368 (1985); First Piedmont
Bank and Trust Co. v. Doyle, 97 Idaho 700, 703, 551 P.2d 1336, 1339 (1976). l.R.C.P.
56(e) states: When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule,

an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his

pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
not so respond, summary judgment,

If he does

if appropriate, shall be entered against him.

Here, because Sprague's affidavit failed in any way to respond to or controvert Messley's
statements with regard to the City's officer training policy, the district court properly
entered an order of summary judgment as to the City.
In this case, because APPELLEES failed to oppose Holli's rebuttal and
direct affidavits claiming and proving HOLLI purchased the property, then APPELLEES
are barred from doing so in these proceedings. Finally, Judge Dunn's order at C.R. Vol.

11, p. 301 admits that Holli had purchased the property through the findings: "After Plaintiff
had advised Smith County of the error she was directed to the property that Smith County
actually owned and that she had purchased.

The Parcel Plaintiff purchased was

significantly different than anticipated."
2.

Appellees claim that HOLLI failed to properly serve the remaining non-

7

appearing Defendants and as a result HOLLl's claims against these defendants were
dismissed without prejudice. Response Br. @ 1.

Objection:

Raised as an issue in this appeal, is whether HOLLI had

the right to invoke the long arm service statute under the Idaho consumer Protection Act
as a service procedure for a summons and complaint.

See Opening Brief, pp 31-32.

HOLLI disputes service by certified mail constituted improper service upon the defaulting
defendants.
3.

Judge Dunn found that exercise of personal jurisdiction over the

Defendants would violate Constitutional Due Process.

Objection : Judge Dunn made such finding because the real property
subject of this action could not be ported to Idaho. See Opening Brief pp. 27 paragraph 4
and

29 paragraphs 2-3.

However, HOLLI sought the deed to the real property as

pages 4-5 of exhibit "6" attached to the Addendum hereto. The paper

promised on

Deed to the property was portable.
4.

Telford attempted to submit a bid on real property.

Objection:
Holli

did submit a bid,

that

Page 1 of exhibit 6 to the attached Addendum shows
Holli's

bid was approved and that Holli was sold

the

property.
The property bid on was struck off to Tyler School District. Res.Br. @ 2.

5.

Objection: This is a false statement. The property bid on was struck
off to Smith County Trustee. See C.R. Vol. I, p. 36.
6.

Telford submitted the bid by providing a written paper copy of the bid to

the Smith County Assessor's office.

Objection:
office by certified mail.

Telford sent her bid in to the Smith County Assessor's

Telford was later asked to resubmit a new bid based on the

county's erroneous listing of the situs address to the property. C.R. Vol. I, p. 34.
7.

Holli's sealed bid indicated a Texas address for Holli citing to C.R.

Vol. 1, p. 134. Response Breif @ 2.

Objection.

Holli maintains that the envelope found at C.R. Vol. 1, p.

134 is a forgery and not from Holli.
283 - 284,

Moreover C.R. Vol. I, pp. 34, 146; C.R. Vol. II, pp

and pg. 1 of exhibit "6" attached to Addendum hereto,

all show Holli's

address and the origin of the purchase funds to buy the subject real property as being
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Malad City, Idaho.

Furthermore, Holli does not possess a phone line carrying a Texas

phone number and Appellees exhibit A @ C. Vol. Supp. p. 127 is a self generated
document by Smith County carrying an incomplete Texas phone number of 469, stop.
8.

Plaintiff never recieved the Deed for the Property,

Objection:

As part of a fraudulent scheme by the Defendants,

Holli was deprived of the deed. See Opening Brief pp 24-27.
9.

Throughout the bidding process,

Telford made a number of visits to

Texas in February 2011, April 2011 and May 2011.

Objection : The bidding on the subject property commenced
on March 1, 2011. The February check shown at C.R. Vol. I, p. 146 and bearing Holli's
Idaho Address was sent well in advance of this property being offered via the

internet.

Accordingly the bidding process had not yet begun.

the winner of the bid on March 31, 2011.

Holli was announced

Affidavit of Kim Vogt, C.R. Vol. I, p. 134,

Hence the bidding process commenced March 1, 2011 and concluded

para. 4.

March 31, 2011.
process."

"Holli therefore was not in Texas "throughout the bidding

Furthermore, C.R. Vol I, p. 128, paragraph 10, admits that Holli did not visit

Texas until April 30, 2011 to commence rehabilitation work on the property, almost one
month after Hali had been advised that she owned the property through an irrevocable
sale.
10.

Telford recieved a number of telephonic communications from Smith

County presumably informing Telford that she had won. In fn. 8, the Appellees contend
that because Telford failed to cite to the record proof of these phone calls,

that they

should be disregarded.

Objection: C.R. Vol. 1, p. 149 shows at least 4 phones made to
Telford's Idaho residence

on April, 4, 2011 (a monday) and

one on April 8, 2011

discussing the letter Lois Mosley executed in Lundahl's favor.

This letter is found at

exhibit "6" in the attached Addendum, page 1 of that exhibit.
11.
2011,

Telford visited the State of Texas on April 30, 2011 through May of

to take possession of the property despite the fact that no Deed had been

received.

Objection : The selling officer for the Smith County Assessor's ofice
Lois Mosley informed Holli that she could "possess the property as the new purchaser"

9

and that Holli "could also make improvements to the property."
paragraph 11 and exhibit "6", pg 1

C.R. Vol. I, p. 141,

attached to the Addendum herein, paragraph 3.

Furthermore, Holli had been promised delivery of the Deed through the mail by Smith
County's other attorneys, the Law offices of Linebarger, Goggan, Blair and Sampson.
See exhibit "6" attached to the Addendu hereto, pgs 4-5.

Finally, to date Smith County

has always retained the purchase funds on the real property,

C.R. Vol. 11, pp. 283 and

284 - pursuant to the modified bid contract. C.R. Vol. I, p. 34.
12.

On May 6, 2011, Plaintiff ... attempted to provide a substitute bid (in

the form of a letter) as oppose to a sealed bid. As this letter was not a sealed bid, it
could not be accepted.
Objection:

Holli submitted a nun pro tune modified bid,

lettered bid. See C.R. Vol. I, p. 34.

However, the sale was over. The property had

been sold. The sealed bidding process was MOOT.
with the selling officer Lois

not a

This issue was directly discussed

Moisley on May 6, 2011 where Holli and 4 other persons

appeared at Smith County Assessor's office to address the sale defect. Holli as well as
the other 4 witnesses observed Lois Mosley directly discuss the listing defect with the
Smith County Assessor Gary Barber.

Lois Mosley instructed HOLLI to

"resubmit

another bid nun pro tune to a day before the bidding closed and bid the assessed
value of the property only."

C.R. Vol. I, p. 142 paragraph 14.

Holli did resubmit

another bid. See C.R. Vol. I, p. 34.
13.

Although Telford was the only bidder on the property, her bids were

never accepted by Smith County.
Objection: The only written notice that the cournty had not accepted

Holli's bid or purchase of the property came from the July 6, 2011 affidavit of the County
Assessor - well after Holli served the Assessor with the lawsuit. C. Supp. R. p. 125. Of
interest is that 6 days, after the Assessor executed his perjured affidavit denying Holli
owned the real property which had now been improved by more than $250,000,
property was allegedly redeemed by the former defaulted owners and
Judge Joel Baker accepted the redemption.

the

Smith County

Smith County Judge Joel Baker was the

statutory agent who recieved service of process of the underlying Idaho lawsuit on June
4, 2011.

(See C.R. Vol. I, pp.

103 - 104 for return of service),

See exhibit "7"

attached to the Addendum hereto for certified copy of this void Redemption Deed.
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On

October 3, 2011, Judge Dunn referred to this redemption deed in his Order when
"After Plaintiff had incurred substantial costs improving the

Judge Dunn found:

land, Plaintiff was notified that the former owner had redeemed the property and
that Smith County was revoking the sale."

The Redemption Deed was attached to

Holli's Affidavit filed into the record on August 1, 2011. The Deed has been purloined

from

the record by the District Court Clerk Diane Skidmore. Because Judge Dunn

referred to this deed when it entered his October 3, 2011 decision,

this Redemption

Deed is properly before this court. This court should take judicial notice of who authored
the void Redemption Deed; none other then the Defendants herein attorney Tab Beall
under the rubric of his lawfirm, the Law Office of Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins & Mott.
In footnote 9 of their response brief,

APPELLEES conceal the execution of this

Redemption Deed so that they can avoid liability for their participation in the criminal
scheme to steal $250,000 + in monetary assets from Holli.
14.

Telford never paid for the property at issue.

Telford cites C.R. 258-

259 of the record to support her contention that she paid a deposit on the property.

The

money transferred to Smith County ... was to purchase of a manufacture home citing
C.R .p. 144, para. 18.

Objection:

Paragaraph 18 of the Telford Affidavit states : "I had

placed a manufactured home on the property which I had purchased from Smith
County."

The reference is to purchasing the property from Smith County, not the
Holli purchased the manufactured home sitting on the property

manufactured home.

from a dealer in Waco Texas.

Attached as exhibit "8" is the purchase reciept and wire

notice for the double wide manufactured home that is presently on the property. Williams
is a reference to a former owner. As can be noted by the reciept, the manufactured home
was purchased one year before Holli purchased the Smith County real property.
15.

Barber does not remember ever talking to Plaintiff during the periods

outlined in Plaintiffs complaint.

Objection:
talked to Barber.
Mosley,

Plaintiff did not allege in her complaint that she ever

Rather Plaintiff attested in her affidavit that Barber instructed Lois

the selling agent, to instruct Holli to prepare a modified bid on the correct

property sold to Holli.

C.R. p. 142, Vol. I, paragraph 14. Which Holli did. C.R. Vol I, p.

143, paragraph 15.
16.

No personal service of the summons was made on Barber.
11

Objection:

As soon as Judge Dunn issued his order on July 18,

2011 asserting that the complaints must be personally served under the Idaho Consumer

Protection Act, instead of by certified mail, Holli sought to preserve this issue on appeal
as to the defendants who made no appearance at all, and Holli caused each specially
appearing defendant to be personally served.

At C.R. , Vol II, pp 288-290, an Amended

return for Personal Service on Defendant Gary Barber was filed.

The Texas process

server, Sarah Garner, attests under penalty of perjury that she personally served Gary
Barber on September 14, 2011 @ 2:00 p.m at his place of work, the Summons and
verified Complaint. C.R., Vol. 11, . 290.
Smith County Count is a Political subdivision and has essentially no

17.

general contacts with the state of Idaho.

Holli's

Objection:

personal jurisdiction

claims

against

all

defendants hereon are targeted under the "Specific jurisdicition" rule, not the general
jurisdiction rule.
why

Moreover, on page 14 of her Opening Brief Holli succinctly outlined

Smith County does not bear the cloak of a government entity when acting in a

commercial capacity

to execute contracts and sell property.

Footnote 1 very clearly

shows that the State of Texas withholds all government immunity from county entities in
such situations as the case at bar.
18.

The facts regarding Beall and Purdue Brandon are similar, and show

how inately rediculous it was to include them in this suit. These defendants . . . have
essentially no general contacts with the state of Idaho.
Objection:

Holli's

personal jurisdiction claims against

and Purdue Brandon are also targeted under the "Specific jurisdicition" rule,
general jurisdiction rule.

Attached as exhibit "7" to the

Beall
not the

ADDENDUM hereto is the

certified copy of the redemption deed which Beall and Purdue Brandon authored no less
than 45 days after they had been served with the summons and Complaint underlying
action. They colluded with the county judge to strip plaintiff of more than $250,000 in
portperty assets tied to the property, knowing full well that plaintiff was seeking specific
performance on the sales contract,

that plaintiff had improved the property,

that the

defaulted owners had by passed their redemption period, and that they were committing
a crime through extortion under color of law by authoring and sustaining the execution of
the void redemption deed in collusion with the County Judge Joel Baker.
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19.

The law offices of Purdue Brandon have not been properly served.

Objection:

As soon as Judge Dunn issued his order on July 18,

2011 asserting that the complaints must be personally served under the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act, instead of by certified mail, Holli sought to preserve this issue on appeal
as to the defendants who made no appearance at all, and Holli caused each specially
appearing defendant to be personally served. At C.R. , Vol II, pp 294-296, an Amended
return for Personal Service on Defendant LAW OFFICES OF PURDUE BRANDON was
filed. The Texas process server, Sarah Garner, attests under penalty of perjury that she
personally served this law office on September 14, 2011 @ 2:00 p.m

at

305 S.

Broadway, Tyler TX 75701, by serving the the Summons and verified Complaint. upon
the office manager Stephan Golden. C.R., Vol. 11, . 296. Plaintiff Holli followed up with a
mailed copy of that service. Accordingly, this law office has been properly served under
Idaho rule for personal service on a business entity who does not have a registered agent
of service in the state of Idaho.

OBECTION TO APPELLEES PROCEDURAL FACTS
The Appellees claim that Telford did not file a motion to amend the Complaint
until after final judgment.

In an affidavit filed by Telford as C.R.,Vol.111, p.438,

paragraphs 8-9. Telford attests that at the first hearing conducted by Judge Dunn on
September 7, 2011,

Telford tried to amend her complaint to add additional RICO

allegations deriving from the criminal prosecution.

Judge Dunn stated in open court that

it would not hear Holli's new allegations irrespective that the case was only 3 months old.
Judge Dunn also refused to allow Holli to amend her error in stating a Utah Fraudulent
Communications claim instead of an Idaho RICO claim so Holli argued her Idaho RICO
claim under IRCP rule 15(b) conforming her claims to the new evidence presented to the
court. See Paragraph 10 and fn. 4., p. 438.

Several times thereafter, Holli continued to

ask the court orally to allow her to amend her complaint, and the court continued to reject
Holli's pleas for amendment because he had no intention of sustaining jurisdiction over
the action, irrespective that it may have existed.
Vil.Ill, p. 458.

Holli filed a written motion as C.R.

APPELLEES implied assertions that Holli did not attempt to amend until

after final judgment are and were therefore false.

ARGUMENT
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On page 17, paragraph 2 of their Response Brief the APPELLEES properly
identify that Holli was seeking the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants
"for acts giving rise to Telford's causes of action." This type of jurisdiction is referred to as
specific jurisdiction.

1.

Five Of The Issues Raised In Appellant's Opening Brief
Address Two Components Of The Idaho Long Arm
Statute l.C. Section 5-514 And Therefore Holli Has Not
Waived Any Issue Of Jurisdiction
APPELLEES argue that Telford has waived her argument or Issues re personal

jurisdiction under the Idaho long arm statute by virtue of her failure to site to the statute
number, l.C. 5-514 (the Idaho Long Arm Statute) in her analysis.
13.

Response Brief@ p.

This is an absurd argument as it would place form over substance in the

pleading averments.

7

Five of Telford's Issues on appeal clearly address two

components of the Idaho Long Arm Statute, ie the doing business clause and the tortious
injury clause.
HOLLI pleaded 8 issues on appeal :
The first issue deals with the due process requirements under the long arm
service statute of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and requires this court to set forth a
first impression rule as to whether Congress intended that the word "Notice" in the statute
was intended to cover service of a Summons and Complaint by certified mail, or whether
personal service had to be accomplished under this act to acquire in personam
jurisdiction over the seller in violation of the act.
The Second and Fourth Issues assert that the Defendants committed fraud,
deception and false promise against an Idaho resident during a consumer transaction

7. See Anderson v. Crapo, 589 P.2d 957; 99 Idaho 805 (ID. 1978) (Appellants
Crapos argue at the outset that the trial court erred in not granting their motion to dismiss the writ
of habeas corpus on the grounds that respondents Andersens failed to provide an answer to the
return on the writ. They argue that without such an answer the return to the writ stands as the
complaint and, since its allegations are deemed admitted, the writ must be dismissed. This
argument exalts form over substance since it is standard procedure to treat the petition itself as
the answer to the return when the petition fully serves to traverse the allegations of the return and
when no further affirmative pleading appears necessary. Cole v. Cole, 68 Idaho 561, 573, 201
P.2d 98, 106 (1948).). Followed in In re Weick, 127 P.3d 178, 142 Idaho 275 (Idaho 2005)
(Attempting to place form over substance with regards to noticing requirements.).
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dealing with real estate and that plaintiff was largely monetarily damaged and continues
to be damaged in the state of Idaho.

The Fourth Issue asks the court to direct turn over

of the portable Deed to prevent further ongoing damages, or to create a constructive
trust over the properties and determine the amount of Plaintiff's conversion damages.
The Idaho long arm statute has a "tortious injury" clause which provides for jurisdiction
over any person that injures an Idaho resident.
The Third Issue deals with forming a contract in the state of Idaho for
purposes of completing a business transaction.; clearly a prong under the doing business
clause of the Idaho Long Arm Statute.
The Fifth Issue asks this court to determine whether the personal
jurisdiction statute for crimes applies to the Idaho RICO statute where one element of the
crime is committed in Idaho and part of the injuries are felt by the Idaho resident within the
state.
Telford's Sixth, Seventh and Eighth issues deal with procedural due process
questions and whether the trial court abused it's discretion in not allowing Telford to
amend her complaint to plead attempted extortion through illicit use of the criminal
process to defeat Plaintiff's civil claims and criminal conversion via extortion under color of
law in blatantly stealing Holli's and other Idaho citizen's properties in violation of the Texas
Property Tax codes.
Accordingly,

Holli did not waive any jurisdictional argument against the

defendant.

2.

HOLLI STATED BOTH TRANSACTIONAL AND TORTIOUS
INJURY DIRECTED AT AN IDAHO RESIDENT
APPELLEES subsequently assert that "even assuming that Telford argued

jurisdiction under Section 5-514, she still could not show an act which would invoke this
section." APPELLEES correctly state that two prongs of the Idaho long arm statute apply,
ie. the doing business clause and the tortious injury clause.
APPELLEES argue that because Barber, Beall nor Purdue were the
sellers of the property in question, Smith County was, that they cannot be held liable
under the doing business clause of the Idaho Long Arm statute.
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Telford did not argue that these persons were liable to her under the doing
business clause.

She expressly argued that they were liable to her under the tortious

injury prong of the Idaho long arm statute. See Opening Brief pp 23-26.
APPELLEES next argue that none of the defendants committed any tortious
acts against Telford.

Specifically, ''Telford can point to no action committed by Barber.

Attached as exhibit "7" to the the Addendum attached hereto is the Redemption Deed
that was gutted from the trial record and referred to in Judge Dunn's October 3, 2011
Order. C.R. Vol. II, p. 304, reference to fn. 33.

This Redemption Deed is crticial to the

inquiry of whether the Defendants tortiously and criminal attempted to injure Telford and
those situated with Telford. See Aff. Of Ferron Stokes C.R. Vol. Ill 446-447, and Aff. Of
Mike Slicker, C.R. Vol. Ill, pp 444 - 445.
In the Clerk's Supplemental Record, pp. 122-125 is the Affidavit of Gary
Barber. C Supp R.., p.124.

At paragraph 15, Barber admits that the first bid Telford

submitted to Smith County@ $12,001.00 "was more than seventy-five per cent of the
value of the taxes owed on the property."
bid.

Hence,

See C.Supp.R. p. 130 for Telford's original

the $4200 modified bid made by Telford pursuant to Lois Mosley's

instructions, see C.R, Vol. I, p. 34, more than compensated Smith County for the back
taxes owed on the property Holli purchased and would have given Smith County an
additional $1200 in transaction funds.
Paragraph 18 of Barber's affidavit states "Prior to Ms. Telford's bid being
accepted, the property was redeemed pursuant to Texas Law."
Texas law provides: Texas Property Tax Code:
Sec. 34.21. Right of Redemption, provides:
(f) If the owner of the real property makes an affidavit that the owner has
made diligent search for the purchaser at resale, and has failed to find the
purchaser, ... that the owner and the purchaser cannot agree on the amount
of redemption money due, ... the owner may redeem the land by paying
the "required amount" as prescribed by this section to the assessorcollector for the county in which the property described has been
redeemed.
Accordingly, under Texas Law

Barber is the person who received the

redemption fees referred to in the Reemption Deed attached as exhibit "7" to the
Addendum. Furthermore, according to Barber's own testimony, the redemption fees due
on the property would have been no more than $3,000. ( If Telford's original bid was
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$12,001, and Telford paid more than 75% over the amount of redemption taxes due on
the property as attested to by Barber,

than the actual redemption fee would have been

$3,000.).
It is admitted that no affidavit was ever filed with Barber to redeem the property
as required under Sec.34.21 (f) and Barber's affidavit wholly omits reference to any such
affidavit.

C.R. p. 405.

Furthermore, on May 6, 2011, Barber was aware that Telford

construed herself as the purchaser of the property in question,

because

in

evidence submitted by Barber himself, (ex. D attached to Barber Affidavit), C. R.
Supp. 137, in the first paragraph, Telford asks for clerification on which property
Telford purchased (emphasis added) at the tax sale.

Also submitted by Barber was

the internet advertisement on the Tax Sale. C.Supp. R., p. 133.
the property in question.

Item number 197 shows

After listing the account no., this record shows that the property

was deeded back to the County in cause no. 22, 107-C. The Deed was recorded with the
Texas court on September 10, 2010. O.B. p. 17.

This record also shows that the first

sale on that property took place on November 2, 2010 and the property was not sold, but
rather struck back to Smith county.

Hence the March 1, 2011 sale where Telford placed

a deposit on the transaction (refer back to C.R. Vo. 11, p.283), was a resale.
In C.R. Vol. I, p. 140, paragraph 10, Telford talks about the faxed letter Mosley
executed and delivered to Telford as referenced in C.R., Vol. I, p. 141, paragraph 11.
(Exhibit "5" in the July 18, 2011 Telford Affidavit was the letter by Lois Mosley. This letter
was gutted from the clerk's record and is exhibit "6'' to the Addendum attached hereto.).
In paragraph 10 of Telford's affidavit (C.R. p. 140), Telford attests that both the Smith
County sales officer Lois Mosley and Telford concurred that Texas Tax Code section

34.05 controlled the resale of the property: The relevant section read as follows:
The acceptance of a bid by an officer conducting the sale is conclusive
and binding. On conclusion of the sale, the officer making the sale
shall file and record each deed under this subsection and after
recording shall return the deed to the grantee.
Accordingly, since the subject sale was a resale of the struck off property,

and since the sale admittedly concluded on March 31, 2011, (see Aft. Of Kim Vogt
C.R. Vol. , pp. 134-135, paragraph 4, whom testified that she appeared at the Smith
County Tax office at the close of the sale on March 31, 2011 and heard Lois Mosley
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announce Telford as the winning bidder),

then Smith County taxing sales officer

Lois Mosley had no option but to file and record a deed in Telford's favor. Contrary
to Barber's

Affidavit,

under Texas law

conclusion of the sale on March 31, 2011.

Telford's bid was accepted at the
These laws and arguments are made in

the opening brief at pp. 15 - 20.
According to the foregoing,

Barber had no right under Texas Law to reject

Telford's bid more than 2 months after the sale had concluded on March 31, 2011 and
Telford was publicly announced as the winner.
In addition, when Barber accepted redemption fees from Paul Kelley Jr.,
Barber violated Texas law.

As aforesaid,

Texas Property Tax code Sec. 34.21. Right

of Redemption requires the filing of an affidavit :

(f) If the owner of the real property makes an affidavit that the owner
has made diligent search for the purchaser at resale, and has failed to
find the purchaser, that the purchaser . . . that the owner and the
purchaser cannot agree on the amount of redemption money due, ...
the owner may redeem the land by paying the required amount as
prescribed by this section to the assessor-collector.
It is uncontested that the owners had already been served with Telford's
Idaho lawsuit some 33 days before they allegedly submitted redemption fees to Barber on
July 6, 2011.

(See C.R. Vol. I, pp 63-73, with attention to verification for certified receipt

tracking confirmation. C.R. Vol. I, p. 71.).

Hence, the redeemed owner knew full well

where to contact Telford in any attempt to redeem the significantly improved property. (It
should also be noted that both before and after the double wide manufactured home was
placed on the texas property, the defaulted owners came onto the property inquiring into
Telford's improvements and Telford informed the defaulted owners that she had
purchased the property at a tax sale several months earlier and now owned the property.).
In spite of having actual notice of how to contact Telford, the defaulted owners
never contacted
required Affidavit.

Telford

discuss redemption fees,

a necessary condition to the

Furthermore the Affidavit is jurisdictional and in it's absence,

redemption can take place.
owner's affidavit,

to

no

Hence Barber's failure in his affidavit to refer to the defaulted

is fatal to Smith County's entire defense that the property had been

redeemed. The redemption therefore was void ab initio.
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In addition, the Deed to the county was first filed of record on September 10,
2010.

On Pages 17-18 of Telford's Opening Brief, Telford details at length that the

owner had no right to redeem the Texas property because he had not performed all
required redemption acts within

180 days of September 10, 2010, which would have

been March 9, 2011, while the property could still be withdrawn from the resale.

The

deed attached as exhibit "7" to the Addendum hereto is dated July 12, 2011, more than 4
months after the redemption period had passed under Texas law.
from failing to obtain and file the jurisdictional affidavit,

Accordingly, aside

no redemption rights were

accorded the owner as a matter of Texas law.
Barber played a pivotal role in stealing more than $250,000 in residential
assets from Telford and the redemption Deed attached as exhibit "7" to the Addnedumis
critical to proving all Defendant's fraud.

Without Barber receiving the redemption fees,

no property Redemption could have been executed.

Furthermore, the county benefited

monetarily from the transaction. As attested to by Barber in his affidavit filed in the Idaho
Court on July 6, 2011, C. Supp. R., p. 124, paragraph 15,

the back taxes owed on the

property were $3,000 (% of the bid amount Holli initially offered).

All Kelly would have

been required to pay to redeem the property would be the back taxes of $3,000. The
Redemption Deed attached hereto shows that Kelley paid $12,608.36 to get the property
back.

This means that the County charged Kelly an additional $9,600+ over an above

the redemption fees. What the County in fact did was revoke the sale from Telford and
resell the property to the defaulted owner.
Barber's affidavit filed in the Idaho district court asserting that the property was
validly redeemed under Texas law,
extortion under Idaho law.

was therefore perjured and constituted theft by

Since Barbers' fraudulent extortion actions occurred within

the 4 corners of the state of Idaho and for purposes of obstructing justice in an Idaho
lawsuit,

this court has personal jurisdiction over Barber and his employer Smith County

under the servant - master theory.

Moreover, the fact that APPELLEES induced Judge

Dunn to dismiss the Idaho action WITH PREJUDICE under a jurisdictional theory,

shows

that the Smith County defendants corruptly intended to bar Telford from ever raising her
theft, extortion and conversion claims against the Smith County defendants in any
subsequent forum under the doctrine of res judicata.
As to Defendants Beall and Purdue Brandon,
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these Defendants authored the

void Redemption Deed - knowing that they were engaging in a criminal conspiracy to
steal properties from Telford and other Idaho residents so invested.

A reference to the

Redemption Deed at exhibit "7' attached to the Addendum, shows that it was authored
by Purdue Brandon and forwarded back in the mails to the office that Beal controls in
Tyler Texas. It is Telford's contention that Beall orchestrated the criminal scheme to steal
the properties from Telford and others, joined the County Judge Joel Baker in his scheme
to give it "judicial credibility" and then colluded with the Oneida County District Court
clerk Diane Skidmore to "gut"

this record from the file. Refer back to the October 9,

2012 hearing transcript attached as exhibit "1" to the Addendum hereto showing Telford
complaining again about the gutting of records from Telford's court files.
It is also Telford's contention, that counsel for Appellees and the Texas
attorneys and lawfirm, colluded with the Oneida County prosecutor to illegally search and
seize Holli's Idaho home on August 10, 2011, for the purpose of stealing and destroying
Holli's original paper and electronic evidence in the Smith County and Oneida County
cases - Holli had pending.

See C.R. Vol. II, pp. 220 - 256 for Holli's Mandamus Writ

to Judge Dunn to order the Sheriff's office to return Holli's files, records and evidence for
her case against Smith County; a petition which Judge Dunn Rejected.
In addition, because APPELLEES counsel engaged in collusion to conceal the
deed attached hereto,

and because counsel has withheld the existence of this

Redemption Deed from this court in APPELLEES response brief,

this court should

sanction counsel as well as Appellees for committing a fraud upon this court and
automatically grant Telford default sanctions.

This Court should also direct Telford to

submit an affidavit of monetary damages she has suffered as a result of the Defendants
criminal conduct.

3.

UNDER TEXAS LAW, SMITH COUNTY IS CONSIDERED A
PERSON PERFORMING PRIVATE COMMERCE FUNCTIONS.
SMITH COUNTY DID CONDUCT A BUSINESS TRANSACTION
WITH AN IDAHO RESIDENT IN WHICH SMITH COUNTY
REALIZED A PROFIT THUS SUBJECTING SMITH COUNTY
TO THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT UNDER 5-514
APPELEES argue that Smith County is not liable to plaintiff because they are

a government entity who is not subject to the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.
In Opposition, Telford asserts that Smith County's government status is not
20

relevant because Smith County was engaged in performing private commercial functions
and therefore is liable as a private party would be. Addressing Smith County's liability
would be be a first impression question for this court.
Nevertheless,

Smith County next argues that if Smith County is liable, they

conducted no business transaction in Idaho. Smith County asserts that the bid process
was still ongoing when Telford appeared at the County Assessor's office on May 6, 2011
to raise issue as to which property Telford had purchased.
As Aforesaid, the bidding process had been closed almost 5 weeks by the
time Holli appeared that the Assessor's
office.

Furthermore,

the Assessor Barber's own evidence indicates that Telford

appeared as an established purchaser - inquiring into which property she had actually
purchased.

(See ex. D attached to Barber Affidavit), C. R. Supp. 137, in the first

paragraph, Telford asks for clerification on which property Telford purchased
(emphasis added) at the tax sale.
Smith County further asserts that Barber rejected Telford's bid.
adopts in whole here entire argument against Barbar's claims supra, p 15-19,

Telford
as if fully

set forth herein - because Barber was acting as the chief employee of the county at the
time he acted and clearly established a practice to violate Telford on the County's behalf.
Holli also asserts that the gravamen of the injury by Smith county occurred
after Holli sued Smith County and served Smith County Judge Joel Baker with Smith
County's Process. The record shows that a conspiracy then developed to assert that the
property was a residential property because Telford had placed a double wide
manufactured home on the property and made it into a residence.
- 26.

Opening Brief, pp. 21

However under the Texas Tax Code Section 34.21, Paul Kelley Jr. the heir of

Paul Kelly Sr, the latter deceased for more then 12 years, could not claim a residential
exemption to the property because there must have been a competent residence
structure on the property which was used as a full time residence at the time the property
was foreclosed to Smith County on September 10, 2010,

not after Telford developed the

property into a residence. See Opening Brief at pp. 20, fn. 5 and 22 fn. 8.
Furthermore according to the court records, even the record produced by the
assessor himself,

C Supp. R., p. 128, the property was owned by the Smith County

Trustee, whom is the party Telford served in the lawsuit (See C.R. Vol. I, pp 103 -106,
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and note that the summons named "Smith County Trustee" as defendant.).

The smith

County Trustee appeared in this action as Smith County, not the school districts. See
C.Supp.R. p. 60 showing special appearance under the name SMITH COUNTY, not the
school districts.

Moreover, at no time while this case proceeded before the district

court did SMITH COUNTY argue that the school districts were the true parties in interest,'
therefore this court must strike SMITH COUNTY's argument that they are not the true
party in interest in the case proceeding before this court.
Smith County then argues that Telford cannot show that Smith County realized
a profit from the transaction and therefore no business was conducted. Telford adopts her
argument supra that :
. . . the county benefited monetarily from the transaction. As attested to by
Barber in his affidavit filed in the Idaho Court on July 6, 2011, C. Supp. R., p.
124, paragraph 15, Telford's (initial) bid was more than seventy-five per cent of
the value of the taxes owed on the property. Telford's initial bid was $12,001.
C.Supp. R., p. 130. Therefore the back taxes owed on the property were
$3,000. All Kelly would have been required to pay to redeem the property
would be the back taxes of $3,000. The Redemption Deed attached as exhibit
"7"to theAddendum shows that Kelley paid $12,608.36 to get the property
back.
This means that the County charged Kelly an additional $9,600+ to
make money on the transaction to Telford's injury..
The County therefore earned a windfall of $9,600. on the transaction after Paul
Kelly Jr. paid the true redemption fees (back tax fees of $3,000.).
County did conduct business in Idaho and did

Accordingly, Smith

profit from the transaction.

McGee v. lntern'I Life Insurance Co., 355 US 220, 222- 223 (1957) :

See

In

The US Supreme

Court held that entering into a single contract with a forum resident subjected the
defendants to the plaintiff's forum even though no property belonged to the insurance
company in California, no other policies were issued in California and the insurance
company had no offices or agents in California.).

4.

APPELLEES COMMITTED TORTIOUS INJURY IN THE
STATE OF IDAHO AND WHICH THEY DIRECTED AT
AN IDAHO CITIZEN
APPELLEES admit that BLIMKA, 143 Idaho at 725, 152 P3 at 596 affirmed

that internet advertisements that reached the forum were sufficient to sustain jurisdiction
arising from conduct pertaining to that advertisement. Response Brief@ 18. But
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APPELLEES assert that Blimka does not apply because Telford viewed the advertisement
in Texas, dispatched to Texas to inspect the property (impliedly before the sale), bid on
the property from Texas,

and then went to Texas to take possession of the property.

Response Brief @ 18, para. 3.

THERE JS ABOSLUTELY NO EVIDENCE IN THE

RECORD TO ESTABLISH ANY OF APPELLEES CONTENTIONS.
Appellees cite to the affidavit of Greer for the contention that Telford found the
advertisement concerning the property in Texas.
thing.

The affidavit of Greer says no such

Greer testified that Holli was interested in bidding on Texas tax properties and in

pursuit of that interest, filled out a preliminary statement while in Texas on a unrelated
matter on February 8, 2011.
internet until March 1, 2011,
wire the deposit funds.

The property had not even been posted for sale on the
at which time Telford immediately dispatched to her bank to

See C.R. Vol. II, p 283 for wire verification. Also note that the

bank letter indicates that the deposit funds were in drawn from the loan proceeds
identified in Telford's letter of credit which was produced as evidence by Barber in his
affidavit at C.Supp.R. 132.

So Telford could not have found the advertisement on the

property while in Texas on an unrelated matter in early February of 2011. Rather Telford
was at her home in Idaho when she viewed the advertisement, prepared and executed
the bid contracts and then sent them to Texas.

Moreover,

on page 16 of Appellees

Response Brief, paragraph 2, Appellees ADMIT that Telford
and sent the documents to Texas."

documents,

"filled out the paper

Hence, Appellees are bate and

switching their own argument to obstruct this appeal.
Telford admits that she did bid on the property but the deed was illegally
withheld from Telford in violation of Texas Tax Code section 34.05 controlled the
resale of the property: The relevant section read as follows:
The acceptance of a bid by an officer conducting the sale is conclusive
and binding. On conclusion of the sale, the officer making the sale
shall file and record each deed under this subsection and after
recording shall return the deed to the grantee.
Hence the reason Telford sued Smith County for specific performance to turn
over the deed.

Smith County in the interim induced Telford to improve the property to

the tune of $250,000.

See C.R., Vol. I, p. 141, paragraph 11 and exhibit "6'' attached to

the Addendum to the reply brief for Lois Mosley's letter.
Finally, Telford possessed the property when she became owner of the
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property.

8

When Telford dispatched to the property in May of 2011, it was to improve her

property - not possess it.
Appellees cite to Acichika as the relevant jurisdictional case and which
describes the seller's connections with the forum state as only incidental.

Acichika is

not similar to the case at bar.
First, the buyer in Acichika did not attach his Idaho properties as
security for the various loans Telford obtained to improve the Texas
property for purposes of resale. C.R. Vol. Ill, p.406, para.9.
Second, an Idaho lender executed an $85,000 mortgage on the double wide
manufactured home and has converted that mortgage to a reverse mortgage with
increasing principle, interest and penalties. See Aft. Stokes, C.R.,Vol. Ill, pp. 446-447,
para(s) 2-5.

A lien has now been placed against Telford's Idaho home to pay for these

security interests owned by Stokes and because the defendants have not stolen and
confiscated Telford's Texas properties on the reported basis that Smith County beat
Telford in the Idaho Litigation. See Aft. Slicker, C.R. Vol. Ill, pp 444-445.
Third, Telford expended additional savings from her local bank to excavate
the property for the placement of a double wide manufactured home, C.R. Vol. I, pp 107
-110; Telford paid a deposit on the property, C.R. Vol. II, p. 283.
Fourth, Telford extended

additional loan fees of $18,000.00 for infra

structure work on the property. C. Supp. R. p. 132.
Fifth, Telford purchased a double wide manufactured home one year earlier
and which required a down payment of $65,000 to pay the difference between the
mortgage and the sale.

See exhibit "8" attached to Addendum for the purchase receipt

and wire transmittal notice on the double wide manufactured home that is presently on the
property.
All loans have defaulted as a result of theft of the properties as identified
by the Slicker Affidavit, C.R. Vol. Ill, pp. 444 - 445, and as a result thereof, plaintiff's
Idaho home has been attached as security to pay off the loans carrying an approximate
principal balance of $235,000 to date.
8. Constructive possession is a legal theory used to extend possession to situations
where a person has no hands-on custody of the object. Most courts say that constructive
possession, also sometimes called "possession in law," exists where a person has knowledge of
the object plus the ability to control or use the object, even if the person has no physical
contact with it. United States v. Derose, 74 F.3d 1177 [11th Cir. 1996]).
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Yes indeed, the facts in the Akichika case are not even remotely similar to
the instant case. Therefore, given all defendants had a hand in the tortious injury inflicted
upon Telford,

they are all liable to Telford under the Idaho Long Arm Statute. Appellees

have wholly omitted these injuries from their Response brief.
Additionally, the Appellees have analyzed their phone contacts to the Idaho
forum to the Akichika case rather than the Blimka case.

Telford maintains that Blimka

controls. Appellees stole Telford's phone devices out of her home during the seizure on
August 10, 2011 and never returned them. See copies of some phone records filed in the
case before the seizure as C.R. Vol. I, p. 149. Furthermore, when Appellants computers
were finally returned, Onieda county had blocked Telford's navigation abilities and gutted
Appellants hard drives of it's memory. See C.R. Vol. II, p 214-215. Telford sought a writ
from judge Dunn but this was rejected as aforesaid. See C.R. p. 220. Nevertheless, the
only communication that took place in Texas is when Telford appeared in Texas more than
33 days after she had purchased the property, to inquire into which property she had
purchased. Otherwise all phone calls were directed to Telford at her Idaho residence.
See Taylor v. Phelan, 912 F.2d 429, 433 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990) ("So long as it creates a
substantial connection, even a single telephone call into the forum state can support
jurisdiction.");
With respect to the use of a passive or active website which Appellees
argue on pages 20-21 of their brief, Telford moves to strike this argument because the
Appellees did not raise this argument in the lower court. Judge Dunn while acting as an
advocate for appellees improperly raised this defense. Nevertheless, the website was
active because all the materials to draw down and expedite the sale were posted on
Smith County's website as in Blimka.

"A website is not passive where it provides a

means to purchase goods or products or services." See Holland America Line Inc. v.
Wartsila

North America, Inc., 485 F.3d 450

(9th Cir. 2007)

CompuServe,

Inc. v.

Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (posting information over the internet for
purpose of selling products is not a passive website and meets the express aiming
requirement to impose jurisdiction where the sales have an impact.). In the instant
case, smith county's website was fully active, all one had to do is draw down their self
authored contracts, provide the consideration for the bid which included deposits and /or
letters of credit, and send the bid in. Accordingly, Smith County's website was interactive
and promoted their sales nationally.
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5.

APPELLEES HAVE FAILED TO COMPETENTLY ADDRESS
AND JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENT RE TELFORD'S RICO
CLAIMS OR CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT CLAIMS
Appellees have not addressed any of Telford's jurisdictional arguments under

Telford's Idaho RICO Act or the Consumer Protection Act, other than to say the Telford
cannot prosecute a crime.

However the RICO act may be enforced by private parties

acting as attorney generals as decisioned by the US Supreme Court in Rotella v. Wood,
528 U.S.549 (2000). Nevertheless, the Appellees have conceded to this court addressing
Telford's Issues nos. 1,2,5 and 8 as first impression questions.

6.

EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER APPELLEES WOULD
NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
APPELLEES deny that Telford made any argument going to the due process

prong of exercising jurisdiction in the state of Idaho in Telford's Opening Brief. This is

again a misrepresentation. See pp. 33 -42 of Telford's Opening Brief talking about the
scope of due process contacts with the forum state under CPA; under contracts; under
loans; under equity claims such as specific performance and /or constructive trusts; and
under the criminal personal jurisdiction statute as applied to a RICO claim
APPELLEES then attempt to limit their contacts by stating that Telford traveled
to Texas to research the property and to submit a bid. Response Brief @ 24.

facts are patently false.

These

Telford did not travel to Texas to research the property. The

record shows that Telford had already purchased the property

by the time she

traveled to Texas to improve the property 35 days later after the sale terminated.
The County Assessor admitted this fact in his own evidentiary submissions made to the
Idaho Court approximately 33 days after Barber had been sued.

Furthermore, As

admitted in Appellees own Response Brief, Telford submitted the bid from the state of
Idaho. See Response Brief. p. 16 paragraph 2.
The Due process analysis depends on the type of contacts with the forum. See

Yahoo Inc v. La Ligue Contre Lw Raciseme Et L'Antisenitiseme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th
Cir. 2006) (We treat "purposeful availment" somewhat differently when addressing tort
and contract claims..

In tort claims,

we inquire whether a defendant "purposefully

direct[s] his activities" at the forum state, applying an "effects test" that focuses on the
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forum in which the defendant's actions were felt, whether or not the actions themselves
occurred within the forum.

See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803 (citing

Calder v.

Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984)). By contrast, in contract claims, we inquire whether
a defendant "consummate[s] [a] transaction" in the forum, focusing on activities such as
delivering goods to or executing a contract in the forum state. Both anaylsis' must be
conducted to determine if one or the other will sustain jurisdiction

In terms of the effects tests, numerous courts have held that where the
plaintiff becomes subject to an obligation as a result of a transaction, that jurisdiction is
proper in the forum where the obligation is situated.

Loan obligations created in the

forum state to fund contracts creates contacts in the forum state where the payments
on the loans are expected to generate. Rynone Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indus., Inc., 96
S.W.3d @ 640, (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002.) ("Calling a Texas resident in Texas to solicit
a loan is a purposeful contact with Texas under a contracts anaylsis.)
Axess

Inc.

v. Orlux Distribution

Inc.,

Nos. 03-4179,

03-4189

See also Pro
(10th Cir. 2005 )

( Exercising personal jurisdiction where a contract that

was presented through the

internet by a French defendant was signed in Utah

and committed

monetary

the

obligations

in

Utah

in

perfomance

on

contract.);

Plaintiff to

Vreeken v.

Lockwood Engineering, BV 218 P.3d 1150, 148 Idaho 89 (Idaho 2009)

(loans

obtained locally for business purposes result in contact with forum.) same Hsu v. Liu,
Case no.07-1046 (Texas Supreme Court 2007).
Also see fraud claims in general.

See Gates v. Collier, 378 F.2d 888 (9th

Cir. 1967) (With respect to that portion of Collier's claim which is based on fraud, § 377
of the Restatement recites that

" When a person sustains loss by fraud,

the place of

wrong is where the loss is sustained, not where fraudulent representations are made.");
United States v. Pascucci, 943 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991) (Jurisdiction lies where the
plaintiff's assets are depleted through the wrongs commited by the defendant); Sinatra
v.

Nat'I

Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1195 ( 9th Cir. 1988 ) (exercising personal

jurisdiction over a Swiss Clinic that misappropriated Frank Sinatra's name through a
series of advertisements claiming recommendation by high profile California resident.);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Neaves, 912 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1990) (fraudulent letter
sent to plaintiff in forum state was express aiming. Also see Calder v. Jones, 465 US
783, 789-90 (1984) (We take this opportunity to clarify our law and to state that the "brunt"
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of the harm need not be suffered in the forum state.

If a jurisdictionally sufficient

amount of harm is suffered in the forum state it does not matter that even more
harm might have been suffered in another state. ).

Also see Blimka v. My Web

Wholesaler LLC, 152 P.3d 594, 143 Idaho 723 (Idaho 2008) (Blimka argues that the
district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the defendants with respect to
the fraud claim pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-514(b), and with respect to the contract claims
pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514(a). Since we conclude that jurisdiction existed on the

fraud claim, both with respect to My Web and DePalma, and because the fraud claim
supports all relief granted in the judgment, we need not address the issue of jurisdiction
over the contract claims.

See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984)

and Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984).

In this case, the allegedly

fraudulent representations were directed at an Idaho resident and the injury
occurred in this state when Blimka departed with funds as a result of the fraud.
Plaintiff paid large sums of money for defective goods that were mispresented to
Blimka. Thus, we hold that Blimka's allegation of fraud was sufficient to invoke
the tortious acts language of Idaho Code
defendants.

Morover,

§ 5-514(b)

with

respect

to

both

because the defendants purposefully directed their allegedly

false representations into Idaho and the plaintiff suffered a pecuniary loss as a result of
these false representations,

the exercise of personal jurisdiction is presumed not to

offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice under the Due Process
Clause. See, e.g., Brainerd v. Governors of the Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1260 (9th
Cir. 1989). Idaho has an ever-increasing interest in protecting its residents from
fraud committed on them from afar by electronic means.). Citing

Calder et al v.

Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) ("the fact that the actions causing the
effects in California were performed outside the State did not prevent the State from
asserting jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of those effects .. .the brunt of the
harm was suffered or is being suffered in the forum state,. .. thereby invoking jurisdiction
in the forum where the "effects" of the out of state conduct is felt."

World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-298 (1980); Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws§ 37 (1971).
Based on the damages alone which now place Telford's Idaho home at risk for
foreclosure, there is no doubt that Idaho is the forum where Plaintiffs claims should be
properly heard.
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7.

THERE EXISTS LACK OF CLERITY IN IDAHO RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 4(i)
See State v. Yzaguirre, 163 P.3d 1183, 144 Idaho 471 (Idaho 05/25/2007)

(In determining its ordinary meaning "effect must be given to all the words of the statute if
possible, so that no word will be rendered void, superfluous, or redundant." State v.
Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006) (quoting In re Winton Lumber
Company, 57 Idaho 131, 136, 63 P.2d 664, 666 (1936)).
At pages 4-6 of plaintiff's amended opposition, plaintiff made the following
argument

citing

Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft, 193 P.3d 866, 146 Idaho 319 (Idaho

0912412008 ) : "If a party wishes to insist upon the objection that he is not in court,
he must keep out for all purposes except to make that objection.

Pingree Cattle Loan

Co. v. Charles J. Webb & Co 36 Idaho 442,446,211 P. 556, 557 (1922) (quoting from
Lowe v. Stringham, 14 Wis. 222, 225 (1861).

Rule 4 (i) provides in part that "If, after a

motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is denied, the party pleads further and defends the
action, such further appearance and defense of the action will not constitute a voluntary
appearance under this rule.

Here, the defendants would not be pleading further in the

action because they merged their rule 12(b)(6) petitions with their rule 12(b)(2),(4) and (5)
petitions and argued all petitions on their merits in the first instance.
The defendants assert that another provision of rule 4(i) permits them to merge
all defenses in one motion and thereby not make a general appearance.
The issue presented is whether this merger of motions is a grant to argue all of
the defenses on their merits at once in the jurisdictional motion, or merely a grant to
preserve the other defenses. Plaintiff contends that it is mere grant to preserve other
defenses otherwise the defendants would render superfluous the other provision under
rule 4(i) , to wit:
"If, after a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is denied, the party pleads
further and defends the action, such further appearance and defense of the
action will not constitute a voluntary appearance under this rule.
Judge Dunn did not address this conflict in the rule in his October 3, 2011
Decision. This Conflict therefore should be settled by this court.

8.

APPELLEES ARE NO ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT NEVER REACHED THE
THE MERITS OF THE CLAIMS AND BECAUSE TELFORD
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HAS PRESENTED A NUMBER OF FIRST IMPRESSION
QUESTIONS

a

a case where no final judgment was entered on the merits of the claims

thus leaving plaintiff free to pursue her claims in another forum did not warrant attorneys
fees.

Puckett, 158 P.3d at 941, 946.

See also Rohr v. Rohr, 800 P.3d 94, 99 (Idaho

1
was clear error
no. 7 in Telford's
Telford's claims,

this court
no

no ,.,.,..,,,..........'""'

that

than 4

Noreen v. Price Development Co. Limited Partnership, 135 Idaho 816, 25P.3d
129 (Idaho App. 2001),

the Noreen Court denied Attorney Fees under l.C. § 12-121

and l.R.C.P. rule 54(e)(1) on direct trial of the case and on appeal on the grounds that

when a party presents a question of first impression for decision to a court, such
proceeding cannot be construed as frivolous.

Here, Noreen presented a first impression

question as to the ramifications of a violation of the Assumed Business Names Act.
Last but not least, itis the defendants/Appellees who have committed a
maassive fraud upon this court using the Idaho courts to commit this fraud.

It is the

Appellees who should be sanctioned in this action by entry of a default judgment in
Telford's favor. Telford requests that this be done.
VERIFICATION
I, HOLLI TELFORD, verify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing facts and
attached exhibits are true process that were submitted to the underlying court in the
instant action, or is process relevant to APPELLEES attempt to taint this appeal until I
am permitted to proceed before an impartial · I court and vacate the referenced
contempt judgments which I contend are void
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)
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Stephen Adams
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Following is the transcript of the Hearing held on October 9, 2012
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TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING DATED OCTOBER 9, 2012
JUDGE DlJ~"'N :

Rumor has essentially taken ... she hasn't really officially quit her position
yet

But, her arrangement with the Idaho Supreme Court is that she only

works on Monday mornings until next week and then I'll have a new full
time court reporter, next week. But I do not have a full time court reporter,
I do not have the option of bringing in another court reporter today, and as
a result of that and by order I'm directing that this hearing proceed without
official court reporting, but it is being electronically recorded for future
possibility of a transcript if needed. So I'm just advising the parties of that
fact under the administrative rules. I am entering that order today. Any
objection either one of you wish to make on the record relative that issue.
Ms Telford.
MS. TELFORD : No
JUDGE

Du~'N

:

Mr. Adams.

MR. ADAMS : No your honor.
JUDGE Du~N :

Alright . So, what we have. Um the Plaintiff, Ms. Telford has filed certain
objections indicating that she wishes the record in this case to be added too
Under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the Defendants have also
filed an objection to the clerk's record asking that certain things be
included and thatother things be deleted. They filed that motion July 19th .
The Plaintiff filed heres on July 25 1h. And then on August 6, 2012, the
Plaintiff filed an objection to the Defendant's Objection. That is, that part
of the Defendant's motion seeking to have certain things excluded from
the record. Now, I'm just going to tell you what I think at the outset, and
then you can, and then I'll let you make whatever additional argument you
want. My initial thoughts after reviewing all of the motions from both
sides is that, I really don't know what arguments are going to be presented
to the Supreme Court. Do I think all of these records are really relevant to
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the issues on appeal? Probably not. Uh. I think it's unlikely.

But one

thing I do know is that the Supreme Court has a lot more help than me and
they got a lot more clerks and people working for them, and they're going
to be able to sort this out. I'm not worried about confusion of the record.
They're going to be able to sort out what's relevant and what isn't relevant
to the issues that ultimately they decide on. An uh, so I'm not really
worried about that. My inclination, just out of an abundance of caution,
is just to let both of your have in the record whatever you want. That's my
inclination. Having said that, so you know what my previous position is.
I want to say that I have already made up my mind for sure, but I'm going
to let both of you argue if you wish. But thats my inclination already, so
that you don't get up there and want to argue something from the record
that isn't in the record. And the Supreme Court's going to decide if what
you want to argue is relevant or not .

I think a lot of it might be irrelevant

when it comes down to the final analysis. But that's my inclination. So
having said that, Ms. Telford your the plaintiff, you filed a motion as
well, you go ahead make whatever argument you wish.
MS. TELFORD :

Yea. I brought the record that Diane sent me in the mail. And I flagged
one particular record which does not have the exhibits that were on the
original record. I brought my computer today, so that you could see that
I saved it as a pdf file on my computer. And I wanted to bring it up to
the court and open it up ... the properties on the pdf file on my
computer indicate that this document was emailed too Diane and
opposing counsel, because I save the gmail to counsel as well.

October...
JUDGE DUNN:

October 2012?

MS TELFORD:

2011,

JUDGE DUN"'N:

October 2011 okay,
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In

MS. TELFORD:

It was re-emailed because one of the charges in the criminal case was
that I had forged Diane's notary to this document. So I redid the
document and re-emailed it to both counsel and Diane. And the

document that she has submitted to me in the clerk's record has a
number of exhibits, critical exhibits missing from the document
that was emailed to her.
JUDGE DUl\'N :
MS TELFORD :

Okay.

So I want to, if the court wants to see that, I'll bring my computer
up to the court. ..

JUDGE DlJ~1N :

I'm not going to look at your emails. The question I have for you is that
despite what that records shows that you have in front of you, my
question is ... did you review the original clerk's file to determine
whether or not the document you claim the you submitted by email,
contains all of the exhibits that you think have not been included.

MS. TELFORD:

No. But I did discuss with Diane a document, the July Document
which exhibit "?"attached to that document was a bunch of
photographs.

And we had discussed that last year. This document is

the one I am referring to that was dated in July, so I know it had these
other exhibits attached to it and her record on appeal does not have
those exhibits in it.
JUDGE DUNN :

And what particular exhibits are you talking about that you think
have not been included and what was the date of the filing?

MS. TELFORD :

Well the original filing was the July l 81h declaration.

JUDGE DUNN:

Of what year?

MS. TELFORD :

2011.

JUDGE DlJ1'.1N :

Okay.

MS. TELFORD :

And it had 17 exhibits attached to it. The seventh exhibit attached to
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MS. TELFORD :

And it had 17 exhibits attached to it. The seventh exhibit attached to
it was a bunch of photographs of damages.

filDGE DUNN :

Well let me just ask this question.

MS. TELFORD :

I'm not so much concerned with that particular exhibit, but
exhibits ... the last exhibit she put into the record is exhibit 3 that
is attached to that declaration. And it had 17 exhibits. Exhibits 4,
5, 6, which are on my computer pdf document as being sent to
both counsel Adams and Diane ...

filDGE DlJN'N :

What was the date again?

MS. TELFORD:

It's the July 18th declaration.

filDGE DlJN1N : July 18th ... (looking through the court file)
MS. TELFORD :

It was signed on July 18th , but I don't know what date it was
recorded.

Let me see what date she has on the . . . stamped date

she has on the document. August 1st is the stamped date she has on
the document in the clerk's record that was provided to me. I
actually considered emailing this document to Diane again so that
she could have it on her email. ..
filDGE DUN1N:

So it's not an affidavit of Holli Telford ...

MS. TELFORD : It is an Affidavit of Holli Telford ...
filDGE DUNN :

in Opposition to Smith County's Motion To Dismiss And Motion
For Summary Judgment. ..

MS TELFORD :

Hold on. It's an Affidavit of Holli Telford In Opposition to
Defendant Smith County, and the date on it is August 1st_

Thats

Smith County, Gary Barner, blah, blah, blah.
filDGE DL1NN :

So your signature subscription is sworn to July l8 1h 2011?
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MS. TELFORD :

Yes and attached to that document is 17 exhibits. Thats what I'm
questioning is that the attachments have been deleted from the
record.

WDGE DUNN : Well there are three exhibits attached to that affidavit in the
official court file.
MS. TELFORD : Well then, the other records have been removed then.
WDGE DU1'J'N : Well let's not make accusations.
MS TELFORD:

Well, Sir I'm going to make the accusations

JUDGE DlJNN:

No you're not going to make the accusations

MS. TELFORD :

because I know I filed it that way and I saved it pdf.

JUDGE

DlJ~'N

: Wait a minute. You can make whatever accusations you want.
I'm not going to make judgments today as to your accusations.
So your wasting your time. If your going to simply accuse
somebody of taking documents out of a court file. You have
no proof of that. I'm not accepting that.

I simply telling you

that. .. I'm telling you whats in the court file right now.

MS. TELFORD :
WDGE DUNN :

MS. TELFORD :

Okay. I do have proof.
Whats in the court file has three exhibits attached.
I do have proof because I have the actual record that was
emailed to Diane. And it has all exhibits attached to it. And

in addition, if you go into the clerk's affidavit it goes up to 11
exhibits attached to it. On the last page, the signature page
talks about exhibit "11 ", page 7 of the affidavit talks about
exhibit "10".

So the Affidavit refers to 11 exhibits. So if

you look at page 8, page 7 of that affidavit its referring to
exhibit "9" its referring to exhibit "IO''.
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So if you've only got

three exhibits attached to it, where are the rest of the exhibits?
JUDGE DUNN :

Can you tell me whether or not, an order had been entered at
the time that this was submitted , you say was approximately
July 181h and it's filed stamped August 1'1, which allowed you
to make filings by email?

MS. TELFORD: Your honor didn't disclude me from doing that until after I was
arrested on the second felony charges. Because that was a
material defense in my criminal case, which by the way ended
up getting the criminal case dismissed with prejudice because
one of my defenses was severe prosecutorial misconduct with
record tampering.
JUDGE DlJ]\'N : Well. Answer my question. \Vas there an order entered which
allowed you to make filings by email at the time you submitted
this affidavit. Yes or no.

MS. TELFORD : You did not enter the order disallowing the filing of emails
until after I was arrested in November.
JUDGE DlJJ\'N :

Well, then answer this question. Do the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure allow you to make filings my email ?

MS. TELFORD :

They allow service by email under rule 5.

JUDGE DlTN'N :

Do they allow filings into the court record by email without
a court order?

MS TELFORD :

It just says service. So whether or not you want to include

that as service upon the court, is a broad term. But it says
that service under rule 5 can be done electronically.
JUDGE DlJJ\'N :

Well tell me this.

What exhibits do you claim are material to
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your appeal, that you think have not been included in the
record.

MS. TELFORD : The ones that have not been, not think - I know, that have
not been included in the record is, a redemption deed that
was executed by Judge Joel Baker in Texas after this case was
filed. It was prepared and authored by the law offices of
Purdue, which is one of the defendants in the action, uh
Purdue, Brandon, Felder and Collins, to obstruct my access to
the property and to basically support the theft claim that I
advanced later on in the case after I found out that they had
stolen everything.

That Deed is not in there. The letter from

Lois Mosley indicating that I could go onto to the property
and improve it and that her sale to me was final and
conclusive, is not in there. There are over, one, two, three,
four, five, six, seven, right, nine emails that were sent to me
that are not included in there and I brought the paper record to
those. There is an email from the law offices that were
handling the sale which is Linebarger, Googan, Blair and
Sampson indicating that they were going to send me the
deeding documents.

Those are critical records because one of

the arguments I am making up on appeal is that this court
acquired jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over all of the
defendants as part of a RICO conspiracy to deprive me and
others of assets that were depleted in the state of Idaho. I
contend those documents are extremely relevant and I do have
like I said, photocopies that I ran off just before I appeared to
the court today.

Those should be in the record.

JUDGE DlJ1'.1N: Well and I do note in the file, it's not a filed document. I do note

that there is placed in the file. A document which is similar to your
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affidavit file stamped August 1si, 2011 which apparently you had
brought to the clerk. There's a note provided by the clerk. No,
there's a note from ... attached to this document is a copy of a note
from somebody... do you know who wrote that (Judge Dunn talking
to clerk Skidmore)
SKIDMORE:
JUDGE DUNN :

Yea, One of the other clerks ...
One of the other clerks wrote a note and attached it to this document,
I dont know when it was supplied, stating this is a copy Holli L
brought in to be switched with your faxed copies, and I dont know
when this was submitted. This is a duplicate of the affidavit to

which certain exhibits are attached, and frankly, many of the
things you have identified as supposedly, that were supposed to
be to that, are attached to this. There are some photographs and
a written statement signed by Jamie Flores, and there is the supposed
check you made to Gary Barber, and there is a letter of approval

from America First, there are a couple of emails from Debra
Milling, there is the letter from Lois Mosley.. .
MS. TELFORD :

Is the email from Debra Milling . .. does it say this document will
becoming from Charlene Fugler at our office and you can
acknowledge that you have received the document?

JUDGE Dffi'.<'N : Yes.
MS. TELFORD :

Okay. That's the deeding documents. Okay that's in there. The
letter from Lois Mosley is in there. How about the emails?

JUDGE DlJ1\TN :

Well, these are what you submitted. These are documents that you
apparently provided. Only the faxed document has the official file
stamp. This is the one you say you sent by email.

MS. TELFORD:

mumbled.

Do you have this deed. This Deed should have been in
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there as well. (mumbling)
TIJDGE DlJ1\1N :

Bunch of photographs, ... I know what you want. (quits looking in
the record ). Alright. Mr Adams, and response to this particular
issue.

MR ADAMS : Yes your honor. Originally, I did not file an objection to Ms.
Telford's request that the record be augmented. I thought she was
referring to documents that had been actually filed with the court . I
thought she was asking that the official record from the record be
augmented. (Mum bing) If shes asking for additional documents that
are not officially in the record, I do have an objection. Because I dont
know what your talking about. I just wanted to make sure that I had
what the court had. If I am missing something, I apologize because I
thought she was just asking for an official update from the court. I'm
concerned that we are going to have documents in front of the
Supreme Court that are not officially filed in this court. My
contention is that if that's what she wants to do is add additional
records, I think the proper way to do that would be to do a motion for
augmentation of the record before the Supreme Court as opposed to
just an objection to this point. Because it sounds like she not asking
for the documents officially in the court record but for additional
records to be added.

If I'm wrong, if she's just asking for

augmentation of what was officially filed into the record, I dont want
to argue about it, I just want to move forward. Im fairly confident
about the content of the official record because I would always check
with Diane and make sure I got my records. So I dont want to argue
about that. If its something new than I do object. It should probably
be done a different way., your honor. One other comment, with
respect to filing by email, there has never been a latter from the
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court authorizing filing by email. Nonetheless, were past that point
and its not worth bring that up now.
JUDGE DlJNN:

Remind me, I havent look for that, uh the date of the order when I
entered allowing filing by email.

MR. ADAMS :

There was no order to that extent. I'm actually looking at the
repository right now and I dont see anything saying filing by email
can be allowed. Like I said, I think we're past the point of arguing
about that is worthwhile. I prefer to get the record settled and just
move forward.

JUDGE DUN'N:

I agree. You say I entered an order allowing filing by email, when
was that?

MS. TELFORD:

Your honor. I'm sure Diane remembers you telling her that, because
she told me I couldn't email anymore documents to her.

JUDGE DUNN:
MS. TELFORD:

Do you remember not allowing it? (Talking to Diane.)
You were not allowing anymore documents to be emailed to the court.

SKIDMORE :

I dont remember.

JUDGE DlJN'N :

Okay. Very well.

MS. TELFORD:

Your honor, I did copy the gmail that I had sent to counsel. And as
you know to copy something from an original file using pdf
software, theres no way that can be forged. (PDF software does not
allow alteration to the presenrd pdf file.). So I did copy the gmail with
counsel receiving the documents, again that were earlier filed as the
July documents.

So these documents were sent to counsel that I am

seeking to augment in the record. So if they dont have a stamp on it
and the stamped document in the court's file missing the exhibits
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is the only one that goes up to the Supreme Court, part of the
procedure for augmenting a file to the Supreme Court is that you've got
to prove that the document was filed with a stamp on it in the lower
court. So if the document that I hand delivered to the clerk has more
exhibits attached to it than the file stamped document, and theres no
stamp on it, then I couldn't use that document to augment it to the
Supreme Court. So this court is going to have to decide that issue now
because these documents by the court's own admissions were
submitted. And as well, there was an audiorecording on Lois Mosley
because I recorded her phone conversations. That was submitted to the
court and also submitted to counsel as an attachment by email.
JUDGE DlJl'."'N : Well, my ruling is this. I'm a new ruling. The ruling is that the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow filing by email. And that as a
result of that an attempted filing of documents by email is not
permitted and is not part of this clerk's record. And so, you can have
any document. .. Heres my ruling. Any document you want thats in
the official clerk's record, that is file stamped as having been filed
and received by the clerk can be included in the clerks record on
appeal. No other document will be allowed.
MS. TELFORD:

Your honor. I would object ...

JUDGE DlTh"'N : Thats my ruling.
MS. TELFORD : under rule 10. Because if the document has been grafted, or lost or
however want to phrase it from that file, to obstruct my case, then
I'm entitled to have that document re-introduced into the record.
JUDGE

DlJ1~"'N

: Take it up with the Idaho Supreme Court.

MS TELFORD : I want a copy of this CD. And I would also like to ask the court at
the county's cost to provde a transcript of this CD.
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JUDGE DlJNN:

Your motion is denied. So that anything that is not in the official
clerks record with a stamp on it, will not be included in the clerk's
record . Any document that either party wishes to have included in the
clerks record, which has been filed in the clerks record and which is
not included in the clerks record,

than that will be allowed.

MS. TELFORD: Okay, how about the document that doesn't have a date stamp on it.
JlJDGE

DU1'1~

: Would you please let me finish Ms. Telford. Any objection. Mr.
Adams. I'm simply going to make a ruling. Based on the statements
you've already made, any objection that has been made by the
defendant to documents or requests that they be removed from the
clerks record, will not be removed. They will be allowed to be
included.

MS. TELFORD : Your honor. How about the document that was not date stamped that
has the additional exhibits that we just earlier discussed. But its not
date stamped. It needs to be date stamped.
JUDGE

DU1'1~:

Why does it have to be date stamped. You simply brought it to the
court ...

MS TELFORD

Because I cant augment it in unless she does a supplemental record
and introduces that in a supplemental clerks record and numbers it,
because it's not date stamped. So I cant go up to the Supreme
Court and ask them to supplement it into the supreme court record
because it has no date stamp, but it's in the clerk's file with the
documents claimed missing.

I personally believe that everything

should be filed electronically because it prevents court officials
from messing with files.
JUDGE DUNN :

Well it's coming.

MS. TELFORD : And I hail the day it does because PACER in the federal system
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makes it a lot harder to commit fraud by an attorney, and if
pro se ECF filing, a court official.

And she has the CD recording

that was sent to counsel and to her and I need that entered into the
record too, so that the CD can be submitted to the Idaho Supreme
Court as well on contacts with Lois Mosley for voice identification
purposes.

Lois Mosley was the selling officer of the property

in question in Texas. I need a stamp in order to augment into
the Supreme Court.
JUDGE DlJNN :

I'm looking at rule 30 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

ATTY ADAMS : I am too your honor.
JUDGE DlJNN : And what it says is the parties may move the Supreme Court, to
augment or delete from the clerk or agency record, must be
accompanied by a statement setting forth the specific grounds and
attaching a copy of any document sought to be augmented to the
original motion, with two copies of the motion, which document must
have a legible filing stamp of the clerk indicating the date of it's filing
or the moving party must establish by citation to the record or
transcript that the document was presented to the district court. Thats
the rule that applies here. And that motion has to go to the Idaho
Supreme Court. I dont see anything here that requires this court to
rule on that preliminarily.
MS. TELFORD : It does state that it has to have a stamp on it correct.
JUDGE DUNN : It says that it has to have a stamp on it or, listen, or the moving party
must establish by citation to the record or transcript, that the
document was presented to the district court. So you've got to
establish either a file stamp or citation to the record. There is no.
MS TELFORD : Well...
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JUDGE Dill\TN:

You've got to let me talk. Please quit interupting me. There is no
way that I can have the clerk file stamp something that nobody knows
when it was brought in. I can file stamp it today, do you want that.
I'll allow that, then you can present it to the Idaho Supreme Court and
make whatever argument you wish as to why you think the record
should be augmented with these documents. But nobody knows when
this so called document was filed. This document was allegedly
presented to the clerk as a substitute for some document that is
officially file stamped and does not have the same number of exhibits.
There is no way I know when this was done. So I cant file stamp it at
some past date that no one knows when it was. I cant do that. If you
want to try and augment this record, with this document, fine we'll file
stamp it today and you can make your argument before the Supreme
Court. I don't care what you do relative to that and they can make their
decision. They make the decision as to whether the official clerk's
record is or is not augmented. I don't make that decision.

MS. TELFORD:

Can I testify when I came in and brought that document. Because
I didn't fax the pictures because they wouldn't have been competent
images.

JUDGE DlJl\TN:

You can submit an affidavit supporting your request to augment this
record.

MS. TELFORD:

Okay, I'll submit that by tommorrow morning.

JUDGE DlJNN : But as for the ruling today, my obejctive here and my authority is to
determine whether or not anything that is officially in the clerk's record
and has a file stamp should be added or deltered from the clerk's record .
My ruling on that issue today is, that anything either side wants that is
officially part of this record may be included in the clerk's record.
Anything that is an objection or any request that anything be deleted
15

from the clerk's record is denied as to both parties. That's my ruling.
MS. TELFORD :

Your honor, one last thing on that matter. I can attest to the court today
that since the criminal proceedings were terminated,

I have not been

in the court or at the clerks office with exception on three or four
occassions where I was making payments on the restitution fee which I
am presently proceeding with a federal habeas corpus on, or not
restitution fees, but the fines in the criminal delay case. So I have not
brought in any records for this case since before I was arrested in
November of 2011 because I was on a restricted bond which provided
that I could not contact anybody in this county, otherwise I would be
thrown back in jail where they deprive me of my blood pressure
medications and I suffer another stroke.

Be that as it may, I have not

filed anything in this record. So with that in mind, that representation
made to the court in mind, that document with the clerks handwriting
on it had to have been in the record before I was arrested on November
21, 2011, in preparation for the hearing that was supposed to be
conducted in this case on November 21, 2011, because that hearing was
taken of calander because I was arrested by Semrad right aside the
courtroom door in appearance for that hearing.
JlJDGE DlJ1,i"'N :

So whats your point.

MS. TELFORD :

My point is that the document, you don't know when the document was
submitted. It had to have been brought in, or when it was submitted to
the clerk, it had to have been submitted before that date.

JUDGE DUNN :

Well thats your argument. Make your argument to the Idaho Supreme
Court because I can't augment the record with a document that has not
been officially filed. I don't have the authority to do that.

MS. TELFORD :

Well you said I could file an affidavit of augmentation and your going
to file stamp it today right.
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JUDGE DUNN

I'm going to file stamp it when it's filed. I'm not going to fi)e stamp it,
the clerks going to file stamp it when it's filed. That's not today. Its
whenever you said you were going to do it. You said you would do it
by tommorrow.

MS. TELFORD :

Okay.

rn file the affidavit of augmentation and I'll attach the missing

exhibits to my affidavit.
JUDGE DUNN : Just file your affidavit. Whatever argument you want. Make your
argument to the Idaho Supreme Court because they can augment the
record, and if they chose to do so, then they chose to do so. That's not
my decision. My role today is to decide what goes into the clerk's
record and what doesn't as of today.

Tra~scriber's Certificate
I, STEVEN FRITTS, bonded transcriptionist and notary for the State of Utah,
in and for the County of Salt Lake, DO HEREBY CERTIFY ON MY BOND that I am
authorized to take and give oaths in the state of Utah, that I received the electronic
recording of the hearing of the proceedings herein described, which was heard on
October 9, 2012, before the Honorable Stephen Dunn, Sixth Judicial District Judge for
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Oneida, that I transcribed said tape into
typewriting, and that the within and foregoing constitutes and is a full, true and correct
copy of the transcript of said evidence and proceedings, said transcript consisting of
Seventeen (17) pages.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF WYOMING
CASPER DIVISION

Case No. 2012· CV .. 280-S

MARTI LUNDAHL
Plaintiff

Plaintiffs Motion For A Declaratory
Decree Finding The March 17, 2004
Utah District Court NAR Attorneys
Fees Judgment And The April 3,

vs.

2003 Utah Supreme Court Civil
Contempt And Attorneys Fees
Judgment, Both Entered Against
Holli Lundahl VOID As A Matter
Of Law And To Vacate Same

AMERICAN BANKERS INSURANCE
COMPANY OF FLORIDA, INC

To be heard by an impartial tribunal

Defendants

This Court Has Sua Sponte Jurisdiction To Vacate VOID
Judgments That Encumber A Record
COMES NOW Plaintiff and files this motion for declaratory decree finding the
March 17, 2004 Utah District Court NAR Attorneys fees Judgment and the April 3, 2003
Utah Supreme Court Civil Contempt and Attorney Fees Judgment referenced in this
court's February 27, 2013 OSC,

void as a matter of !aw,

and to thereby vacate these

judgments under this court's sua sponte inherent powers to not permit void judgments to
encumber a record.
The Wyoming Supreme Court held in re Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 745 (Wyo.
08/09/1965) : "The provisions of WY Stat § 1-325, are irrelevant when the Plaintiff
seeks to vacate a

wholly void for lack of jurisdiction, 30A Am.Jur., §
1

p.
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659. The power of a court to vacate a void judgment
independent of any statutory authority.

regarded as inherent and

A Court will not permit a void judgment

to encumber a record and will vacate the ineffectual entry thereof on application at
any time. 49 C.J.S. Judgments§ 267, pp. 480-481.

A void judgment is not binding.

It confers no rights and equitable relief is mandated

to prevent harm

resulting from the fact that the judgment appears or purports to be valid.
A.LI. Restatement, Judgments,§ 117, p. 565 (1942).
Attached hereto as exhibit "1" is an authenticated copy of the Void NAR
judgment

Attached hereto as exhibit "2" is an authenticated copy of the Void Civil

Contempt Judgment entered by the Utah Supreme Court. Both void judgments are now
being filed with this Court to attack impending contempt charges against Plaintiff.

INTRODUCTION
Void Judgments Are Subject To Collateral Attack Under
The Declaratory Judgment Act If They Are Prima Facially
Void And They Are Presented For The Purpose Of Inflicting
Harm Against A Party To The Case
The State of Texas recently decided a case where the

Plaintiff in the action

collaterally attacked a void judgment in an offensive maneuver in re Wagner v. D'Lorm,

315 S.W.3d 188 (Tex.App. Dist.3 2010).

Here,

judgment against the Plaintiff in another court.

the Defendant had obtained a void

Plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment

act case in the jurisdiction of his choosing to collaterally attack the void judgment.

The

Defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
asserting that because plaintiff did not seek relief before the court that rendered the
judgment, Plaintiff could not seek collateral relief in a foreign court. The Court of appeals
rejected the Defendant's claim and granted Plaintiff full relief.

The analysis of that court

was as follows:

Appellant Ronald R. Wagner sued appellees Roberto D'Lorm and
Edward P. Dancause in Travis County district court seeking a
declaration that a default judgment previously obtained by D'Lorm and
his attorney, Dancause, against Wagner in a Zapata County district
court was void. D'Lorm filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting that the trial
court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to declare void the judgment
another district court. Wagner moved for summary
on
claim.
trial court granted O'_Lorm's
to the
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jurisdiction and denied summary judgment for Wagner, finding summary
judgment "improper" for jurisdictional reasons.
In a single issue on appeal, Wagner asserts that the trial court
erred in granting D'Lorm's plea to the jurisdiction and in denying his
motion for summary judgment because the Zapata County default
judgment was void and, therefore, could be collaterally attacked in
another court We will reverse the trial court's order and remand the cause
for further proceedings.
Analysis:
in his sole point of error, Wagner asserts that the trial court erred
when it granted D'Lorm's plea to the jurisdiction and denied his motion for
summary judgment. Wagner contends that he mounted a valid collateral
attack on the Zapata County judgment by alleging facts showing that the
judgment was void because the Zapata County court lacked jurisdiction over
him as he was not named a party to that suit. Wagner asserts that "because
the [Zapata County] judgment is and was void ... it could be collaterally
attacked in any court." D'Lorm counters that Wagner failed to properly
emp!oy the options available to him to challenge the Zapata County
judgment. Citing McEwen v. Harrison, 345 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1961 ), D'Lorm
contends that Wagner should have filed a bill of review in the Zapata
County district court that rendered the default judgment.
Because
Wagner failed to file a bill of review in Zapata County during the time
allowed, D'Lorm asserts that he has "waived any rights to attack the
[default] judgment."
The Travis County Di$trict Court's Sl!Qj_ect-Matter Jurisdiction
In this appeal from the grant of D'Lorm's plea to the jurisdiction on the
pleadings, our task is to decide whether Wagner has pleaded sufficient
jurisdictional facts to invoke the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, using a
liberal construction of his pleadings. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. In his
petition, Wagner alleged that the Zapata County default judgment is void
because he was not named as a party to the prior lawsuit resulting in a
judgment against Wagner.
A judgment is void, and thus may be collaterally attacked, if the
rendering court had "no jurisdiction over a party or his property, no jurisdiction
of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no
capacity to act as a court." Austin lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495
S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex. 1973); see also Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336,
346 (Tex. 2005) (same); Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex.
1990) (orig. proceeding) (same). Ely v. United States Coal & Coke Co .. 243
Ky. 725, 49 S.W.2d 1021; McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 37 S.Ct. 343, 61
L.Ed. 608 (1917). L.R.A 1917F, 458; Restatement of the Law of Judgments,
§§ 6, 8, and 117; 1 Freeman on Judgments, §§ 226, 228, and 339. For a
court to have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the defendant must be
amenable to the jurisdiction of the court and the plaintiff must have invoked
that jurisdiction by valid service of process on the defendant. Kawasaki Steel
Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex. 1985). This Court has also
held that a judgment may be collaterally attacked because of "fundamental
error."
Dep't of Transp. v. T. Brown Constructors, !nc., 947 S.W.2d
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659 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, pet. denied). Fundamental error occurs where
"the record shows the court lacked jurisdiction or that the pub!ic interest is
directly or adversely affected as that interest is declared in the statutes or the
Constitution of Texas." Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982). A
court's rendition of judgment against a party not named in the suit is
fundamental error. Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex. 1991 ).
Here, Wagner pleaded that he was neither named as a party nor
served with process. If true, that would mean that the Zapata County district
court committed fundamental error by rendering judgment against Wagner
because he was not a party, see id. The default judgment rendered against
him would be void and subject to collateral attack. See Austin !ndep. Sch.
Dist., 495 S.W.2d at 881.
The phrase "jurisdictional power" means
"'jurisdiction over the subject matter, the power to hear and determine
cases of the general class to which the particular one belongs."'
Middleton v. Murph, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. 1985) (quoting Deen v. Kirk,
508 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tex. 1974)).
D'Lorm asserts that, because the Zapata County court had subjectmatter jurisdiction in that case and the time for filing an appeal from that
judgment has expired, Wagner's only remedy "to attack" the judgment was a
proceeding in the nature of a bill of review. We disagree. The purpose of a
direct attack is to change the former judgment and secure the entry of a
correct judgment Austin lndep. Sch. Dist., 495 S.W.2d at 881. Here, Wagner
does not seek to "correct" the Zapata County judgment, nor does he seek to
"change" it and secure entry of a "correct judgment" in lieu thereof. Wagner
brought his attack in a different court from the one that rendered the
judgment under attack. Wagner's attack here is properly classified as
collateral, not direct. This Court has held that, in a collateral attack, the
challenger must show in the record that the judgment was obtained without
jurisdiction. Narvaez v. Maldonado, 127 S.W.3d 313, 317-18 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.). Alfonso v. Skadden, 251 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tex. 2008)
("'In order for a collateral attack to be successful the record must affirmatively
reveal the jurisdictional defect."' (quoting White v. White, 179 S.W.2d 503, 506
(Tex. 1944))). See also Browning, 698 S.W.2d at 363 (appeal from declaration
rendered by one court declaring judgment of another court void is collateral
attack); Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Albright, 87 S.W.2d 1092, 1096 (Tex. 1935)
(attack on judgment of one court in another court is collateral attack);
In light of the foregoing, we hold that Wagner's pleadings were sufficient
to give the trial court subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate his claims for
declaratory relief. The court therefore erred when it granted D'Lorm's plea to
the jurisdiction. We sustain that portion of Wagner's issue on appeal.
We hold that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and
consider Wagner's declaratory judgment suit. We therefore reverse the
district court's dismissal order and remand the cause to that court for further
proceedings.
Likewise, with respect to contempt/injunction orders unconstitutionally obtained.
The

Court held in Baker v. Gen Motors Corp,

4

U.S. 222, 234-36, n 9; 118
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S Ct 657; 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998) ("if the

st.ate injunction order was not

constitutionally obtained, full faith and credit cannot be accorded that judgment in

the forum where that judgment comes at issue.

Accord in Chapman v. Krutonog,

No. 8214451 (Cal.App. Dist. 2010); Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc. (2002} 29
Cal 4th 697, 708 .

Void judgments are never given credit. Prather v. Loyd, 86 Idaho 45,

50, 382 P.2d 910, 915 (1963) ("[a] void judgment is a nullity, and no rights can be
based thereon; it can be set aside on motion or can be collaterally attacked at any

time.").

Other courts have also held that full faith and credit applies equally to equity

decrees as it does money judgments.

McElroy v. McElroy, 256 A.2d 763 (Del.Ch.1969);

Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 92 N.J. Super. 18, 222 A.2d 120 (App.Div.1966); Miller v.
Miller, Supra ; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 102 (1971); 50 C.J.S.
Judgments § 889 h. (1947).

"Full faith and credit extends to foreign equity decrees or

money judgments which order an in personam payment of money or conveyance of
property to another.

Varone v. Varone, 359 F2d 769 (7th Cir.1966); Rozan v. Rozan, 49

Cai.2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Ivey v. Ivey, 183 Conn. 490,
Weesner v. Weesner,

439 A2d 425 (1981);

168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682 (1959); Higginbotham v.

Higginbotham, supra; Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws§ 102 comment d (1971)
While the judgments at issue here are not against Plaintiff,

both the Defendant

and this court are seeking to enforce them against Plaintiff as an alter ego of Holli.
Irrespective that the concurrently filed affidavit of Marti Lundahl establishes as a matter of
fact and law that Holli and Marti are different persons,

it is Plaintiff's position that the void

judgments directed against Holli should be declared void so as not to impact plaintiff any
further in this or any other proceeding in which plaintiff may become a party. Furthermore,
the age of the judgments being attacked bears no consequence.

See United States v.

One Toshiba Color TV, 213 F3d 147, 157 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting if a final judgment is void,

"no passage of time can transmute [it] into a binding judgment".).

Uncontroverted Facts Rendering Both Judgments Void Ab lnitio
1.

ln March of 2002, a dispute arose concerning a $100 balance due on

the Respondent's collective family's dental account - when the dental service (installing
a cap) had not

been completed.

The dentist assessed

the Lundahls,

surcharge on the debt - in violation of the usury laws. A check was tendered to

5

a 30%
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dentist for $100, the actual amount of the dental bill. The Lundahls refused to pay the
30% surcharge.

The dentist sent the check to a collection agency, NAR Inc., who

assessed Kelli Lundahl another 30% collection fee.

The actions of the dentist and NAR

inc violated both the usury laws of the state of Utah,

Utah's Consumer Protection Act,

and the Federal Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act
2.

On March 9, 2002,

North American Recovery Services Inc. aka "NAR",

through their attorney Olson caused the Lundahls to be served with a dunning letter and
a small claims complaint, both documents which demanded $597.21 to avoid the small
claims action and ruination of Kelli Lundahl's credit. (See exhibit "3" attached for dunning
letter and complaint.).

3.

Kelii had 20 days to respond.

Ten days later, on March 19, 2002, Kelli asked Holli to deliver a check to

NAR for the full amount demanded in the complaint in order to mitigate any damages to
Kelli's credit which was paramount to a pending commercial transaction.

On the bottom

of the check, Kelli wrote that the check was being paid under duress because of extortion
threats made against Kelli's credit.

Holli personally delivered the check to OLSON at

Olson's law offices in Salt Lake, which also was the offices for NAR Inc.
attached for this check

(See exhibit "4"

bearing the disclaimer and the canceled side

of the check

showing that the check was negotiated on March 19, 2002, as soon as it was tendered to
Olson on behalf of his business NAR Inc.).

At the time of delivery,

Holli obtained a

promise from Olson to dismiss the state small claims action as moot

The check

cleared Olson/NAR's account on March 21, 2002.
4.

Instead of dismissing the complaint,

6 days after Olson had negotiated

the payment on behalf of his company NAR, Inc. (North American Recovery Services,
Inc.). Olson authored and filed a certificate of default against Kelli Lundahl on March 27,
2002 without notice, and 30 minutes later appeared before the judge ex parte and
obtained a default judgment for

three times the whole amount claimed in the

complaint and in the dunning letter. (Refer back to Ex. "3" attached for the dunning
letter and complaint.).

The Default judgment claimed $671.69 against Kelli Lundahl and

$444.60 against John Behle, the latter who did not
and was never served any process.

owed no debt

(See exhibit "5" attached for default and default

judgment.).
5.

NAR subsequently reported

default judgment

6

Kelli's credit
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report in the amount of $1, 116;
transaction.

thus interfering with Kelli's pending commercial

(See Exhibit "6" attached for this false report made against Kelli's credit

report.) Kelli learned of the false reporting when she was denied credit in her pending
commercial transaction.

6.

Kelli

subsequently filed a motion to vacate the default judgment based:

(a) on fraud upon the court by attorney Olson, (b) because the judgment was void for lack

of a case or controversy at the time the judgment was entered, and (c) because the
default judgment was for three times the amount pleaded in the complaint in violation of
URCP rule 54(c).

On May 29, 2002, Judge Fratto vacated the default judgment but did

not sanction his friend attorney Olson for the fraud that was comitted. (See exhibit "7"
attached for vacation order.).

Olson nevertheless kept the false report on Kelli's credit

report thus s ustaining an unlawful debt collection violation as a matter of law.
7.

Kelli shortly thereafter,

sued NAR for violations of the Fair Debt

Collection Practice Act and Utah's Consumer Protection Practices Act.
filed her counterclaim,

Kem paid a separate filing fee and jury fee.

At

time Kelli

Keili caused the

counterclaim to be immediately served upon NAR through it's registered agent, Attorney
Olson.
8.

After Attorney Olson received service of

appeared before the clerk's office on June 17, 2002,

Kelli's complaint, Olson

removed Kelli's Counterclaim

from the court's file and then filed a motion to dismiss the collection case with prejudice
as settled between the parties.

The face of the motion bore no notice to the Lundahls

nor was it signed by Kelli Lundahl.

{See first part of exhibit "8" attached}

The next

day, Attorney Olson again met ex parte with Judge Fratto and colluded with this judge to
sign an order to dismiss the case with prejudice - completely disregarding notice and
hearing rules for the state of Utah.

Moreover, Kelli was wholly unaware of any motion to

dismiss the case and had never negotiated to settle any claims against NAR.

(See

second part of exhibit "8" attached for the order dismissing Kelli's case with prejudice on
June 18, 2002, without Kelli's knowledge.).
9.

Kelli

learned about the dismissal when she appeared at the clerks'

office to file an amended counterclaim with Holli as the assignee of al! claims.

Kelli filed

another motion to vacate the dismissal order based upon yet another fraud upon the court
by atty Olson.

Kelli also asked that Fratto be recused for twice violating the

7

of
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conduct for judges.
Judge Lubeck.

Judge

did recuse and the NAR case was

On June 6, 2002,

re-assigned to

Judge Lubeck issued an order which raised concern

about file tampering given the removal of Kelli's counter-complaint from the court's file.
Judge Lubeck vacated Judge Fratto's dismissal order and instructed Kelli to file another
copy of her counter-claim complaint with the court.

(See exhibit "9" attached for Lubeck's

order vacating the dismissal order and instructing the clerk to reconstruct the court file with
Kelli's missing pleadings.).

Attorney Olson was never disciplined for his conduct

irregardless of Kelli's numerous petitions that he be so disciplined.

1

Kelli assigned all

claims to Holli as another ob!igor of the debt and because the chose in actions in Kelli's
counter-claim complaint were assignable under the law.
10.

2

After Judge Lubeck's order reinstating the case,

attorney Olson

arranged to have the case unilaterally transferred to another judge, Judge Quinn, who
was ver1 good friends with O!son.

3

After the transfer to Judge Quinn's court,

Olson

grafted Holli's Amended counterclaim from the court file leaving Kelli's reconstructed
counterclaim complaint as the operative complaint

1. It is well-settled that courts have the authority to direct investigation into an
attorney's license where necessary to protect the public. See id.; In re Ruffalo , 390 U.S.
544, 550 (1968) Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957); Ex parte Wall, 107
U.S. 265, 288-89 (1882).
2.
Chose in actions are generally assignable. Capps v. FIA Card Servs.,
N.A., Docket No. 35891 (Idaho Supreme Court Oct. 2010). McCluskey v. Galland, 95
Idaho 472, 474-75, 511 P.2d 289, 291-92 (1973). An assignment may be done in such a
way to be construed as a complete sale of the claim. 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignment § 147
(1999). An assignment of the chose in action transfers to the assignee and divests the
assignor of all control and right to the cause of action, and the assignee becomes the real
party in interest. McCluskey, 95 Idaho at 474, 511 P.2d at 291. Only the assignee may
prosecute an action on the chose in action. Id. Assignment" is defined as "the transfer of
rights or property."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 115 (7th ed. 1999). American
Jurisprudence, Second Edition, defines "assignment" as: a transfer of property or some
other right from one person (the 'assignor') to another (the 'assignee'), which confers a
complete and present right in the subject matter to the assignee.
See also England v.
Mg Investments, Inc., 93 F.Supp.2d 718 (S.D. W. Va., 2000) (Fair Debt Collection Practice
and RICO claims are assignable and the assignee takes subject to all the defenses and
al! the equities which could have been set up against the instrument in
hands of the
assignor at the time of the assignment.")
3.
See Repub!ic Royalty Co. v.
931 S.W.2d 338, 342 (Tex. App.-Corpus
once a lawsuit has been randomly
Christi 1996) (... "cases should not be transferred
"'"'<01 "'''"'n to a particular court. Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Alonso, 941 S.W.2d
290 (Tex.

8
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When

Holli !earned

about

the

grafting

of

her amended complaint,

she filed a

mandatory intervention motion under rule 24(a) given all claims before the court had been
assigned to Holli.

Hom supported her intervention motion with a stamped copy of her

First Amended Counterclaim which had been purloined from the record by NAR's counsel
after the transfer from Judge Lubeck's court.
11.

NAR summarily opposed Holli's intervention motion by self servingly

asserting that Kelli had not assigned her claims.

In her response,

Hom provided the

court with Kelli's assignment contract dated June 11, 2002.
12.

When the correct amount of time had passed,

separate notices to submit for decision to Judge Quinn.
notices to submit for decision. Accordingly,

Holli then filed two

Judge Quinn ignored Holli's

Holli filed a mandamus writ as authorized

under Utah law pursuant to Barnard v. Murphy, 852 P.2d 1023 (Utah App. 1993)
commanding Judge Quinn to address her notices to submit for decision.
13.

In the interim,

4

Judge Quinn compelled the assignor Kelli to appear at

App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ). Allowing arbitrary transfers "undermine[s] the random
assignment system within the courts and encourage[s] improper forum or judge shopping by the
parties" ... "); See also McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1983){vio!ation
of the random selection process .... renders the entire process null and void as Congress intended
the random selection process "to be absolute to avoid any bacterium of impugnment" ).
4.
See Barnard v. Murphy, 852 P.2d 1023 (Utah App. 1993) (We grant the writ and
direct judge Murphy to act on Barnard's notices to submit for decision.). "Mandamus is the
highest judicial writ and is issued only when there is a specific right to be enforced, a positive duty
to be performed, and no other specific remedy.n Littlefield v. Williams 343 S.C. 212, 540 S.E.2d 81
(2000); Willimon v. Greenville, 243 S.C. 82, 132 S.E.2d 169 (1963). A party seeking mandamus
relief must show that (1) the trial court had a legal duty to act, (2) there was a demand for
performance, and (3) there was a refusal to act Wang v. Chertoff, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 23146
(D. Idaho Mar. 23, 2009); Stoner v. Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex.1979). The Idaho Supreme
Court has held that mandamus is the proper remedy for one seeking to require a pyblic officer to
carry out a dearly mandated ministerial act which is not discretionary. Cowles Pub!'g Co. v.
Magistrate Court, 118 Idaho 753, 760, 800 P.2d 640, 647 (1990). Numerous courts have held that
where an official fails or refuses to rule on or decide matters before the court, mandamus is proper
to compel the official to perform his duties under the !aw. See Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906
(9th Cir. 2009) (Mandamus petition filed in the Ninth Circuit granted to compel the district court to
decide a petition that had been pending.); Sedighi v. Holder, No. 07-1881, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
56875 (D. Or. July 2, 2009) (The court found that agency officials did not adjudicate plaintiffs'
applications and ordered them to do so under its mandamus authority.); Chowdhury v. Siciliano,
No. 06-07132 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2008) {Mandamus proper to direct Magistrate to perform
ministerial duties); Elkhatib v. Bulger, No. 04-22407, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 60485 (S.D. Fla.
Mar.14, 2006) (mandamus granted to compel adjudications of claims before the court as in
violation of the procedural rule of speedy disposition of claims.).

9
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the summary judgment hearing to argue the claims belonging to Holli.
Quinn should have either dismissed

By law, Judge

action without prejudice or stayed the action until

Holli was installed as the true party in interest.

See Stank v. Jones, 404 P.2d 964, 17

Utah 2d 96 (1964) (Only the assignee may prosecute assigned chose in actions.).
Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT App 175 (1999).
14.

On January 12, 2003, Holli filed a mandamus Writ with the Utah Supreme

Court on the grounds that Judge Quinn refused to act on Holli's notices to submit for
decision re Holli's intervention motion.

Judge Quinn was immediately served with this

mandamus writ.
15.

On January 31, 2003, Holli filed chapter 13 bankruptcy. Thereupon, the

NAR lawsuit immediately became an asset of Holli's bankruptcy estate subject to the
automatic stay.

See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B) (2006). The debtor's estate includes "all

legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property," "wherever located and by whomever
hefd. Id.§ 541(a)(1).
16.

5

To moot this writ, on February 14, 2003, Judge Quinn entered a final

judgment in the state NAR action which addressed Hollis notices to submit for decision by
joining Holli to the state litigation as the assignee thereto and

thereafter sua sponte

dismissing Hollis counter - claims with prejudice without allowing Holli the opportunity

5.
"The stay applies to all attempts to obtain control over causes of action that
areproperty of a bankruptcy estate." 3 Collier on Bankruptcy~ 362.03[5], at 362-20, 21 (Lawrence
P. King ed., 15th ed. 1997) . See Young v. Repine, No. 06-20807. July 22, 2008 (5th Cir. 2008)
(The legal conclusions applied were: "Civil contempt proceedings are conducted to exact usually a
monetary penalty against the alleged contemnor. The monetary penalties reduce the value of
estate assets in the bankruptcy estate and are construed as an attempt to obtain control over
causes of action that are property of the bankruptcy's estate. As such, any non-bankruptcy court
contempt proceeding which seeks to create a debt against the debtor or to diminish the value of
estate assets, is strictly prohibited by the automatic stay of the bankruptcy code." In re Chaparro
Martinez, 293 B.R 387 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003); Foster v. Heitkemp, 670 F.2d 478 (5~~ Cir. 1982)
(The automatic stay provision remains in effect as concerns all acts attempting to gain control over
property of an estate. Any action endeavoring to obtain control over property of an estate ls void.).
Thus, "[a]ny action in which the judgment may diminish" an asset of the bankruptcy estate "is
unquestionably subject to a stay under this subsection." Concurring ln re Johns Manville Corp., 33
B.R. 254, 261 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)) ; In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d i 074, i 082 (9th Cir. 2002) ; And In
re Atkins, 176 BR 998, 1006 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994). The automatic stay as applied to a
bankruptcy estate does not terminate until a final order has
issued by a judge sitting in his
bankruptcy jurisdiction which disposes of the bankruptcy estate.

10
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adversarily litigate her claims.

6

Judge Quinn's action caused Holli's Mandamus Petition

to the Utah Supreme Court to be rendered moot See LOS ANGELES v. LYONS, 461
U.S. 95 (1983) (A Judge's or party's actions can cause intervening moot-ness to the
claims before the court.

When the actions moot the process, the process cannot be

deemed as frivolous.).

Judge Quinn's actions also invoked the protection of the

bankruptcy code given Holli's new status as an assignee defendant and counterclaim
plaintiff.

7

17.

Holli filed a timely rule 59 motion to attack the state judgment for due

process violations and additionally sought to amend her counter-complaint to allege new
allegations.

Holli also filed a motion to dismiss the Utah Supreme Court Writ proceeding

based on intervening mootness and because Holli was in chapter 13 bankruptcy. ( See
exhibit "11" attached for the motion to dismiss the Supreme Court Writ proceeding filed by
Holli.).

Shortly after Holli made the foregoing rule 59 filings,

Holli removed both the

state court action and the Utah Supreme Court writ action (which had not yet been
officially dismissed) to the bankruptcy court under the bankruptcy removal statute. This

6. See Cowen and Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109, 114 (Utah 1984)
(Judgments may be assigned); Same in Taylor v. American Fire And Cas. Co., 925 P.2d 1279
(Utah App.1996); Eiu Guam v. Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, 322 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 2003)
(where judgment has been assigned, assignor lacks standing to prosecute any post judgment
proceedings.); And International Transaction v. Emotelladora Agra!., 347 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2003)
(Where judgment has been assigned, assignor lacks standing to prosecute any post judgment
matters going to the competency
of the judgment.).
7.
See In re Seven Seas Petroleum, Inc., 522 F.3d 575 (5th. Cir., 2008) (The filing
of a bankruptcy petition creates an estate that is comprised of, among other things, "a!I legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. §
541 (a)(1 ).
The phrase "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property" has been
construed broadly, and includes "rights of action" addressed in lawsuits. See 1 David G. Epstein
et a!., Bankruptcy § 3-i 4, at 162 (1992) ("Section 362(a)(3) stays all actions, whether judicial or
private, that seek to obtain possession of property of the estate, or property from the estate, or to
exercise control over property of the estate. The trustee or debtor ln possession takes control of all
property of the estate. No entity, including a federal or state court, may exercise control over
the causes of action in an estate which represent direct injury to the debtor, unless and until
the trustee or debtor in possession files an affirmative petition seeking specified action, or unless
the court grants an order lifting the automatic stay pursuant to specific !imitations set forth in the
code.). "The stay applies to attempts to obtain control over causes of action that are property of the
ed., 15th ed. 1997);
estate. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy~ 362.03[5], at 362-20, 21 (Lawrence P.
!n re Chaparro Martinez, 293 B.R 387 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003); Foster v. Heitkemp, 670
478
(5th Cir. 1982).

11
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removal stripped the

courts of all further subject matter jurisdiction.

6

As shown in

exhibit "12" attached, the NAR case was assigned Bankruptcy removal case number 0302317.

The case wou!d later be withdrawn to the district

court under it's bankruptcy

jurisdiction and assigned case no. USDC-Utah 2:03-CV-1083.
18.

Nevertheless, on April 13, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court acting without

subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, in wholesale violation of due process, ex
parte and without notice,

entered a void civil contempt judgment against Holli directing

her to pay double attorneys fees and costs to the NAR litigants.

9

(See last page of exhibit

"2" attached, bracketed section for this order.).

19.

Furthermore, as shown on the face of the Utah Supreme Court contempt order,

there was no OSC issued nor served upon

Holli to advise Holli of any pending contempt

proceeding before the Utah Supreme Court ;

aside from the fact that the order exceeded the

four comers of the writ petition itself. 10

8.
See National Steam-Ship v. Tugman, 106 US 118, 1 S Ct 58, 27 L.Ed 87
(1882) (After removal, the duty of the state court was to proceed no further. Every order thereafter
made by that court was coram non judice, void.).
9.
The Writ action was directed against Judge Quinn, not NAR.
Hence any
attorneys fees incurred in the Writ action would have been incurred by Judge Quinn who mooted
the Writ action before any substantive response was made. Nevertheless, in Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990): the Supreme Court held that Rule 11 does not authorize a
district court to award an attorney's fee incurred in appellate proceedings. (a) The language of
Rule 11 limits sanctions to district court procedure only. Furthermore-- the Advisor/ Committee
Note suggests that Rule 11 cannot be used for awarding sanctions for appellate proceedings.
Rule 38 must be employed by the appellate courts to award attorneys fees on appeal, and the
Appellate court is charged with the duty to make an attorneys fees award.)
10.
For example, the contempt judgment addresses the alleged merits of more
than 21 petitions filed by Holli over a 9 year period in the Utah Appellate Court system, the
majority of which sought appellate orders directing the lower courts to order the Utah Public
Safety Director to renew Hollis Utah driver's license - which the Utah Department of Public
Safety refused to renew for the sole purpose of retaliating against Holli for suing the department
for 5th amendment takings claims. The refusal to renew Holli's driver's license caused Hom to
be repeatedly prosecuted for driving without a license in possession in more than 16 criminal
prosecutions over this 9 year period. Each criminal prosecution terminated in Holli's favor based
on the unlawful refusal to renew Ho!l!'s drivers license without just cause. However upon the
termination of each criminal case, the traffic judges still refused to direct the public safety director
to renew Hollis driver's license so that Holli could avoid future criminal prosecutions. When Holli
appealed the favorable dismissals because she stood to be prosecuted in the future on the same
criminal charge,
the Utah appellate courts summarily dismissed Holli's appeals for lack of
jurisdiction as moot irrespective that Holli stood to be prosecuted in the future. See See CraV1iford
-EL v. Britton, 523 US
592, 118 S. Ct 1584, '140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (Held: "official retaliation
or the object of a bad faith
occurs when one is prosecuted, threatened with
and legal
as a resu!t of their First amendment rights.).

12
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20.

under

After all matters had been removed to the bankruptcy

the bankruptcy removal statute,

Holli again sought to attack the competency of the void

orders entered in the NAR state court litigation.

For example, on July 22, 2004, Holli

filed a second motion in her removed bankruptcy case no. 03-CV-1083 as Pacer Doc.

no. 28, seeking permission to amend her complaint to allege violations of the automatic
stay by the NAR litigants. Refer back to exhibit "12" attached.

On July 27, 2004 as

Pacer Doc. no. 29, Holli filed a second motion for declaratory judgment to decree the
2/14/03 state court judgment (exhibit "10"

attached hereto) and

the

4/13/03

Utah

Supreme Court judgment (exhibit "2" attached hereto), "void as a matter of law". (Again
Refer back to exhibit "12", the court docket showing these filings)
21.

The Bankruptcy court docket attached as exhibit "12" hereto shows that

the NAR litigants did not respond to Holli's declaratory judgment motions. The docket
further shows that the federal judge 25 days later mooted NAR's motion to enter a federal
pre-filing injunction against Holli - after reading Holli's motion's to decree the state orders
void which purported to support the issuance of a federal pre-filing injunction order. The
court reasoned that it was going to dismiss the federal action for jurisdictional reasons which would allow the parties to pursue their claims in another forum. 11

However of

greatest jurisdictional importance is that on September 1, 2004, the federal judge entered
an order dismissing the removed state case on jurisdictional grounds and subsequently
mooted or denied as moot the remainder motions pending before the court as PACER
DOC. 38. Subsequently, the federal Docket shows that the federal court simply dosed the
case ; thereby permanently stripping the state court of jurisdiction over the original cause.
22.

The federal docket shows that the state NAR case was removed to the

Utah Bankruptcy court in early 2003 and then withdrawn to the District court the same
year.

The docket shows that the parties actively litigated matters before the federal

court until dismissal of the case on 9-1-2004, and further,

that Holli appealed the

dismissal order which sent her out of the jurisdiction, without avail.

A reference back to

11. This court purports to do the same thing the federal judge in Utah sought
to do in Hollis bankruptcy case, i.e. send Plaintiff Marti out of this forum to pursue her
claims in another forum - by granting the Defendants motion
dismiss for improper
venue ; a ruling that plaintiff will directly attack on appeal.
13
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the void attorneys

judgment entered against Holli (exhibit "1" attached), shows an

entry date of March 1

2004 in

federal bankruptcy court in 2003.
herein,

same state case which had been removed to the
Accordingly,

the attack record provided by Marti

shows on it's face that the March 17, 2004 state court NAR attorneys fees

judgment entered against Holli is void on it's face for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as
the state case wherein the judgment was entered had been removed to the bankruptcy
court in 2003 and never remanded back to the state court at any time. There are also
other defects apparent from this judgment to include:

(1)

Failure to acquire personal

jurisdiction over Holli given the OSC was served by mail on a massage parlor which was
not affiliated with Holli in any way (*** note that the federal docket record lists Holli's
address as cache county jail in Logan, Utah - given the NAR litigants were prosecuting
Holli for the unlawful practice of law as mentioned in the Utah Supreme Court contempt
judgment at page

headnote

paragraph 7 (bracketed) in exhibit "2" attached. As

have other prosecutions, this prosecution also failed. (2) The attorneys fees judgment
was a blatant violation of the automatic stay attaching to Holli's estate assets because
Holli's estate was not closed until 2 years later on January 4, 2006 as shown in exhibit
"13" attached.

(3) The state trial court had no authority to enter an attorney's fees

judgment which was admittedly acquired during an appellate proceeding,

and (4) Holli

was not provided with a constitutionally impartial tribunal.
23.

Likewise, .the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment also

suffered from multiple jurisdictional defects.

By the time the civil contempt order had

issued, Judge Quinn had mooted the basis for the Mandamus writ petition which was
filed to compel judge Quinn to act on Holli's numerous notices to submit for decision. On
February 13, 2003, the trial judge entered an order subject to Holli's notices to submit
See exhibit "10" attached.

Therefore, the Utah Supreme Court's civil contempt judgment

entered several months later constituted an unconstitutional advisory opinion in a case
where there was no Hve case or controversy at the time it was entered.
---·---···------.

10

---

10.
In addition, Judge Christine Durham, who authored the void opinion,
owed stock interests in the attorney lawfirm representing
NAR litigants through
merging stock interests of her former !awfirm and !aw partner Paul Moxley.
Judge Durham
an interest in covering up the misconduct of
, this
should not have been al!lowed to sit on the writ case.
14
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24.

Also,

the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment (exhibit 2

mentions nowhere on it's face that the Utah Supreme

attached hereto)

issued an

OSC to Holli thus giving Holli notice of contempt sanctions to be imposed against Holli.
This failed notice rendered the Utah Supreme Court Judgment void for lack of the
notice required under URAP rule 38.

25.

11

In addition, the Utah Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to conduct any

civil contempt proceedings against the bankrupted debtor Hom because the legal and
equitable claims subject matter of the collection action and Hollis counter-complaint were
property of Holli's bankruptcy estate, and the contempt judgment on it's face sought to
collect monies from Holli by way of attorneys fees.

(Refer back to footnotes 5 and 7

supra.).
Finally,

because the collection action and a!! related proceedings had

been removed to the bankruptcy court and never remanded back to the state court, the
Utah Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to enter any rule on the removed matter.
27.

In late 2005,

judgment was patently void,

residence.

NAR knowing full well that their 2004 attorneys fees
!iened this judgment against Holli and Marti's Idaho

Attached hereto as exhibit "14" is the county recorder's certified record

showing this lien.

A federal action was brought to attack the validity of this lien and the

underlying attorneys fees judgment and Utah Supreme Court civil contempt Judgment as
USDC-ldaho case no. 05-CV-127.

The resulting Judgment entered in this Idaho action is

attacked under separate cover.
Plaintiff Marti Lundahl now appears before this court as a prejudiced party given the defendant seeks to impose contempt sanctions against Marti as based on void
contempt orders entered against Holli. Marti seeks declaratory judgments decreeing both
the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment and the NAR attorneys fees judgment
void ab initio for lack of subject matter and persona! jurisdiction, for usurpation of federal

-----·--------------------11.
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U
384 ( 1990) (Rule 11 does
not authorize a district court to award an attorney's fee incurred in appellate proceedings.
(a) The language of Ru!e 11 limits sanctions to district court procedure only. Furthermore-11 cannot be
for awarding
the Advisory Committee Note suggests that
sanctions for appellate proceedings. Rule
must
employed by the appellate courts
to award
fees on appeal. ).

15
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bankruptcy power non existent in the state court, and for due process violations in the
rendition of these related judgments.

ARGUMENT
I.

Nar's Attorneys Fees Judgment Dated March 17, 2004 ls Void Ab
lnitio : (1) For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction In The State
Court When The Judgment Was Entered; (2) For Lack Of
Personal Jurisdiction Because The NAR Litigants Never Properly
Served Holli With The State Court Process; (3) For Due Process
Violations In Entering The Attorneys Fees Judgment; And (4)
For Usurpation Of Federal Power
(1)

The Utah State Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction
To Enter The Attorneys Fees Judgment Against Holli
Because The State Case Had Been Removed To The
Bankruptcy Court Under The Bankruptcy Removal Statute;
Thus Stripping The State Court Of All Jurisdiction
The US Supreme Court has long held in Granny Goose Food Inc. v. Teamsters,

415 US 423, 435-438 (1974) that after removal to a federal court, a state court loses
jurisdiction over the subject matter;
state court may be set aside,

furthermore after removal, a judgment entered by a

modified or otherwise corrected by a federal court on

equitable grounds. After removal, the federal court sitting in it's bankruptcy jurisdiction
has exclusive jurisdiction over the removed claims. See Gen. Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore Ry.,
260 US 261, 267 (1922) (after removal, the power to alter, correct, modify or otherwise
dispose of the case passes to the federal court);

In re Birting Fisheries, Inc., 300 B.R.

489 (9th Cir. B.AP. 2003) (Bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction to collaterally attack
state court order and review for conflict with either confirmed chapter 11 plan or
Bankruptcy Code.); In re General Carriers Corp., 258 B.R. 181 (9th Cir. B.AP. 2001) (Only
federal court sitting in its bankruptcy jurisdiction has jurisdiction to decide matters
concerning the removed case after state court action had been removed to bankruptcy
court.)

12

12.
When a case is removed, it is the mandatory duty of the state court to
proceed no further because subject matter jurisdiction has been stripped. If the state does so,

16
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In a case similar to the instant case,

Allstate removed a case to the federal

court under the diversity statute in re Preston v. Allstate Insurance
(Fla. 3d DCA 1993).

After removal of the case,

, 627 So. 2d 1322

the federal court dismissed the

removed action without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction and did not remand the case back
to the state court. 13
state complaint.

The Prestons returned to the state action and amended the original

The state court dismissed the amended complaint asserting lack of

subject matter jurisdiction over the case based on the removal. The dismissal judgment
was appealed to the state Supreme Court.

The Florida Supreme Court held: 'The state

court is allowed to resume jurisdiction of the removed case if, and only if, the federal court
grants permission by entering an order of remand. The statute is explicit on this point.
There was no order of remand in this case. Consequently the trial court could not resume
jurisdiction of the removed action.
prejudice,

Once the federal court dismissed the case without

the plaintiffs were free (among other things) to file another lawsuit in state or

federal court.

Absent an order of remand, however, plaintiffs could not return to state

court to resume litigating the original (removed) case.

See also 14A C. Wright, A Miller &

E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure 551-53 (2d ed. 1985) (Unti! a remand order is
certified and the certified remand order and File returned to the state court and docketed,
the state court lacks jurisdiction over the removed matter.);

It was necessary for

plaintiffs to file a new lawsuit. Id. At 1324. The high court further held that it was error
for the trial court to dismiss an action over which it had no jurisdiction. "Once a matter is
removed to the federal court, a state trial court and its judge have no jurisdiction over the
matter and cannot dismiss it." Weiser v. Bierbrouwerij, B. V, 430 So.2d at 987 (citations
omitted).

Accordingly,

the Supreme Court struck

the order granting the

motion to

dismiss and instead directed that the action was abated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

any resulting process is void. See National Steam-Ship Cp. Tugman, 106 US 118, 1 S Ct
58, 27 LEd 87 (1882) (After removal, the duty of the state court was to proceed no further. Every
order thereafter made by that court was coram non judice, void.) ; Johnson v. Estelle, 625 F.2d
75, 77 (5th Cir. 1980); Same in Job v. Calder (In re Calder), 907 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1990)
(Removing a case to federal court causes the state court to lose jurisdiction; until a certified copy
of a remand order is filed with the state court.). See 28 U.S.C. 1446(d); In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co ,
235 S.W.3d 619, 624 (Tex. 2007) (holding that orders issued by a trial court without remand
jurisdiction are void.).
13. The record shows that the federal court sitting in it's bankruptcy jurisdiction did
the same thing in Hollis removed action against NAR. lt dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
and did not remand the action back to the state court.

17
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1446(d).
In thls instant case, NAR obtained their attorneys fees judgment in the removed
state action, more than a year after removal to the federal court.

Six months after the

void attorneys fees judgment was entered, the federal court entered a final judgment
dismissing the case and did not remand the case back to the state court.

The federal

docket record shows that neither the federal court nor Holli were aware of the March 17,
2004 attorneys fees judgment. (See federal docket as exhibit "12" attached hereto which
does not mention this judgment).

Therefore, the state court not only lacked subject

matter jurisdiction at the time the attorneys fees judgment was entered ex parte against
plaintiff because the state action had been removed,

but the state court also lacked

contempt jurisdiction to enter an attorneys fees judgment against Holli because these
petitioned for this relief in the original (removed) state case.

Accordingly, this court had

a mandatory duty to vacate the March 17, 2004 attorneys fees judgment as statutorily

abated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).

(2)

NAR's Attorneys Fees Judgment Is Void For Failure
To Acquire Personal Jurisdiction Over Respondent In
The State Case Through Proper Service Of An OSC
The power to sanction is limited by the due process clause of the United States

Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XlV (due course of law).
mandatory component needed to effect imposition of a sanction order.

Jurisdiction is the
See Standard v.

Olesen, 74 S. Ct.768 (1954) ("No sanction can be imposed under the Constitution absent
proof of subject matter and personal jurisdiction".); Same In Marks v. Vehlow, 105 Idaho
560, 567, 671 P.2d 473, 480 (1983).

As decisioned by the US Supreme Court in

Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) (procedural due process
mandates notice, service and opportunity to respond to an order to show cause before
the imposition of a sanctions order.).
In Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of Utah, 2001 UT 75 (UT 2001), the Utah
Supreme Court reaffirmed the procedure to be employed when contempt proceedings are
being considered against a party.
initiative,

"When the court considers sanctions on it's own

due process requires the court to

18

an order directing the party to
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show cause why that party has not violated (a
time in which to file a response.
in a void judgment.).

and allow the party a reasonable

Failure to give notice

an order to show cause, results

also Poljanec v. Freed Finance Company of Wyoming, 440

P.2d 251 (Wyo. 1968) citing Spriggs v. Pioneer Carissa Gold Mines, Inc., Wyo., 378 P.2d
238, 240, cert. den. 375 U.S. 855, 84 S.Ct. 117, 11 L.Ed.2d 82, reh. den. 375 U.S. 936, 84
S.Ct 334, 11 L.Ed.2d 268, in order to punish for a constructive contempt, the offending
party must have notice of the nature of the charge against him and be given an
opportunity to answer and defend himself. That, we said is generally done by a rule to
show cause or such other process as would meet the requirements of due process.
Failure to give this notice results in a void judgment
The record in this case shows that the NAR litigants purported to serve Holli
with contempt process by mail instead of personally as required under URCP rule 4
at a tatoo and massage parlor located in Orem, Utah,

14

,

knowing full well that Holli did

not reside at this address, and that Holli was in cache county jail as reflected on the

federal docket - due to charges by the NAR litigants that Holli was practicing law without a
license. (As aforesaid, these charges were dropped as frivolous.).
Accordingly,

the NAR attorneys fees judgment ls void for lack of personal

jurisdiction over Holli.

(3)

NAR's Judgment Was Void Because Lundahl
Was Not Provided An Impartial Tribunal

It is well established that structural error occurs in a judicial proceeding

14. Utah courts have acknowledged the importance of actual notice in contempt
proceedings which requires personal service. Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 118, 378 P.2d 519,
520 (1963); see generally Von Hake v Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1171-72 (Utah 1988). Similarly
other state courts also require personal service upon the contemnor to obtain personal jurisdiction
to enter a contempt judgment.
See Ex Parte Acevedo, Case No. 13-05-725- (Tex .App.
11/9/2006). Here, Acevedo Court held that the contempt order entered against Acevedo was void
because Acevedo was not personally served with the order to show cause citation and therefore
not afforded adequate due process. The deputy in this case testified that the show cause notice
was served on one of Acevedo's staff members and not personally served upon Acevedo. It is
settled that constructive notice is inadequate when dealing with contempt matters. Notice
the
citation for contempt must be personally served on the alleged contemnor. Applied in Religious
Technology Ctr v. Leibrech, case no OO-cv-503 (5th Cir. 2004) (we vacate the entire judgment of
the district court including its sanction award --- for lack of
jurisdiction over the alleged
contemnor.).

19
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where the parties are provided a biased tribunal.

See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510

(1927) (structural error to be subjected to a biased tribunal) cited by US v. Marcus, Case
No. 08-1341 (Supreme Court . Ct. May 24,2010.),

the high court affirmed that a

constitutionally biased tribunal exists where the judge shows a personal bias against a
party to the case.) In Offutt v. United States, 267 US 517, 539 (1925), the high Court set
aside a contempt conviction imposed on a lawyer after a trial marked by personal
recriminations

and

animosity

between

the

trial

judge

and

the

lawyer.

Furthermore, when a judge pre - determines a cause and denies a litigant of
his right to present his case,
litigant.

the judge is said to be pervasively biased against that

See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs Of Mobile County, 517 F.2d 1044, 1045

{5th Cir. 1975) ("Efforts to dispose of matters for reasons other than on the merits deserve
to be characterized as "pervasive bias" or "prejudice" and meet the exception to the
"extrajudicial source doctrine" sufficient to have the court disqualified and the judgment
overturned.).

See also United States v. Sciuto,

521 F2d 82, 85

(7th Cir. 1976)

("Disqualification required when the record shows an effort to dispose of the case for
reasons other than on the merits, or shows persistent due process violations committed
by the court. Under these circumstances pervasive bias will be shown.).
Here, the record shows that Judge Quinn never allowed Holli as the Defendant/
Respondent in the state case to present her case on the merits before he entered the
February 13, 2003 judgment dismissing Holli's counterclaims with prejudice and unlawfully
granted a coUection judgment against Holli which debt had been mooted by the
negotiating of a check that paid in full the amount petitioned in the small claims pleading,
(Refer back to exhibits "3" and "4" attached for collection compiaint and payment satifying
this debt.

Judge Quinn's actions evidenced dear pervasive bias against Holli and the

inability to enter an impartial judgment thus showing that the judgment was also the
product of fundamental error in failing to provide Holli with an impartial tribunal.

II.

The Utah Supreme Court Civil Contempt Judgment Entitled
Holli Lundahl v. Judge Anthony Quinn
Void Ab lnitio :
(1) As In Violation Of The Automatic Stay Of The Bankruptcy
Code Because
Had Become Subject Of Holli's Bankruptcy
; (2) For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under The
Bankruptcy
(3) For
Of Subject
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Jurisdiction Because The Controversy Before The Court Had
Been Mooted Several Months Before The Court Sat On The
Controversy, (4) For Lack Of Notice And Of Any Opportunity
To Be Heard On Any Contempt Matter, And (5) For Other Due
Process Violations In Rendition Of The Judgment
In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. 496 US 384 (1976), the High Court held that
"Any order that exceeds the jurisdiction of the court is void, and can be attacked in ANY
proceeding and in ANY court where the validity of the judgment come into issue:' See
Rose v. Himely, (1808) 4 Cranch 241, 2 Led 608; Pennoyer v. Neff, (1877) 95 US 714, 24
L Ed 565; Thompson v. Whitman (1873) 18 Wali 457, 21 I Ed 897; Windsor v. McVeigh,
(1876) 93 US 274, 23 L Ed 914; McDonald v. Mabee, (1917) 243 US 90, 61 L Ed 608.
"Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to
them.

If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it,

their

judgments and orders are regarded as nullities and void. They are not voidable, but
simply void, and this even prior to reversal." O!d Wayne Mut. I. Assoc. v. McDonough, 204
U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236 (1907); Wiliiamson v Berry, 8 How. 495, 540, 12 L.Ed. 1170, 1189
(1850); Rose v Himely, 4 Cranch 241, 269, 2 L.Ed. 608, 617 (1808). Burns v. Baldwin,
138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003).
Moreover, a Court has a duty to declare a judgment void for defects of personal
jurisdiction or subject-matter jurisdiction, Catledge v. Transp. Tire Co., 107 Idaho 602,

607, 691 P.2d 1217, 1222 (1984); or because the rendering court's action amounted

to

a

plain usurpation of power constituting a violation of due process. Dept. of Health and
Welfare

v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 90 P.3d 321, 325 (2004) (citation omitted).
It is with these rules of law that Marti attacks the Utah Supreme Court civil

contempt judgment entered against Holli on April 13, 2003 -

as void ab initio and

complete nullities.

(1)

The Utah Supreme Court Entered A Civil Contempt
Judgment -Against Holli On A Case Which Had Been
Removed To The Bankruptcy Court While A Rule 59
Motion Attacking The February 13, 2003 Judgment
Was Pending Before The State Trial Court

The Utah courts have long held that a litigant

21
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final judgment if due process defects exist in that judgment in Pioneer, 100 F.2d 770 (10th
Cir. 1938).

Here, while the case was pending at the trial level in the Utah state court,

Holli timely filed a Rule 59 motion attacking the February 13, 2003 judgment as wholly
invested with due process violations. The record further shows that after Holli filed her
rule 59 motion attacking the final judgment,
bankruptcy court.

Holli removed the state court action to the

When removal is initiated at the trial level while that court has

jurisdiction over the res,

all ancillary proceedings including appellate proceedings are

equally removed and enjoined.

See Matter of Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 517 (5th Cir.

1992) (The power of Congress to authorize removal of cases on appeal has been
repeatedly affirmed in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304, 349. 4 L Ed 97
(1816)); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 US 257, 269 (1880); citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
US (1 Wheat) 304, 349, 4 L.

. 97 (1816) and Hadley 981 F. Supp. 690, 691(D.C.1997).

Removal carries with it the whole res and matters related to that res. Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304, 349. 4 L Ed
In addition,

(1816)

under the bankruptcy removal statute, either a plaintiff or defendant

can remove an action which alleges matter "related to" a bankruptcy estate.

There is no

question in this case that NAR was seeking to enforce a fraudulently obtained judgment
against the bankrupt Holli Lundahl's chapter 13 estate,
jurisdiction existed to justify the removal.

and therefore "related to"

After removal, the federal court sitting in it's

bankruptcy jurisdiction has exclusive jurisdiction over the removed claims. See Gen. lnv.
Co. v. Lake Shore Ry., 260 US 261, 267 (1922); In re Birting Fisheries, Inc., 300 B.R. 489
(9th Cir. B.A.P. 2003) (Bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction to collaterally attack
state court order and review for conflict with either confirmed chapter 11 plan or
Bankruptcy Code.); In re General Carriers Corp., 258 B.R. 181 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2001)
(Only federal court sitting in its bankruptcy jurisdiction has jurisdiction to decide matters
concerning the removed case after state court action had been removed to bankruptcy
court.)

13

See also 14A C. Wright, A Miller & E.. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure

13. When a case is removed, it is the mandatory duty of the state court to
proceed no further because subject matter jurisdiction has been stripped. If the state
court does so, any resulting process is void. See National Steam~Ship Cp. Tugman,
106 US 118, 1 S Ct 58, 27
87 (1882} (After removal,
duty of the state court was
to proceed no further. Every order thereafter made by that court was coram non judice,
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551-53 (2d ed. 1985) (Until a remand order is certified and the certified remand order and
file returned to the state court and docketed, the state court lacks jurisdiction over the
removed matter.);

Allman v. Hanley, 302 F2d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1962) {state loses

jurisdiction once removal is effected); Lowe v. Jacobs, 243 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1957) .
Here,

all proceedings involving the NAR matter I res had been removed

to the bankruptcy court and then subsequently withdrawn to the federal District Court of
judge Dee Benson siting in his bankruptcy jurisdiction. The Bankruptcy docket shows that
when Judge Dee Benson dismissed the NAR action for lack of jurisdiction and sent Holli
out of the forum, Holli unsuccessfully appealed that decision before the 101h circuit court.
Nevertheless no remand order was ever issued returning jurisdiction over the original
cause to the state courts.
Accordingly, all judgments entered concerning the NAR res after removal were
prima facial!y void, including the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment.

(2)

The Utah Supreme Court Civil Contempt Judgment Was
Entered On Mooted Matter And Therefore Constituted An
Advisory Opinion Prohibited Under Federal And State Law
In Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44 (Utah Supreme Ct 2004), the Utah

Supreme Court re-affirmed that Utah Courts are not authorized to deliver advisory
opinions or pronounce judgments on abstract questions;

where the justiciable

controversy has been decided before judgment is entered by the appellate court. The
appellate court's oniy remedy is to dismiss the appeal as moot following US Supreme
Court law under Steffell v. Thompson, 415 US 452, 459 n. 10 (1974) (Appellate courts are
without power to decide questions once the controversy has been mooted. Only authority
ls the dismiss the appeal.)

Graham v. Peace Officer St. & Tr. Com'n, 737 P.2d 1060

(Wyo. 1987) ( "We have often repeated the universal rule that a reviewing court will
dismiss a case when, pending appeal, an event occurs which renders a cause moot and

void.) ; Johnson v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1980); Same in Job v. Calder (In re
Calder), 907 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1990); Guilbot v. Vallejo, No. 14-07-00047-CV (Harris
Co., TX, 2008) (Removing a case to federal court causes the state court to lose
jurisdiction; until a certified copy of a remand order is filed with the state court.). See 28
U.S.C. ' 1446(d); In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 235 S.W.3d 619, 624 (Tex. 2007)); Mapco, Inc. v.
Forrest. 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (holding that orders issued
by a trial court without
are
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makes a determination of the issues unnecessary.
Service Commission of

Wyoming,

Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Public

Wyo., 620 P.2d 139, 140 (1980);

State ex rel.

Schwartz v. Jones, 61 Wyo. 350, 157 P.2d 993, 995 (1945)).
In the NAR case, when the trial court entered a conclusive judgment on February
14, 2003 which incorporated Holli as a party (refer back to exhibit "10" attached), the
court admittedly reached Holli's notices to submit for decision re her intervention motion
and thus mooted the grounds for Holli's writ petition to the Utah Supreme Court.
Accordingly, when the Utah Supreme Court entered their "advisory opinion" on April 13,
2003,

almost two months after the issues underlying the writ petition had been mooted,

the Utah Supreme Court entered an advisory ruling prohibited under both federal and
state law.

Under Steffel! v. Thompson, supra,

the ruling was void ab initio for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

(3)

The Utah Su
Court Civil Contempt Judgment
Violated The Automatic Stay Of The Bankruptcy
Code Because Holli Was The Respondent To The
Purported Contempt Proceedings In the Utah
Supreme Court

The 10th Circuit had long held that where the debtor is the respondent in the
proceeding before the court,

the automatic stay bars any further prosecution of that

Consolidated Electric Corp., 894 F. 2d 371, 373 (10 1h

Cir. 1990} (Stay

applies in any official proceeding where the debtor is a ... respondent

Any continuation

proceeding.

of that proceeding is taken in violation of the automatic stay and consequently is void and
without effect."). Same in Celotex Corporation v. Bennie Edwards, et al, Case No. 931504 (U.S. Supreme Ct, 1995).
The record herein shows that Holli was clearly the respondent in the Utah
Supreme Court civil contempt proceeding as shown by the order directing the trial court to
award attorneys fees and double costs against Holli for alleging bringing a frivolous writ
petition.

Accordingly,

as a respondent in that proceeding, the automatic stay of the

bankruptcy code applied since Holli was in a defensive position in that proceeding.
Several Courts have thoroughly analyzed the competency of a civil contempt
order entered against a respondent who is a debtor in bankruptcy. The 5th circuit has held
"Where a

violation constitutes a

of civil contempt against a debtor and an
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order is made during the pendency of a bankruptcy case, the contempt order is void as in
violation of the automatic stay." Young v. Repine, No. 06-20807. July 22, 2008 (5th Cir.
2008),

"The stay applies to all attempts to obtain control over causes of action that are

property of a bankruptcy estate."

3 Collier on Bankruptcy

~

362.03[5}, at 362-20, 21

(Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1997) . The legal conclusions applied were: "Civil
contempt proceedings are conducted to exact usually a monetary penalty against the
alleged contemnor.

The monetary penalties reduce the value of estate assets in the

bankruptcy estate and are construed as an attempt to obtain control over causes of action
that are property of the bankruptcy's estate.

As such, any non-bankruptcy court

contempt proceeding which seeks to create a debt against the debtor or to
diminish the vafue of estate assets, is strictly prohibited by the automatic stay of
the bankruptcy code."

In re Chaparro Martinez, 293 8.R. 387 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003);

Foster v. Heitkemp, 670 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1982) (The automatic stay provision remains in
effect as concerns a!I acts attempting to gain control over property of an

Any

action endeavoring to obtain control over property of an estate is void.);

Thus, "[a]ny

action in which the judgment may diminish" an asset of the bankruptcy estate "is
unquestionably subject to a stay under this subsection." Concurring with decisions made
in AH. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001 (citing In re Johns Manville Corp., 33 8.R. 254, 261
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)) ;

In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1082 (9th Cir. 20.02) ; And In re

Atkins, 176 BR 998, 1006 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994).

14

14. The propriety of entering a civil contempt judgment against a chapter 13 debtor was
also thoroughly anlayzed in a Texas case In re Small, Civ. No. 14-08-01075-CV (Tex. App. Houston (14th Dist.) 2009) . Here, a Texas state court ordered the debtor to pay his wife's
attorneys fees in a divorce proceeding while the debtor was in bankruptcy. The attorney took the
attorneys fees judgment and applied it against the debtor's real property. The debtor was in jail
but had filed a chapter 13 case before the judgment for attorneys fees was entered. The Texas
appellate court held the civil contempt order entered by the state judge was void as in violation of
the bankruptcy stay because it ordered the debtor, post petition, to pay a debt of attorneys fees
and then sought to collect against the debtor's estate which was subject to the automatic stay.
The automatic bankruptcy stay abates any judicial proceeding against the debtor,
depriving state courts of jurisdiction over the debtor and his property until the stay is lifted
or nullified by final administration of the bankruptcy case. Baytown St Bank v. Nimmons, 904
S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied); An action taken in violation of
the automatic bankruptcy stay is void, not merely voidable. Howell v. Thompson, 839 S W. 2d 92,
92 (Tex. 1992) (order); Continental Casing Corp. v. Sameadan Oil Corp., 751 S.W. 2d 499, 501
(Tex. 1988) (per curiam). The debtor here, Small, brought a contempt action against the attorney
inside his bankruptcy case and was awarded upwards of $60,000 in punitive damages against the
attorney for a deliberate violation of the automatic

25
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Holli's case bore a remarkable similarity to the Small case cited in footnote 14
supra.

The Utah Supreme Court, ex parte, imposed rule 38 sanctions against Holli and

in favor of NAR during an appellate proceeding and then ordered the trial court to
determine the amount of the monetary sanction for attorneys fees and double costs.
NAR's attorney reportedly asked for these fees in violation of the automatic stay of the
bankruptcy code as noted in the Utah Supreme court civil contempt order.

The Utah

Supreme Court civil contempt Order was void because it ordered the debtor Holli, post
petition, to pay a debt of attorneys fees and then sought to collect that debt against Holli's
estate assets which existed until January 4, 2006, when Hom's estate was fully
administered and thereafter closed. See exhibit "13" attached.
Morever,

while Holli and Marti's Idaho property was still subject to the

automatic stay of Hollis' bankruptcy estate, NAR liened that property as the attorney did
in Small, supra.

See exhibit "14" attached.

The attorney was sanctioned $60,000 for

obtaining a civil contempt order against a debtor who was in bankruptcy and thereafter
seeking to collect on that judgment by liening the debtor's real property which was part of
Small's chapter 13 estate.
Based on the foregoing,

the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment

which is tied to the NAR March 17, 2004 attorneys fees judgment, are void orders as in
violation of the automatic stay of the bankruptcy code.

(4)

The Utah Supreme Court Civil Contempt Judgment Was
Void Because No OSC Notice Was Either Identified In The
Contempt Judgment Nor Served Upon Holli Notifying Holli
Of The Pendency Of Any Contempt Proceeding
The power to sanction is limited by the due process clause of the United

States

Constitution.

See U.S. CONST

component needed to effect imposition of

Amend. XIV

a sanction

Jurisdiction is the mandatory

order.

See Standard v. Olesen,

74 S. Ct 768 (1954) ("No sanction can be imposed under the Constitution absent proof of
subject matter and personal jurisdiction." Sanction orders are in personam judgments.).
Same In Marks v. Vehlow, 105 Idaho 560,

671 P.2d 473, 480 (1983).

Based on the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court lacked the power to sanction
Holli not only because they lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings at
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the time their civil contempt sanction was

against Holli, but also because they

failed to properly acquire personal jurisdiction over Holli's person by service of an OSC
upon Holli.
The face of the Utah civil contempt order does not reflect anywhere in this order
that the Utah Supreme Court issued an OSC to Holli re cause to enter sanctions.

As

decisioned by the US Supreme Court in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,
767 (1980) : procedural due process mandates notice,

service and opportunity to

respond to an order to show cause before the imposition of a sanctions order under
Appellate rule 38.

The Notes of Advisory Committee on Ru!es-1994 Amendment

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 38 provide : The amendment requires that
before a court of appeals may impose sanctions,
notice, service and an opportunity to respond.

the party to be sanctioned must have

The failure to issue Holli an OSC sounds

a death knell to the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment See In Gildea v.
Guardian Title Company of Utah, 2001 UT

(UT 2001 ),

reaffirming the procedure to

be employed when contempt proceedings are being considered against a party.
the court considers sanctions on it's own initiative,

"When

due process requires the court to

issue an order directing the party to show cause why that party has not violated (a rule),
and allow the party a reasonable time in which to file a response. Failure to give notice
via an order to show cause,

results in a void judgment. "

complete absence of any reference to an OSC in the
order,

and in line with this defect,

Because there is a

Utah Supreme Court contempt

the admitted failure to give Holli notice of the

proceedings, the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment is void ab initio.

(5)

Structural Error Bars Enforcement of the Utah Supreme
Court Civil Contempt Judgment
When rules provide the procedure upon which process is to be exercised,

structural error occurs when that procedure is not followed at the level provided.
Cooter & Ge!! v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990),

In

the high court concluded that

Rule 11 does not authorize a district court to award an attorney's fee incurred in appellate
proceedings. (a)

language of Rule 11 limits sanctions to district court procedure only.

Furthermore-- the Advisory Committee Note suggests that Rule 11 cannot be used for
awarding sanctions for appellate proceedings.

Rule 38 must

employed by the
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appellate courts to allow the award attorneys fees that are incurred in the appellate
courts.).

The record shows that Justice Christine Durham directed the trial court to

determine the contempt "attorneys fees" incurred by NAR in the writ proceeding which
NAR was not a party.

The trial court had no authority to issue such sanctions under rule

11 or rule 38. Such order by Justice Durham constituted structural error which rendered
the civil contempt judgment void.
Accordingly, because no notice, service, or opportunity to respond was
given Holli,

the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment is void.

Furthermore,

structural error resulted in an invalid contempt judgment.

Ill.

Where Petitioner Has Established That A Judgment Is Void Court
Mandated To Make Such A Decree and Order
The Judgment
Vacated
"A judgment is void if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject

matter, or of the parties, or if the rendering court acted in a manner inconsistent with due
process of !aw.' " Williams v. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 728 F.2d 730, 735 (5th
Cir.1984); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 LEd. 20 278 (1940) (A void
judgment also includes one procured by fraud.).
Furthermore, a void judgment is one which has no legal force or effect whatever,
it is an absolute nullity,

its invalidity may be asserted by any person whose rights

are affected thereby, at any time and at any place, and it need not be attacked
directly but may be attacked collaterally whenever and wherever it is interposed,
City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W. 2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1973);

11

CHARLES ALAN WRlGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER AND MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2862 (2d ed. 1995). "[T]here is no time limit for an
attack on a judgment as void." Briley v. Hidalgo, 981 F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir.1993) (quoting

11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER AND MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2862 (1973)).
Utah has long held that where due process violations appear from the face of the
record, the court has the duty to declare the judgment null and void and set the judgment
aside.

See Stockyards National Bank of So. Omaha v. Bragg, et at, 67 Utah 60, 246 P.

966 (1925) [So too must a judgment or other order fall for errors of law

on the
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face of the mandatory record, such as showing the judgment obtained to be in variance
with the practice of the court or contrary to well - recognized principles and fundamentals
of the law.

Where the face of the record shows that fundamental law was

disregarded in the establishment of the judgment;

the proceedings and the

judgment will be rendered null and void for all purposes.as will all proceedings
based upon and giving the void judgment enforcement effect. citing Ex Parte Fisk,

113

us 713, 718 (1885)).
CONCLUSION
of the foregoing reasons, the NAR judgment dated March 17, 2004 and

entered in Utah State Case no. 020201658 before the Third Judicial District Court and
Utah Supreme Court Civil Contempt Judgment entered ex parte on April 3, 2003 as
case no. 20030063 should hereby be declared void ab initio, vacated and set aside.
Plaintiff Marti Lundahl further contends that it is irrelevant she is not named in

the void Utah state court judgments.

This Court and the Defense counsel are corruptly

seeking to impose the civil contempt judgments against Plaintiff, thereby making plaintiff
a person entitled to attack the validity of the void contempt judgments.

11 CHARLES

ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER AND MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE§ 2862 (2d ed. 1995).
Dated: March 10, 2013

Certificate of Service
The undersigned certifies that she will electronically served opposing counsel with
the foregoing document and attached 14 exhibits on March 13, 2013 to the following
email address:
Richard Vasquez
Law Offices of Snow, Christainsen and Martineau
10 Exchange Place Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
email address :
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RONJ..l..D F. PRiCE - 5535
Pill.li.S SCOFIELD PRICE

A Professional Corporation
340 Broadway Centre
'l 11 East Bmadwzy
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 i
Te\aphone'. {801) 322-2002
Facsimile: (801) 322-2003

for

IN THE THIRD JUD!ClAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH

N.AR,
ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES Aim
DOUBLE COSTS AGAJNST HOW LUNDAHL, AND
JUDGEMENT AGAINST How LUNDAHL FOR
AITORNEYS' FEES AND DOUBLE COSTS

KELU LUNDAHL, ET AL.,

FY THAT THE FOREGOlNG
ANO-CORRECT COPY
01
L FILED IN FIRST
OURTS.

Defendants.
HOW Ll.JNDAHL,

Counterclaim/Plabtiff,

vs.
MARKT. OLSON; OU;>ON ASSOC LA.TES, P. C.;
ANTHONY C. T!DViEU, 0.0.S., OLYMPUS Vi2N
DEt.JTALA!W NAR,

Civit No. 020201658

Anthony Quinn

Counte rcla irnJDefend ants.

Plaintiff and countercl</1m defendants'
Attome}~s' Fees And Double Costs

"Moving Parties") Motion For Award Of

And For Otl;er Relief (ihe

Hofli

\LI

!i
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came before the Court for hearing at 8:30 am on Thursday, 19 February 2004. Ronald F. Price
of the law firm PETERS SCOFIELD PrucE A Professi'tJnal Corporation appeared on behalf of t1e Moving
Parties. Additionally, counterclaim defendant Marie T. Olson was present No otl)er persons er
parties were present Thus, Holli Lundahl did not appear. Additiona!iy, defendants Kem Lundahl
and John Behle did not appear and were not represented by counsel.
The

having

Ronald F. Price

in

t'le Motion, the supporting memorandum and the affidavit of
of tie Motion, having determined that Holll lundah! was properly

served with the Motion, foe supporting memorandum and the Price

having determined

that Hom Lundah! was properly served wit"i notice of the hearing on the Motion, being duly advised

in the premises and upon good cause showing, hereby enters the following order and judgment
with respect to the Motion:
1.

Pursuant to the ruling of.the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Lundahl v. Quinn,

67 P.3d i 000 (Utah 2003) that the Moving Parties are entitled to recover from Holli Lundahl the
amount of attorneys' fees and double costs incurred by the Moving Parties in connection .wlth

responding to, and as a result of, the Petition for Extra Ordinary Writ Directed to Judge Anthony
Quinn of the Third Judicial District Court Pursuant to Rule 658 (the "Petition"} filed by Hom

Lundahl in connection with this matter, and pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's instructions in
the Lundahl
opinion that this Court determine the amount of those attorneys' fees and double
.
.
costs to ml'lard and to enter such an award against Holli Lundahl and in fa.v.or of the Moving
Parties, the Court hereby ORDERS that Hom Lundahl shall pay to the Moving Parties the sum
of $4 707.50 for attorneys' fees which the Moving Parties incurred in connection with responding

2

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 19 Filed 03/18/13 Page 33 of 77

to the Petition, and the additional wm of $598.70 for double costs which the Moving Parties
incurred in connection wllil resr~ding to the Pefilion. This order shan constitute a judgment
against Hom Lundahl.
DONE this

.11
BYlHECOURT

3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

?

I hereby certify that on the 23ro day of February 2004, and on lhis
day of March.
2004, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES AND OOUE:!.E
COSTS AG>JNST HoLIJ LUNDAHL, AND JUDGEMENT AG>JNST How LUHDA.HL f'OR AITORNEYS' FEES

AND DOUBLE Cosrs was serv~ in the manner indicated to the foliowing:

_:::£... U.S. Mail

Gregory M. Constantino
Constantino Law Office, P.C.
68 South Main Street, Suite #BOO
Salt Lake Cfty, Utah 84101
No. (801) 530-i 333

__ Federal Express
__ Hand Del!verf

Hom Ltmda:h!

U.S.
_ _ Federal Express
_ _ Hand De!rve.ry·

200 East Center Street
Oram, Utah 84057

4
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(Cite lls: 67 P.3d 1000)

45k62 k. Rights ofl.itigauts to Act in Person or
by Attorney. Most Cited C~

Supreme Cou.-t of Utah.

Holli LUNDAHL, Petitioner,
v.

The Honornh1e Anthony QUINN, Respondent.
N.A.R. INC., Mark T. Olson, Olson & Associates,
P.C., Anthony Tidwell, D.D.S., and OlyropllS View
Dental Center, Respondents and Real Parties in Interest

Wnen an individual avails herself of !he judicial
machinery as a matter of routine, special leniency on
th:: basis of pro se status is mll!lifest! y inappropriate,
pill"icul.arly when the filings in qulll!tion rue routinely
frivolous and have been brought wilh the apparent
purpose, or al lellllt effect, of harassment, not only of
opposing parties, but of !.he judicial machinery itself.

ill Attorney and C.llent 45 €;::::>62

No. 20030062.

45 Attorney and C1ient
~Retainer Md Authority
interve,.~ in u.micr'lv11w
The District Court, Salt
£?,!!~~-""'~:.!!!£™' J., re!'hsed to address

sought to

n~••fiA>N>n

for ex.l:rlJQf-

Supreme
that: \ l) when an
indlvi<Jlual avails herself of the judicial machinery as a
matter of routine, special leniency on the basis of pro
>e status is manifestly inappropriate; {2) litigant would
no longer be affon!ed reasonable indulgence; (3) litigilllt's petition was frivolou.~ on its face; and (4) real
parties in interest were entitled 10 s!:cmey foes and
double costs for defending action.
So ordered.

West Head.notes

45 Attorney &lld Client
:'!ID Retainer and Authority
45k62 k. Rights ofl.itigants to Act in Person or
by Attorney, M.Q!t Cited Cases

Supreme Court is generally lenient with pro se
litigant~.

ill Attorney tmd

:I~ L

to Act in Person or

by Attorney. ~"OE.'-""'-'"-~'~""'"'
Prose litigan: wbo bad

numerous

prose acti.:m:s would no longer
indulgence, and lhus, litigant would be cl:wged with

fall lw:lowletlge and undenrumding Qf all relevant
Statutes, rules, and c= law, where fo.igaru hlld chosen

to make legal self-representation a full-time hobby, if
oot a career.

Ml Attorney and Client 45 £;:::;;>62
45 Attorney and Client
~ Re!!liner and Authority
4 5k62 k. Rights of Urlgant.~ to Act in Person or
by Attorney. M2>'1.t Cited <;ases

Supreme C.iurt deemed any argument by pro se
litigant thal a:tempted to distort legal authority fur
purpose of evading or circumventing pros.crlptioo
against unlicensed pmctice of law a.:i oot brought in
good faith, for purpo!!CS of litigant's petition seeldng
_extraordinary writ allowing her to intervene in underlying eo!lec!ions action, where litigant had been
e;:press!y informed in the past that she could not represent the legal ~nteresis of other persons and litigant

Client 45 ~62

45 Attorney and Client
;t5lJ Rewiner !JJld Aud10rity

cited statute prohibiting practicing law without a license in petition. U.C.A 1953. 78-9- !O! (3}.

VGE'RTIFY THAT THE FOR~GOING
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102 Costs
!021 Natur<:, Grounds, and Extent of Right m

General

102.k t Nat>Jre and Grounds of Right
k. ln General.~~~~~~
Pro sc litigant's petition for extraordinary writ,
requesting an order directing trial court to allow her to
intervene as a matter of right in underlying collections
action, failed to comply with requisite standard for
asserting such a petition, and thus, petition was frivolous on i!s face; rn!e governing substitution of paries
provided proper mechanism, if any, for litigant to
obmin relief she
and

Provision in rnle governing substitution of parties
that the action
be continued by or against the
original party," urJess the court grants a motion for
substitution, preserves tbc court's inherent power to
manage the case without undue disruption, confusion,
or interference. Rliles Civ.Proc., Rule 25(c}.
121Parties287 (::::::>6{1)

281 Partie.~
287! Plaintiffs
Persons \Vho May or Must Sue
in l.nterest

she even pu.rport to argu.e
extension or modificntion.

Pretrial Prncedure 307 A

1fil P:irties 187
287. Parties
287IV New Parties and Change of Parties
287k5.1 Substitution
2B7k5S k. b GeneraL "'~"'·"'~""""-"'"""'""'

397;1. Pretrial Proceu'uro
307 Ai:II Dismissal
1Q] Affl(!i) 1nvvlu.-itar/ Dismissal
}_07 AJilll2}£ Gro1mds in General
~,_,_,,~.:;.Par-Jes,

Defects as to

k In General.
Courts cannot be compel.led to recog::llze a subslitution of parties at tile whim of tl:e movnnt Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 2.li:;l.
Appeal and Error 30 €:=:>428(2)

JQ Appeal a::id Error
30V'l] T ransfor of Cause
J9V1IrDi Writ of Error, Citation, or Notice
Filing Notice and Proof of Service
~Qf.:'!£?.GJ k Time for fi!i.ng.
Cited Cases
\\!here a timely motion for attorney fees is interposed, tJi.e time for filing a notice of appeal does not
begin to run until a final order fixing the innount of

~_lpst

Rule requinng actiom to be brought hi the nam.e
of a real party in imerest and prohibiting dismissal of
action or. ground that it was not prosecuted in name of
real party in interest until court hnd appropriately
examined :he issue was inapplicable to prose litigant's
request to intervene in underlying col:ections action as
a matter of right for purposes of pursuir.g counterclaim, where there was no question that counterclaims
were initially brought in name of a real party in interest and basis for dismissal of lawsuit had nothing to
do with litigant's belated assertion that she should be
allowed to i:itervene. Ruics Civ.Proc., Rule 171.e}.

those foes is entered.

2~7

.Parties
287!\:'. New Panies and
7JPk57 Substitution

of Parties

102 Costs
l 02! Nature, Grounds, and Extent of Right ir:
General
lncre::;sd Costs, and Double or Treble
Costs
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Costs 102 ~194.44

102 Costs
l02Vlil Attorney Fees
102kl94.44 k. Bad Faith or Meritless Litigation. Most Cited Cases
Pro se litigant's frwolous petition for extraordinary relief, requesting a.'l order directing trial court to
allow her 10 inter1ene as a maner of right i.n underlying collections action, entitled real parties in interest to
attorney fees and double costs for defending such
petition. Rules Apo.Pree,, Rule 3J(c)(l1; Rules
Civ.Proc. Rule 65B(a1.

llll Costs 102

'I! 2 1\s background to this court's order on lhis
petition, a brief recitation of the history of petitioner's
many appcara."lces before this court is appropriate.
Since 1999, Holli Lundahl Elli has submitted no fewer
than twenty-seven filings, consisting of ninetee::i appeals, four petitions for extraordinary writ (includi11g.
the instant petition), two petitions for writ ofcert[orari,
a.71.d two petitions for interlocutory appeal. Of these,
five appeals are presently p~d~ before e_il?er Lli.is
court or Liie court of appeals, """' two decisions on
appeal were summarily affirmed, one dedsiotl on
appeal has been affirmed per curiam, four appeals
w;re dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (including
Huili's uttempt to appeal a criminal case where the
lower court had dismissed the cha.'"geS against her),
two
were dismissed as premature, one appe~
was dismissed for ~n improper rule 54(b) certificatio::,
a:1d one
was voluntari;y dismis.sed. Three peti[ion.s for

lQl. Costs

rn;;;.:v1

Costs;

in Forma

IO~AJ

27 Actiou or Defense in Fom1a Pauperts
l.Q]Jc 12a k Nam.re and Grour:d.~ of Right

Ordinarily, wi:J.ere litigants cannot afford to pay a
filing fee, that fee is waived so that poverty will not
create a de facto barrier to access to the courts.
*1001 Holli Lund.ahl, petitioner prose.

~~<;t~~±-!.!~' Salt Lake City, for N.A.R., Mark

Olson, Olson & i\.:ssociates, Anthony Tidwell.
Olympus View Denial Center.
PER CURIA-\1:
"J l This matter comes before the court on petition
for extraordinary writ The petitioner, Hom Lundahl,
asserts she bas filw a motion to intervene and an
amended counterclaim comolaint on which the district
court refused :&.rule bccaus; it deemed her a nonpa.rty
lo the action. fodge AntJiony Quinn filed a response,
as did N.AR. be., Mark T. O!son. Olson & Associates, P .C, Anthony Tidwell, D.D.S., and Olympus
View Dentai Center as real parties in interest. We
deny the petition and further hold that it is frivolous.

have been denied.
fN l. Because this roaHtr was originally
brought as a counterclaim by Hoili Lund.i.hl's
sister, Kelli Lundahl, v.. e generally will refer
to them by their first names to avoid confu-

sion..
FN2. Four of Llie nineteen appeals noted
above were consolidated into a single action,
leaving sixteen separate appeals for disposition.
'1) 3 1n fief.son v. }acohsen, 669 ~.2d 1207, i 2 i3
i]Jtah 1983'), Hus court held that "as a genera! role, a
party who represents himself will be held to the same
standard of knowledge :md practice as any qualified
member of lbe bar." Nevenheless, Nelson also noted
that " 'because of his lack of technical knowledge of
law and procedure (a layman ac.ting as his own attorney) should be accorded every*ltl!J2 consideration
that may reasonably be indulged.' " id. (bracketed
ianguagc in original) (quoting Heathman v. Hutch l 3
Uta)) 2d 2.2.§., 268,, 372 P 2d 990, 99 l r l962))

Lllf_:n ~ 4 :\ccordingly, fois court generally is le·
nicnt with prose litigant.,. !r.dividuaJs have a right to
represent themselves wit..'1out being compel1ed to seek
professional ass.ista:ice. \Vbere they are largely
strangers to the legal system, courts arc understandably loath to sanction t.'tem for a procedurat misstep
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here or thcreH Holli 1 however is
a str:n1ger to
the legal system. Wbcre most ordin:i.ry wtlividuals
find :hemse!ves in court on only a handfol of occasions in their iives, Holli has managed to embroil
herself in more litigation iJi just a few sh0r1 years than
one would thIDk humanly possible. Wben an individual avails herself of the judicial machinery as a
matter of routine, special leniency on the basis of pro
se status is manifestly inappropriate.
1

ill,

on the momii>g of a heJring :o determine a mouon for
summ:i.ry judgment. Holli then states tMt "Kelli was
unable to obtain other coue..sel willing lo sue ru1 attorney. Accordingly, Kelli assigned her property
damage claims lo Holli Lundahl." (Em;;hasis added.)
ln other words, the expressed purpose of the assignment was to allow Holli 10 prosecute the action becailse Kelli could not obtain a licensed attorney.

FN3. Lundahl v. Alta View Hospital. .No.

5 This is particularly true where the filings in
question are routinely frivolous and have been brought
with the apparent purpose, or at least effect, of harassment, not only of opposing par'Jes, but of the judicial machinery itself. \Vb.en Holli is Wl.Successful in

20020749; Lundahl v. Qwest CommunU:ations, No. 20020748; Lundahl v. llJC, No.
200 i 0336. Tne response to the instant petition aiso contains some very troubling alle·
gations tba t Holli has appea.-ed at hearings

the relief she seeks she h;1S no~
resorted to collateral attack on the

and

from district cour: denials of petitions for extnlord;,.
nary relief narnicg
as defend::mts. Tnerefcre 1
t.,e dicru.m in l'iel.son cautioniug
courts to be len.iem with pro se
we now r!1ake
clear that the re=nable
ilia! has been
afforded to Holli in :..':e past is al an end. Wbere Holli
has chosen to make iegal self-representation a
foll-time hobby, if not a care.er, it is not too much to
expect her to strictly abide by the ruies
the
appearances of
before th.is court. Tnerefore,
she sball be charged with foll knowledge and understanding of all relevant statc!es, rules, and case law.

as }(eJlL We note thJt t::tis af:id:rvit does
Holh Lundabl as the person aopcarine: we aJsc note some of u1e al" arc...,not
by affidavit a.11d
are heJ.rsay. We therefore make clear tho!
they do nOt affect our decision today.

1

",) 6 We also note Holli has occasionaUy employed
the right to se!f-repn::senLl!tiou in a questionable
manner. In this petition, as well as in at least three
other recent appellate filings, Holli has purportedly
acquired another person's cause of action by assign·
ment and tlien has professed to represent thar cause of
action in her own rigbt.rn;i The Utah State Bar Rules of
lntegrn!ioc and Management do not "prohibit a person
who is unlicensed as an iltlorney at law ... from personaliy representmg that person's ov.11 interests in a
cause to which tbe person is a party." J,}llih S tatc \l_ill
R. integ;a1ion and Manageme!l!J3_ IlI!T}. However,
this exception to the prohibition on the unauthorized
practice of Jaw is limited to actions where "the person
is a party in his or her own right and not as p.n assignee" E'.:f~ ld. (emphasis added). In this petition;
Holli concedes the
cause of action belonged
solely lo Kelli Lundahl. On pages five and six of her
petiuon, Holli asserts Kelli's counsel abandoned her

Le::ielf as Kelii
Resp(Jnd'CTJ\S have attached an aifi-

Subsection 78-9-101(3) of the Utah
Code contaln.s substnntia!ly the same provision. lnitially s.cheduled to be repealed on
May l, 2003, :he repeal date has been extended to May 3, 2004. See H.B. 349 Sl,
2003 Gen. Sess. (Utd1) (enac:ed).
~i 7 We offer no ruling at this time regarding
whether Holli has violated the proscription* IIJ03 on
the unauthorized practice of law Nonetheless, it remains pertinent to our purposes here that she actually
cited section 78-9-101 of the Utah Code in her petition
and that she has been expressly informed iri the pa.st
that she cnnnot represent the legal mterests of other
persons.fl!j Conset:juently, we deem any argumen! t.luit
mt.:mpts to distort legal authority for the purpose of
evading or circwnvenling Liie proscription against
unlicensed practice as not brought in good faith

Ef:J~

E.g.. Lundahl
Alra View 1Iosp11al,
No. 20020749 (letter from court dated October 23. 2002)

'""'"'-'""'-'-"'.1..0!.'-"".,.· "'-~;;,.e...\!.l.~~""'''~ .E roce-

fri volous appeal, motion, bnef. or
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other paper i$ one that is not grounded in fact, not
warranted by existing iaw, or not based on a good faith
argument to extend, modify, or reverse e:dsfrng law."
With this standard in mmd, we turn to L'":e present
petition. T'.1e underl;~ng collections action was com·
rnenced against Kelli as a defendant. 111e plaintiffs
eventually agreed to dismiss the action w1th prejudice,
apparently due to settlement of the claim. However,
the case continued forward because Kelli elected to
pursue a counterclafrn against the plaintiff and otl:er
parties. On November 25, 2002, the district court
granted the counterclaim defendants' motion for
summa.~f judgment and directed counsel to prepare
the order. According to Holli's petition, Kelli assigned
ber claims on December 4, 2002. Holli asser'.s she then
move.cl to intervene fl:!.~ on December 6, followed by
n.umerous mot.ions and
The counterclaim
defendants moved for attorney fees, and the district
court scheduled a
on th;;t mJtter.
a.11 order
to the November 25
on Deceinber 27 ~ and tbe
conducted on January J 6, 2003. The
Ja.nuary 16~ 2003) hearing before the di.strict court
indicates Kelli appeared and was
by licensed legal counsel. It is not clear whet.her Ho!J.i was
present at Llie
The district court indicated it
would av.'<l!'d a fi..'1:.ed amount of attorney fees and
directed the counterclaim defend.ants' counsel to prepare an order. The district 'Court stated it would not
address Holli's pleadings because she was not a party
to the case. It also specifically state.cl it wouid not
aUow HoUi to appear as a party unless she filed a
motion for substitution
to rule 25(c) of ths;
Yl:iill.~1.iJ~.s..Jl1J&llim~~r~. Holli then brought the
instant petition, requesting an order directi..rig the district court to al low her lo intervene as a matter of right.

where "no other piain, speedy and adequate
is
available." Utah R. Civ. P 65filfil. Wbile Holli
acknowledges this standard, her petition manifostly
fails to comply wiLh. it
FN7. The bulk of the allegations of fact in
petmon
are
argumentative,
conclusory, or irreleva.'11- Because !.his couri
doe:; not have access to the record, it must
necessarily rely on those
and documents properly derived from that record and·
submitted as part of !he petition to guide its
deterrnl:nation of frivolousness.

Holli's

the court upon r.11oti(1r,. di:ects the person to whom the
int.ere.st is t::ra.uSferred to be S"'-.Ibstiruted in the act.ion,''
Wnile nr1e 25(£}
m
pcnnissive rather than ma.rn:latory terms, it is clear
courts cannot be compelled to recog:ni:ze a substitution
of parties at the w!-illn of the mov;int. See, e.g.• b:~qjder
l 2£D. (upholding denial of motion for substitution of

real party in interest, where u:olion was filed subsecp..:ent to default judgment). * 1004 The provision L'i:it
tb.e action "may be continued by or against fr1e ongina!
party," unless Llic: court grants a motion for sub:>titutio11. Dreserves the cou..111s inherent power to manage
the ·c~se without undue dis01ption, confusion, or in-

l<;rference.£1:!! See Briggs v. He.fs. ) 22 Utah .559, 56.L,
252 P.2d_53S, 539 (19531.

FN6. The respondents to the petition dispute
whether this motion was actuJJUy filed. They
assert Holli obtained a date-stamped copy
without lea"0JJg a copy for the district court
While these allegations are also troubling,
resolution of the conflicting allegations is not
materiai to our decision here. For the limited
purvose of reviewing this petition, we \vill
assume the morion 10 intervene was in fact
filed.

W49
the petition,
petitwn for

on the documentation provided by

it is not warracted by existing law. A
writ may be brought oPJy

FN8. One of Holli's asserted justifications for
;eking an extraordinary writ is her claim
that the time for filing a notice of appeai
began to :-un on December 27, 2002. The real
panies in intcres!, on the other hand, assert
that order was not a final judgment Regard'., less, where a timely mouon for allomey fees
is interposed, the time for filing a notice of
appeal does not \Jegin to run until a final or·
der fixing the amount of those fees is entered

See

~QQQ_i.[L:t

("[Al irlal court must
determine the am:mnt of attorney fees
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awarclahie to a party before the judgment
becomes final for purposes of appeal."); see

also Sinner v. Schriever. 2000 trr 45. f 19, 2
P.3d 442. In this case, the final order on the
motion for attorney fees had not been filed at
the time Holli submitted this petition, and, in
any event, Holli's own failure to timely move
for substitution does. not create au emergency
necessitating this court's intervention.

assertion that she has a stat..ilo.ry right to i.nter1ene,
accompanied by several manifestly inapposite cita·
tions Vt'here nile 25fc) provided the proper mecl:rnn.ism, if any, for HolJi to obtain the ~lief she .requests,
F!'lo her petition for extraordinary relief is frivolous on
its face.

fN 10,

Si,.,ce rule 38 of the Utah Rules Qf
Appeila1e Procedure allows the appellate
eoun to independently determine prop!!r
substitution of parties, Holli would not have
been deprived of her right 10 seek substituc
tfon even if she had brought a proper motion
for substitution and the district coun had
failed to rule on it prior to entry of final
Jut!gnaerit. Assuming, without deciding, !bat
a motion for substitution
prior to
entry of final judgment would not loll ilic
time for
a notice of appeal, the
to
appeel wouid remain vested in Kelli, and
Holli could
to pursue ber
chii.rn of
before L~e appellate
court

ill '!I l ! Holli instead improperly moved to intervene as a matter of right under rule 24(a).mi Rule
24(a) grants a right to intervene, upon "ri.m.ely application," where the applicant "cl.aims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action.''
however, cannot claim an independent interest relating to either property or a trm:isaction because the "tra:nsaclimi" at issue is the alleged
conveyance of ihc chose in action il~eli. Jf couns were
lO countenance such subterfuges, it would confer an
um:onditional
to intervene on the entire universe
of individuals or entities
capable of
the assignment of a C<Juse of action.
FN9. Holli additionally relies on@~ l 7(a} oJ
the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rnk 17(a) requires actions to be brought in the name of a
real party in interest. It also prohibits dismissal of the action "on the ground that it is
not prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest," until the court has appropriately
examined the issue. This rule plainly is inapposite. There is oo question the counter·
o!a[ms initially were brought in the name of a
real party in interest. Aiso, the bas:s for dismissal of the lawsuit had nothing to do with
Holli's belated assertion that she shonld be
allowed to intervene; indeed, the district
cou.rt granted SUO"..rnary judgment before
Holli received her purponed assigru:nent.

UQJ ii IJ We therefore turu to the appropriate
consequence for filing a frivolous pleading. Rule 33(a)
oft.he Utah Rules of A..miellate Procedure provides that
"if the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay,
i! sh.all award just damages!' llill Pursuant to this
provision, the real·piuty-i.o-intcrest respondents bave
requested costs a.ad attorney fees. See~""'-'-"'-'-"'~'-'
33(c)(l}. We hoid N.A.R. Inc., Mark Oisoa, Olson &
Associates, P.C., Anthony Tidwell, D.D.S., and
Olympus View Dental Center are entitled to attorney
fees and double e-0sts for the time and resources expended in ~ 1005 defending against this frivolous
. petition_ We direct the district court to determine the
am.cunt of those sanctions and to take whatever other
actions it deems appropriate within its jurisdictional

!

Luthority.

fl

12 Conse.quentl.y, the district court's justifiable
refusal to address a multitude of last-ditch, disruptive
legal filings was well within its diuretion nnd ~vp
ported by Holli's failure to avail herself of the procedural rule designed te afford her !l1e relief she claimed.
Holli has documented no basis i.u law for bringing a
petition for extraordinary writ. Nor does she even
purport to argue in favor of a good fuith extension or
modification. bstead, the legal
she presents
in support of her petition is confined 10 a conclusory

fNl L Fer purposes of tr.is n:ile, "a motion
made or appeal takenM necessarily i~ludes
all filings thnt are submitted to this court.
Otberwi.<;e, parties would be excused from
the consequences of filing a frivolous petition for discrctionnrj review.
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l4, 2002

KELLI LUNDAHL
2748 N 930 EAST
PROVO, UT 84604

Reference Number: 68515-60676
Original Creditor: Olympus View Dental-Anthony Tidwell DDS
RE: N.A.R v. KELLJ LUNDAHL,
KELLI LUNDAHL
·rnu h2ve
\Ve have
to collect

tin~

Summons '1nd

whatever means

1; is not too

m.ay

the amcw:t

the

runourH due. As of

A.rnour_t:

Estimated Service Fees:

Estimated
Return Check
Attorney's -Pees;

Fi

Pee,

ESTI:N1ATED PAYOFF
AS OF 02/14/2002:

$ 'i0'7J1
.....,/

'·~

THE BALANCE DUE Wll,L CHANGE DAILY AS Il\1TEREST, COURT COSTS AND
A1TORNEY FEES {IF APPUCABLE TO YOUR ACCOUNTJ ARE INCURRED.

lF YOU PAY PRIOR TO OUR F1L!NG THE COMPLAL'-11, YOU MAY BE ABLE TO AVOID
PA YING IBE FJLL"iG FEE. PLEASE CALL FOR THE CORRECT BALANCE BEFORE
SENDING PA YMEN1.

OLSON ASSOCIATES. P.C.
Attorneys for N.A.R,,

foe.

THIS IS A COi\1Mll1'<1CATION FROllrf A DEBT COLLECTOR.
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Mark T. Olson (5529)

OLSON ASSOCIATES, P.C.

Attorneys for Plaintiff

10 West Broadway, Suite 750

S€llt Lake City, U1' 94101
Telephone:
(801)363-.9966

Reference No.

69515-60676

IN THE T'rl:RD DISTRICT COURT, i>'l'GR.J:l.AY
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
N .A. R.,

DBPli.RTMENT

STAT.E OF trI'AR

INC.

C 0 M P L A I

N T

Plaintiff)

CaSf>! No.

j

Jefendants.
y., _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ ,

Plaintiff. N.A.R., INC.,

as

J1TDGE

lI _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - -

of Defendants and

follows~

. That Plaintiff is a Utah Co:rporatiort, with ita princi.pa1
place of business in Salt .Lake County, Utah.
2. Th.at Defendants are residents of, or the subject agreement

was executed in, SALT ;:...l\KE COQNIY.
3.

That the amount in cont:roversy 1 excluaive cf costs 1 does

not exceed $2000.00.
0

<l.

That under the terms of a signed credit agreemen<: dated

11/27/2000,

(See copy of agxeemeut attached hereto) the

Defendants are indebted to:

Q1yrnpus View Dental-JL-ithony Tidwell DDS

in the amount of $382.59 fer dental ser<ices together with
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interest thereon in the anmunt of $15. 62 at: the current rate of
21.00~

since 12/05/2001, the appro::d.mate date of the default.

S. That the agreement provides for a reasoni!ble attorney's
fee.

That prier to this action the above account was assigned

f.

to Plaintiff herein, who is now entitled to bring sui':: thereon,
7. That the subject obligation is a family expense, Defendar.ts were acting as a !arniJy unit at the t:.rne the obligation •,;as

incurred, and Defenda:nt:E are jointly and severally liable upon
this debt pursuant to Ut~~ Code ~,.nn. Sect.l.on 30-2-9,

balance may

If authorized by contract, the

B~

include a collection agency fee.
ff

re

sed, or failed,

to pay.

against Defendants
in the

S\.l.Jrt

thereon,

of $382.59, together with court costs,

•at

and int.crest

21~00~ from 12/os/2001, post: judgrnent interest at

21.00% frcrr, the date of judgment, and a reasonable attorney's
fee Pu.!:Suant to Rule 4-505.01 in the

a..~ount

of $150.00, or as

esta..'?lished by affidavit purguant to Rule 4-SCS, Utah Code of
J"udicial Administration.
DATE'JJ this 14 day of FEBRUARY, 2002.
OLSON ASSOCIATES, P.C.

Plaintiff
Plai~tiff's

Address:

10 Weat Broadway, Sulte 610
Salt ~ake City, Utah 84101
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M.D. D!CT, LLC.
535 E. .;sons. SV!TE iHW
SALT L"$£ CITY, UTAH z.!!07
(50;) 293<3 H}C

-PAY
TOTH£
DRDEROF

OL£n &. Ass. (}J:lthoncy Tidweij)
HJ Wd ·Sm:a.dMy~750
S:ili L<k!: Ci1y, lJtllh 84 ID l

F1B5T SECUPJfY ,
fUt.,""7 fJNiON OFr:i;..,,
MIDVAL£. tIT 84047
(l!Ol) 24!H%Cl:l
31.,]/!240

4763
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P--CL/ .l'D:co/3/19 ·-AAR-02D!i3 CL:';! /:£24 Uib£ B/597. 21/USD/'176313
/ l/OOODOOQ021~Q008,1 5'6 /SV • ,10 2122GEGH350/
·-. ,

---- ~

iCl osed i.s the photocopied ,i..teru ycu J;eCjlle.St..ed~ ' }'O!" furt.her E!;SSi&tance
.e·ase call ::.-.a00·-85 9-·3557. \: ·- 800-'J.'O·- WELLS ! Y-'.JtJ have no: J:>een charged
~e fc:r thi.s ~e.rv .ice_

7
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Olson (5529)

MAR 27 2DO?

P.C.
750

Reference No.

363-9966
68515·60676

I:l\J TF.E YBIR.D DIS'I'RICT CDDRT, MIJRRAY DEPP~RTI~fil!J'"f
SJ~LT L~._f\:E COL1:::T-£, STATE ('F CTl~S

JS .A.R.,

et

lNC

21-.

De.fenda12L ( s) .

Il\: TEIS )\CTIOJ\T

1

t.he DefenCant {s) :

fai.led Le
appear CL"ld ansh,.er

Plainti:::-f ts

on

file t.e:rein
, the

sai.d

IJef enCant {s)

in

c:he

to law,
~~ttest

of

;nv ha:nd.1

and the seal of said Court: this
2002.

1

and the

defal~l t

cf
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Mark T Olson (5529}
OLSON llBSOCIATES, P.C.

Attorneys for

PlaL~tiff

10 Vlest
Salt Lake

1

OT

Suite 750
84101

Reference l'lo,

IJefendar~t

( s)

~

T11e Pla.ir.ti£
er1tered tb.e

filed

it.s :::c.use of actionr

tb.e Clerk

defc~ul t

reason of breach of contract, it is hereby.:

entered in fa-;,roi-

cf. Plaintiff

PR::C!.'\FCIPAL 3AL.l1-1<1C2: :PE.EJITD0YIE1\T :::S.JTE:f-:ESJ." FEOJ,·1 12/0S/2GC~~:

F'Il:I?>JG :FEB~
PROCESS SER\lTCE l~EE:
o~rHER CODT:1:' C().STS :
I~TTQR!:Jif~ FEES :

::::
$ 3 2''
'"'

$

CCl1?h~TI1T

RETORH C?..EC!\: FEE:

J ,,

1a

5 }

~?

} .fl

$ 2,
$ 215.VO
$

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 19 Filed 03/18/13 Page 52 of 77

2

Interest as to Defen6a.nt, KELLI LillT.:JP1i11 on total

is 21.00% per ar;num

fro~

until

the date of

is enter.e-ii .in fa\.ror of Plaintiff and

3.

.,,¢

PRI.NCIPP.21 BJl.LFECE:

'{

PROC'ESS SERVICE FEE:
O~~ CODR'T COSTf3:
? ..TI'CRNEY FE:ES f

RETDFJ} CIIBCK

382~59

cy H 01
<: 37 ()'1
$ 1~"' DO

PREJODGMEfv'T IN'I'E'""ri.EST FROM 12 / 0 5 / 2 0 0 l :
COI".!PlJ',I.l'n' FILING F.EE:

$ D 00
0.
[;

FEB~

0 QO
$ D o::;
$ 444 f

LESS .PAYJ'{E!Tl'S R3CET>l!!D:

total

Defend<3..r1t

K£LLI

f

e:xpeilded in collecting s2.id

'
'
JUagrnent:

by exect1tio:c.t or
2002.

DEFEl(D..?iN"'}'·

I

s

Il\-P'OR11?~"2ION':

KEL.l)I 'f.,ffiffiAfIL

'
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-lr'lit>r1i:1r:.t!on

be::fcre and atter th0.
tnrve
\\'~ted

r1eg~ltive

t>.

11-ffec:-r

n~wnber1 fctJ~~_,,.,:anpJe ~~l ~ .. 1

yo1.;r h.:tun!! c

r!:df~ extension

.t-i.n<.J c.re.,>t

en 1ho· 1 !!.q. )c;rt.

carefd\y r t:v[e\v the ·n-ern1~ listed bekrw \"-1he.n tht~y chvck
PV!!r.\~e nl'.:)tt! that the. ~(COL;qt !f'lforrr:..1n~·.w, cunr.+.~c~t:Kl v,.-1e1
nxorde<, <«>ch ,,. b~:1kn1ptc::r, ul·;o rnily ;,ppear wl:r1 your cred:t
ht~d

lati::ar' ln thi:i n:!pt:.1rt

.i,r..x.,,1.Jcv1
n•trrJli4r

:;rm
5'\6 \

Cl!'<. CT MU1U<AY CIY

3-7002/

s ;;r.r..,-rE ST

//' STATE
MU!'>,Rf\Y UT G•\ l (J/

N/;

I 6St)

AMEX

P
BCJ>-:, 78'7 !
FORT LAUDEFDPL:: H..

T)-155016302652

BA[)KONU:

P\) EOX 90 ! 008
~i

VvOP:r'H TX, 76 IQ i
l !7800/ l '

12-19')7/

!997

! I :J.CYJ2!

f~"1vo:vlnµ/

) 1·2002

NA,i
$~OJ

()·./It Cl~1trt1 Jildgn 'IC ;"H, f'la~1itlif

!N<:. Th~ itcrn ;s sd·,i;,d1..1i~;;;-.~ ~:o
on r·ccord Lni;ii 3~2009.
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DISTR.ICT COURT MURRAY COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF tJT.ilJi

MINUTES

NlL~,

MOTION TO SET fl.BIDE J1JDGY&\<"T

Case No: 020201658 DC

VS.

C~
Da~e:

FR?;.TTO

May 29, 2002

PRESENT

Defendant{s) ~
LUl\'D?~!'.iL
Plaintiff's· Atrl~orney(s}: !"lA.'RlC
Audio
·
Tape Number:

02-265

T OLSON

Tape ColL"'lt: 3530-5.920 .

JIB.AIU NG

TAPE:

02-265

.cou:NT; 3530-

0n record

This matt€r
before the court on the defendant's motion to set
aside the default judgment.
The default juµgment is set aside.
To be set for ~rial'..
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Mark T. Olson (5529)
OLSON ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Plaintiff
nr:ci;~~·v 1 Suite 750
U7 84101
) 363-9966

Reference No.

68515-60676

IN TI·D~ THIRD DISTRICT COURT, MV'i~.Rl-'.Y DEPAR'.I1>';El>JT
SAL'I IJL'ili COUN'.I'Y I STATE OP D'l'l\11

MCY:rION TO DISMISS
PPEJDlJ I CE

J:LA.

Case No

020201658

t.~

p:.rrsuan.t

witC

to

Rule

41

f

tJ'tah

Rc.les

of

.p:

Ci \ril

l=)rccedure

This motion is based

of act.icr1 'Upon

C>Il

tb.e fact that

wh.icb th:is action was

the

based h.as been

the satisfaction o:f Plaintiff and L";efendai.;_t (s)
D~...TED

cause
set:.t.1 ed to

~

this 13 <lc.J." of Ju..ne, £002.

A;:tor:neys fo:c Plaint.iff

This is a cc;rrrnunicatioD from a de~ct colle:ctor. !rhis is c:r1
to collect a debt. ~"A.ny infO?Fi2tio:r;_ obtained v,rill be used
purpose.
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Ha:rk T. Olson (5529)
OLSON ASSOCIATES, P.C
Plaintiff

Reterence 1-Io ~

S:::ite 75C
84101
363 9966
68515·60676

L"'J Z...:r:E ?tlIRD DISTRICT COGT / M"DR.PJ:..Y
SALT LAKE

comu~y

J

KELLI I.JJND.AJ-IT.i

JO:tf!i B.EhwE

is dis:m.issed
DJ!.TED

~~>Ii tb

thJs
BY TiB COLTR:I

~his

is t.~_ COfft:'T;u::;icat ion froru
to collect a detn:. :P.22.'{
r:r:..:rpc::;{:.

DEPP.:RTr'iED,,tT

STATE GF L....rr?B

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 19 Filed 03/18/13 Page 60 of 77
}

9

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 19 Filed 03/18/13 Page 61 of 77

THIF..D DISTRICT COURT MURRAY COURT
SA.LT LA.1<E COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NAR,

MHTDTES

Plaintiff,

OBJ TO DISMISSP.L H:Ell.RJNG

vs.

Case No: 020201658 DC

KELLI LUNDAHL
Defendant.

Judge:

BRUCE LUBECK

Date:

Ji.lly s, 2002

FP..ESE:tJT

Defendant{s): KELLI LDNTIAHL
Plaintiff• s Attornev (s) : JIK.ARK T OLSON
Audio
Tape Number:
02-345
Tape Count: 545

REARING
TAPE: 02-345

COUNT: 545

Mark Olsen appearing for NAR. Deft Kelli Lundahl appearing.
COUNT: 598
Kelli Lundall addresses the court regarding her opposition to the
Judge signing the dismissal. Case was not set on the calendar
because of the dismissal filed. Deft requestino the Dismissal
Order to be set aside as she has filed a -counte~ claim.
COUNT: 1053

Mark Olsen presents his agrument.
COl~'T:

12213

Court after hearing the arguments and concerned about.missing
documents in the file ordereu that the Dismissal Order to be set
aside. Court to prepare a complete file with all documents intact
and set the case for another Pre-trial.
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Case No: 020201558

Date:

·Jul 08, 2002

Dated this

.f(__ day

of
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II
i
RONALD F. PRlCE • 5535
PARSONS, DAVlES, KINGHORN

& PETERS

185 South State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-4300
Facsimile: (801) 363-4378

IN THE THIRD JUDIC1Al DISTRICT COURT,
STATE Of UTAH, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

KELL! LUNDAHi-. ET AL.,

Defendants.
HOLLI LUNDAHL,
Counterclaim/Plaintiff,

Civil No. 020201658

vs.
MARKT. OLSON; OLSON AsSOCIATes,

P.C.; ANTHONY C. TIDWELL, D.D.S.
OLYMPUS VlEW DENTAL AND

Judge Anthony Quinn .

1

N.A.R.,

CounterclaimJDefendants.

Counterclaim defendants' application for award of attomeys's fees came before
the Court for hearing on 16 January 2003, at 9:00 a.m. Counterclaim defendants Mark

Olson and Olson Associates, L.C. were present, and plaintiff and counterclaim

defendants were represented by their attorney Ronald F. Price of the law firm of Parsons,

I
l

\I.

Jj

ID
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Davies, Kinghorn & Peters. Defendant and counterclaim plaintiff Kem Lundahl was

A.rm.§ 76-10-1601 st seq ..

Court at the

he!c! Oil 16

awards

and counterclaim

defendants attorneys' fees in the amount of $4,517 .22.

Additionally, and for the reasons stated at the 16 Januacy 2003 hearing, the Court,

on its own motion, hereby strikes any and all papers filed in this matter by Holli Lundahl.
Now, therefore, being fUiiy advlsed in the premises, and having previously entered

its order re: counterclaim defendants' motion for summary jt:dgment and related motions.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1.

That plaintiff's complaint. and all claims asserted therein, be, and the same

hereby are, dismissed with prejudice.
2.

That·younterclatm..Sefo~am Hom Lundah!'s counterclaim, and all claims

asserted therein, be, and the same hereby are, dismissed with prejudice.

Case

2:12-cv-0028~-SWS
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II
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ii

l!
11
1

3.

l

Judgment is entered In favor of plaintiff and counterclaim defendants and

againstemh1111luim defendant Kem Lundahlln the amount of $4,517.22, with such sum 1

l

to bear interest at the judgment rate.

I
I

1
J

4.

It is further ordered that this judgment against Kelli Lundahl shall be

augmented in the amount of reasona~e costs and attorneys' fees against ccunterclalm

i plainmf Kelii Lundahl expended in collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise .as

Ii shall be established by
ii
!I

of

11

ii

!I

11

I

1
11

t

l

Approved as to Form:

CONSTANTINO LAW OFFICE, P.C.

Greg Constantino

2003 .

I.

I
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.. FILED

V1AH S!JPAEME C01Jfi7

· HoJliLundahl
200 E. Center Street
Or.e~ Utah 84-05 7

"1r..? .2 B2003

PAT.aAArttoJ.OMEW
.CLERK OF mt: ccivm
t.iTAH. SUPREME
. COURT

HOLLI UJNDAf:IL
Petitioner

: MOTION FOR.SUMl\iiARY
DIS).-iISSAL OF PETITION
FOR EXTRAORDINARY
.
. Vv'RIT
AS MOOT

Ancilla..7 Proceedings to i'l:illd Jtidicial Di.strict CoU.rt
Case.no. 020201658

NAR.INC
Plaintiff
v

HOLLI LUN"DAHL as .
.·Defendant assignee. to coottaet
Ciaims·of K.~ Lundahl

Third Judicial District Court case
no. -02020 Hi58

HOLLI. LUJ:IDAHL as assignee
To coµntercl.a~s [Set off claims}
Of Kelli Lun&h1
Countero1aim Plaintiff,
v
NAR, lNC., MARK OLSON,
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OLSON & ASSO,...."t~ . SS P.C.~
OLY}JPUS VIEW DIDffAL,
ANTIIOf-.i-ry TIDWELL DDS Al\i"D
DOES COUNTERCLAIM
DEFE1'i1JAi-rrs

Petitioner Holli Lundahl hereby moves this court for summruy
dismissaJ ()f the Petition for Ex:t.ra-Ordinary relieffiled wit.h this court by

toentera

filed by Holli Lundahl in December 2002 and January 2003 •

This dismissal is required because said petition ~ been rendered
moot by order entered by Jµdge Quinn on February 13, 2003 in re Third
Judicial District Court case no. 020201tf8 md attached he.."eto as exrubit

"'A".

The judgment adds Hom Lundahl as a party to i.heaction by a

rilling 011 the merits of Holli Lundahls cotmterclaims S'llhject: matter of her 2
First Amended Counterclaim filed wlli the trial court on December 6, 2002;

therefor:e implying that thecourt granted Holli Lundahl's motion to
intervene and mooting petitioners request herein.to direcUudge QuIDn to

enter a ruling on LUNDAHL's Notices to Submit for decision LlNDAHL's

motion' to intervene.

11

d

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 19 Filed 03/18/13 Page 70 of 77

In addition to the foregoing, on January 31, 200~ Holli Umdahl
filed chapter 13 bankrutpcy. As the defendant assignee to the OLYMPUS
VIEW dental contract and the underlying case here~ this court is
permanently enjoined by the automatic stay ofthebankmptcycode from

court

no impact upon enforcement of the ru..1:om.atic stay.

Dated: March 28, 2003

Certificate of Service

The undersigned certifies mat she served this motion for SUllllil&Y
dismissal upon the following parties:

Brent JQ!:m.son
Atty
Judge Quinn
450 S. State Street

SLC, Utah 84111
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PROSE

Utah (Central)
FOR CASE #: 2:03-cv-01083-DB

Lundahl v. NAR, et al
Assigned to: Judge Dee Benson
Demand: $0
Case in other court: 04-04224
US Bkrcy Dist UT, 03-02317
USBkrcy Dist Uf, 03-21660
USCA 10th Circuit, 04-04224
Cause: 28:0157 Motion for Withdrawal of Reference

Date Filed: 12/H/2003
Date Terminated: 09/0112004
Jury Demand: Defendant
Nature of Suit: 423 Bankruptcy Withdraw!
Jurisdiction: Federal Question

represented

Hom Lundahl
139868

CACHE COlJNTY JAIL
E-3
1225 W VALLEY VIEW STE l 00
1

PROSE
V.

Respondent

NAR

represented by Ronald F. Price
5742 W HAROLD GATIY DR
SALT LAKE CHY, lJf 84116
(801)530-2964
Fax: (801) 322-2003
Email: ronprice@ppktrial.com
LEAD AITORNEY
AITORNEY TO BE iVOTJCED

Respondent

Tom Olson

represented by Ronald F. Price
(See above for address)
LEAD ATFORlvEY
AITORl'vEY TO BE NOTICED

Olson & Associates

represented by Ronald F. Price
(See above for address)
LEAD A HORNEY
A1TORNEY TO BE N011CED

\I .

II

l:J...
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SECOND Motion
Holli Lundahl to amend counterclaim to add additional parties and
claims for wi!lfu 1 violation of the automatic stay and removal statutes (kvs) (Entered:
07 /26/2004)
07/27/2004

29 Memorandum by Holli Lundahl in
to [18-1] motion to enjoin Holli Lundahl
from commencing any litigation against NAR, Mark T. Olson, Olsen Associates,
without first obtaining leave from this court

Holli Lundahl on
-,,n,hr-~•,. of service [29-i] opposition memorandum, [29-2] motion to file a second
amended coi.mterc!aim in accordance with the present status of the case, [29-l) motion
and -1/J/03
!]

07/28/2004

of the summonses

07/28/2004
change of address (kvs) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
Order mooting [18-1) motion to enjoin Holli Lundahl from commencing any litigation
against NA.Tl, Mark T. Olson, Olsen Associates, Anthony Tidwell and Olympus View
Dental without first obtaining leave from this court (See order for details)signed by
Chief Judge Dee Benson , 8/24/04 cc:atty (kvs) (Entered: 08126/2004)
08/25/2004

36 Order granting [10-JJ ex parte motion for leave to file overlength memo sig,11ed by
cc;atty (kvs) (Entered: 08/26/2004)

08/25/2004

to extend time until 115103 for p!a to resp to Safety lnv's
mot'remand action to state court signed by Chief Judge Dee Benson , 8/24/04 cc:atty
{kvs) (Entered: 08/26/2004) ·

09/0J/2004

38 Order granting [2-1 Jmotion to withdraw the reference, granting [3-2] motion to dismiss,
mooting (3-l J motion to remand, denying r7- l l cross motion for sanctions of default
judgment and recommendation of disciplinary action against the license of Ronald
Price, denying [7-1] cross motion for Declaratory Judgment, denying [28- J] motion to
amend counterclaim to add additional parties and claims for willful violation of the
automatic stay and removal statutes signed by Chief Judge Dee Benson. 813 J/04 cc:att\
(kvs) (Entered: 09/0 !/2004}
.
•

09/0l/2004

per docket no. 38 (kvs) (Entered: 09/01/2004)
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District of Utah· Live Database 03-2J66t,

PROSE, DISMISSED, CLOSED

U.S. Bankruptcy Court
District of Utah (Salt Lake.City)
Bankruptcy Petition #: 03-21660
Date filed: 01131/2003
Assigned to: WiUi.am T. Thurman
Date terminated: 01/0412006
Chapter 13

Voluntary
Asset
represented by Holli Lundahl

Debtor
Holli Lundahl
200 East Center Street

PROSE

Orem., UT 84057

UTAH-Ur
80 l-368-5 707
SSN I ITIN
Trustee
An1:!xes' Diaz tr

9
Place
Suite 313
Salt Lake City, lJT 84111
(801) 537-1910

U.S. Trilslee
Unih::d States Trustee
#9 Exchange Place
Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 8411i-2147

#

Docket Text
The Trustee has filed a Final Account ofTnistee and has
certified that the estate has been fully administered, and oo
timely objection has been filed. Accordingly, it is ORDERED
that the trustee is discharged and TIIB CASE IS HEREBY
CLOSED. Judge William T. Thurman (kmc,) {EOD:
01/04/2006)
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05103/2006

10:49:00

CLERKS O!"FlCE

RC006
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HOLLI LUNDAHL
10!!21 S. OLD HWY 191
MAlAD IO 83252

14 16S !ll!E T<l779
14 HiS ;31!E T.:1779
NAR, INC. (LIENOR}

13'!962

0411!712001! 03::ZOp

$9.00

056 ·DEED, WARRANTY, SPECIAL

NORTHERN TITLE COMPANY

14 HlS 3GE T-37711
14 H!S 3BE T·3779
GAANTOR; SECURITY NATIONAL MORTGAGE COMPANY
GRANTEE! KEDDrNGTON, JAMES ·
LUNDAHL, HOLLI
MARCHANT, MARIE
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Marti Lundahl
PO Box 2814
Evanston, WY 82931
307-352-9577
Fax# 307-212-6888
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'
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<
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ulc' nRR 18 AfTJ lo 51
STEPHAN ;
s, CLERi\
CASPER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF WYOMING
CASPER DIVISION
MARTI LUNDAHL

Case No. 2012· CV - 280-S

VERIFIED

Plaintiff
VS.

AMERICAN BANKERS
COMPANY OF FLORIDA

Plaintiffs Motion For A Declaratory
Judgment To Decree The May 24,
Contempt Judgment Entered
Court Case No.
I

To Be Considered After Considering :
Plaintiffs Motion For A Declaratory
Decree Finding The March 17, 2004
Utah District Court NAR Attorneys
Fees Judgment And The April 3,
2003 Utah Supreme Court Civil
Contempt And Attorneys Fees
Judgment, Both Entered Against
Holli Lundahl VOID As A Matter
Of Law And To Vacate Same

Comes Now Marti Lundahl and files this Motion for a declaratory judgment
decreeing the May 24, 2006 contempt judgment entered in Idaho federal
number 4:05-CV- 127, Holli Lundahl v. NAR, Inc.,
Lundahl, a non party to that action.

court case

void ab initio as applied to Marti

Furthermore, this federal judgment is also void on

it's face as to any person - based on standing defects in the complaining contempt

1
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witnesses who obtained the May 24, 2006 federal contempt order.
To establish the constitutional defects in the May

2006 Idaho federal

contempt order entered in USDC-ldaho case no. 4:05-CV-127,

Plaintiff adopts in full

and incorporates herein,

her motion for a Declaratory decree finding the March 17, 2004

Utah District Court NAR Attorney Fees Judgment and the April 3, 2003 Utah Supreme
Court Civil Contempt and Attorneys fees judgment entered against Holli Lundahl VOID as

a matter of law, as predecessor argument to this motion for declaratory decree ruling
the Idaho May 24, 2006 federal Judgment void ab initio.

Plaintiff has standing to seek this declaratory decree because all of
the aforesaid contempt judgments are being unlawfully applied against plaintiff - to
avoid enforcement of a final Utah money judgment entered in Plaintiff's favor against the
American

lnsurance

of Florida.

Furthermore, Plaintiff was first apprised by an OSC order entered by this District
27,
a

1n

as

above

contempt

by

footnote 2

of that judgment which asserts that plaintiff herein Marti Lundahl is also Hom Lucinda,
the latter a party to that Idaho federal litigation.
herewith,

Marti Lundahl

will file concurrently

a response and supporting affidavit to this Court's February 27, 2013 OSC

which will attest under penalty of perjury that Hom and Marti are not the same persons,
and,

that Marti and Holli have been the victims of a criminal scheme to bar their fair

access to the courts through the corrupt use of various "partial" court offices as criminal
enterprises to achieve the illegal objectives of extortion under color of law and criminal
obstruction of justice by the tort defendants constitutionally liable to Marti and Holli.
Nevertheless before reaching the contempt issues raised in this litigation, it is
necessary for Marti to attack the validity of the two contempt orders upon which this court
predicates Marti's alleged rule 11 violations.

This motion addresses the invalidity of the

Idaho federal contempt judgment entered May 24, 2006 and facially directed against Marti
Lundahl aka Marti Telford.

This Court Has Sua Sponte And Inherent Jurisdiction
To Vacate VOID Judgments That Encumber A Record
The Wyoming Supreme Court held in re Emery v. Emery, 404

2

745 ryvyo.
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08/09/1965) : "The provisions of WY Stat. § 1-325, are irrelevant when the Plaintiff
seeks to vacate a judgment wholly void for lack of jurisdiction, 30A Am.Jur., § 693, p
659. The power of a court to vacate a void judgment is regarded as inherent and

independent of any statutory authority.

A Court will not permit a void judgment

to encumber a record and will vacate the ineffectual entry thereof on application at
any time. 49 C.J.S. Judgments§ 267, pp. 480-481.

A void judgment is not binding.

It confers no rights and equitable relief is mandated

to prevent harm

resulting from the fact that the judgment appears or purports to be valid.
A.LI. Restatement, Judgments,§ 117, p. 565 (1942).
Attached hereto as exhibit "1" is the void March 17, 2004 NAR attorneys fees
judgment which served as the basis of filing the Idaho federal court case, Holli Lundahl
al v. NAR, Inc, et

case no. 4:05 - CV - 127.

This judgment is established as void

pursuant to the showing made in Plaintiff's motion for declaratory judgments decreeing
17,
Court

the
Contempt Judgment,

ab initio.

That Motion should be

considered first by this court before considering this motion.
Attached hereto as exhibit "2" is the lien against Plaintiff's and Holli Lundahl's
Idaho residence by NAR, Inc. and which unequivocally placed jurisdiction in the state of
Idaho to attack this lien /collection process. (Moreover Holli Lundahl could obtain general
personal jurisdiction over the NAR litigants because NAR Inc. does business in the state
of Idaho as a national debt collector.).

See exhibit "3" attached hereto for certificate of

authority for NAR Inc. dated May of 2003.
it is the foregoing VOID process that plaintiff sought to collateraly attack in the
state of Idaho.

INTRODUCTION
Void Judgments Are Subject To Collateral Attack Under
The Declaratory Judgment Act If They Are Prima Facially
Void And They Are Presented For The Purpose Of Inflicting
Harm Against A Party To The Case
The State of Texas recently decided a case where the Plaintiff in the action
collaterally attacked a void judgment in an offensive maneuver in a court of registration in

3
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re Wagner v. D'lorm, 315 S.W.3d 188 (Tex.App. Dist.3 2010). The Defendant moved
to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff offensively
collaterally attacked the void judgment in a different court

under the Declaratory

Judgment Act The Texas Appellate court concurred with the Plaintiff holding that since
the judgment was void as shown

by the face of the record, the judgment could be

collaterally attacked in any forum where collection on the judgment could be made. A part
of the analysis in that case went as follows:
Appellant Ronald R Wagner sued appellees Roberto D'Lorm and Edward P.
Dancause in Travis County district court seeking a declaration that a default
judgment previously obtained by D'Lorm and his attorney, Dancause, against
Wagner in a Zapata County district court was void. D'Lorm med a plea to the
jurisdiction asserting that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to
declare void the judgment of another district court.
Analysis:
The Travis County District Court's Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
in this
from the
of D'Lorm's
to the jurisdiction on the
has
sufficient
facts to
jurisdiction,
a liberal construction of his
pleadings. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. In his petition, Wagner aBeged that the
Zapata County default judgment is void because he was not named as a party to the
prior lawsuit resulting in a judgment against Wagner.
A judgment is void, and thus may be collaterally attacked, if the rendering
court had "no jurisdiction over a party or his property, no jurisdiction of the subject
matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act as a
court." Austin lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex. 1973); see
also Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 {Tex. 2005) (same); Mapco, inc. v.
Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (same). Ely v. United
States Coal & Coke Co., 243 Ky. 725, 49 S.W.2d 1021; McDonald v. Mabee, 243
U.S. 90, 37 S.Ct 343, 61 L.Ed. 608 {1917). LR.A. 1917F, 458; Restatement of the
Law of Judgments, §§ 6, 8, and 117;1 Freeman on Judgments, §§ 226, 228, and
339. This Court has also held that a judgment may be collaterally attacked because
of "fundamental error." Texas Dep't of Transp. v. T. Brown Constructors, lnc., 947
S.W.2d 655, 659 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, pet. Denied). A court's rendition of
judgment against a party not named in the suit is fundamental error. Mapco, Inc. v.
Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex. 1991).
Here, Wagner pleaded that he was neither named as a party nor served with
process. If true, that would mean that the Zapata County district court committed
fundamental error by rendering judgment against Wagner because he was not a
party, see id. 1 The default judgment rendered against him would be void and
subject to collateral attack. See Austin lndep. Sch. Dist., 495 S. W.2d at 881.

1.
Likewise here. Marti complains that she was not named a party to the Idaho
federal litigation in re Holli Lundahl v. NAR, !nc.4:05-CV-127 and therefore it was
fundamental error for the trial court to have entered a judgment against Marti.
Furthermore, Marti contends that the court
no contempt jurisdiction over Marti
because no OSC was issued nor served upon Marti in order to invoke the court's in
personam contempt jurisdiction over Marti.
4
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D'Lorm asserts that, because the Zapata County court had subject-matter
jurisdiction in that case and the time for filing an appeal from that judgment has
expired, Wagner's only remedy "to attack" the judgment was a proceeding in the
nature of a bill of review.a direct attack. We disagree. Wagner brought his attack
in a different court from the one that rendered the judgment under attack.
Wagner's attack here is properly classified as collateral, not direct This Court
has held that, in a collateral attack, the challenger must show in the record that the
judgment was obtained without jurisdiction. Narvaez v. Maldonado, 127 S.W.3d 313,
317-18 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, no pet.). Alfonso v. Skadden, 251 S.W.3d 52, 55
(Tex. 2008) ("'In order for a collateral attack to be successful the record must
affirmatively reveal the jurisdictional defect."' (quoting White v. White, 179 S.W.2d
503, 506 (Tex. 1944))). See also Browning, 698 S.W.2d at 363 (appeal from
declaration rendered by one court declaring judgment of another court void is
collateral attack); Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Albright, 87 S.W.2d 1092, 1096 (Tex.
1935) (attack on judgment of one court in another court is collateral attack);
ln light of the foregoing, we hold that Wagner's pleadings were sufficient to
give the trial court subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate his claims for
declaratory relief. The court therefore erred when it granted D'lorm's plea to
We reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

same
injunction, as in the case

with respect to

re USDC-ldaho case no.4:05-CV-127.
orders unconstitutionally obtained.

May

ldaho

Likewise, with

judgment

to contempt/injunction

The Supreme Court held in Baker v. Gen Motors

Corp, 522 U.S. 222, 234-36, n 9; 118 S Ct 657; 139 l.Ed.2d 580 (1998) ("if the sister
state injunction order was not constitutionally obtained, full faith and credit cannot
be accorded that judgment in the forum where that judgment comes at issue.
Accord in Chapman v. Krutonog, No. 8214451 (Cal.App. Dist. 2010); Advanced Bionics
Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal 4th 697, 708 .

Void judgments are never given

credit. Prather v. Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 50, 382 P.2d 910, 915 (1963) ("[a] void judgment is
a nullity, and no rights can be based thereon; it can be set aside on motion or can

be collaterally attacked at any time.").
credit applies equally

Other courts have also held that full faith and

to equity decrees as it does money judgments.

McElroy v.

McElroy, 256 A.2d 763 (Del.Ch.1969); Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 92 N.J. Super. 18,
222 A.2d 120 (App.Div.1966); Miller v. Miller, Supra; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
laws§ 102 (1971); 50 C.J.S. Judgments§ 889 h. (1947).

"Full faith and credit extends

to foreign equity decrees or money judgments which order an in personam payment of
money or a duty in equity. Varone v. Varone,

359 F.2d 769 (7th Cir.1966); Rozan v.

Rozan, 49 Cal.2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Ivey v. Ivey, 183 Conn. 490, 439 A.2d 425
(1981); Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682 (1959); Higginbotham v. Higginbotham,

5
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supra; Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 102 comment d (1971)
issue here was the product of a case in which Marti Lundahl

The Judgment

was not named as a party nor was Marti served notice regarding any contempt matter
directed at her in the Idaho federal case. This Court and the Defendant are seeking to
enforce the Idaho federal judgment against Marti because the Idaho federal judge sua
sponte named Marti as subjected to the May 24, 2006 judgment in footnote 2.
Marti has concurrently filed under separate cover an affidavit which attests and
establishes as a matter of fact and law that Holli and Marti are different persons,

it is

Plaintiffs position that the Idaho federal judgment should be declared void and set aside
so as not to impact plaintiff any further in this or any other proceeding in which plaintiff
may become a party.
consequence.

Furthermore, the age of the judgment being attacked bears no

v. One Toshiba Color

See United

if a

now proceeds

213

is

1

157 (1 Ot11 Cir.

can transmute

a

lay out a Statement of Facts relevant to the Idaho federal

judgment

Uncontroverted Facts
1.

Marti adopts the factual history set forth on pages 5-16 of her Motion for

Declaratory Judgment to decree the March 17, 2004 Utah District Court NAR Attorney
Fees Judgment and the April 3, 2003 Utah Supreme Court Civil Contempt and Attorneys
fees judgment entered against Holli Lundahl VOID as a matter of law, .

. as if fully set

forth herein and further states:
2.

In the latter part of 2005, the NAR litigants recorded the void March 17,

2004 attorneys fees judgment against Holli Lundahl in the state of Idaho for enforcement
purposes

(in spite of knowing that the judgment was a nullity.

The March 17, 2004

attorneys fees judgment on it's face pointed to the void Utah Supreme Court civil
contempt judgment See exhibits "1 "and "2" attached for this judgment and recordation.)
3.

The state of Idaho had both general personal jurisdiction over NAR Inc.

(see exhibit "3" attached) and in rem jurisdiction over Holli and Marti's Idaho properties
(refer back to exhibit "2" attached which reflects a special warranty- reconveyance deed
conveying Idaho residential property to Holli Lundahl),

6
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the Idaho wrongful lien act.

4.

As shown in Marti's motion for Declaratory Judgment to decree the March

17, 2044 NAR Attorneys Fees judgment and the April 3, 2003 Utah Supreme Court civil
contempt judgment VOID ab initio,

these judgments were void primarily because of

federal injunctions under the Bankruptcy code

which stripped the state courts of all

subject matter jurisdiction to issue any process against Holli, a chapter 13 debtor.
5.

It is undisputed that Holli Lundahl filed chapter 13 bankruptcy on January

31, 2003 in the state of Utah as Bankruptcy case no. 03-21660.
2003,

On June 10 and 11,

the Bankruptcy Judge Judith Boulden conducted a confirmation hearing in

Lundahl's chapter 13 case and confirmed a modified chapter 13 p!an after disallowing
debts claimed by Eli Lilly, LAHA, the IRS and CNA, which determined were al! VOID.
Bankruptcy Judge

Holli to file an amended plan

19,

her

chapter 13

creditors

See exhibit "4"

No creditor or

in interest

confirmation order.

6.

Three months after Holli's Amended Chapter 13 plan had been confirmed,

another bankruptcy judge invoked jurisdiction over Holli's chapter 13 case and sought to
conduct another confirmation hearing.

Hom filed a Mandamus Petition against

Bankruptcy Judge Thurman barring him from acting unconstitutionally with respect to
Holli's chapter 13

bankruptcy case.

In retaliation to Holli's mandamus petition,

Bankruptcy Judge Thurman dismissed Holli's chapter 13 bankruptcy case asserting that
Holli no longer qualified as a chapter 13 debtor given all of the debts to Eli Lilly, LAHA,
CNA and the IRS were disallowed as VOID. See 11 USC§ 109(e) of the Code requires the
chapter 13 bankruptcy debtor to owe a bonified debt to obtain standing as a debtor under the

Code.)

Bankruptcy Judge Thurman then dismissed without prejudice several of Holli's

"removed cases from other jurisdictions",

for lack of residual subject matter jurisdiction -

given his dismissal order of the main bankruptcy case.

These dismissal orders occurred

while Holli's motions to withdraw the reference of her removed cases, were pending.
7.

When Holli's motions to withdraw the reference of her removed cases

citing personal injury and RICO claims to the Bankruptcy Court reached the single District
Court assigned to all of Holli's cases,

i.e Judge Paul Cassel for disposition,

Judge

Cassell converted al! of Holli's motions into appeals given Holli's bankruptcy case had

7
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been dismissed.

Judge Cassell then entered

same perfunctory affirmance order in

every case dismissed by the Bankruptcy Judge Thurman; thereby also dismissing Holli's
removed cases for lack of residual subject matter jurisdiction, & WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

1

Holli appealed every dismissal because they involved removed cases wherein extensive
litigation had occurred for 9 years or less. In late October and November of 2005, the

1otn circuit would essentially affirm each dismissal judgment entered by Judge Paul
Cassell. Under the Utah Savings statute,

Holli then had one year to re-bring ail of her

dismissed claims in another forum from the date the appellate mandates were returned to
the District court in late November and December of 2005.
Plaintiff now lists the relevant cases dismissed without prejudice in the Utah
and

101h

circuit courts sitting in Bankruptcy,

as these non-prejudicial dismissal

dispositions are relevant to the lies and fraud upon the court perpetrated in the Idaho
case

of

case no. 4:05-CV-127.

Bankruptcy Removal Proceedings As To Eli Lilly et, al,
(1}

On September 15, 2003, Holli removed 6 related and pending
state and federal cases involving Eli Lilly and Company,
ACS, GE, Pacific Mutual Insurance Company (PIMCO), Doug
Murdock and others, AND dating back as early as 1992, to the
Utah Bankruptcy Court as Adversary proceeding# 03-P-02402.
Attached hereto as exhibit "5" is that removal petition filed in
USDC-Utah case no. 2:04-CV-88, Judge Paul Cassell presiding.
Attached hereto as exhibit "5" is the removal petition filed in the
Utah federal court.

1. Judge Cassell made subsequently mooted inaccurate assertions in his perfunctory
dismissal orders, to wit: that Holli failed to properly serve summonses on the defendants in her
adversary proceedings and that Holli failed to prosecute her appeals. First and Foremost, the
summonses had been properly served on the defendants when the process had been initiated in
other jurisdictions before removal to the district court. After removal, a plaintiff is not required to
serve the defendant with a new summons. Finally, with respect to prosecuting her matters as
appeals, in the first paragraph of every order, Judge Cassell admitted that he had converted
Holli's motions to withdraw the references into appeals at the time he issued his dismissal orders.
Hence Holli was given no notice that Judge Cassell would proceed on the matter as an appeal.
Nevertheless, the final rulings dismissing the cases without prejudice mooted all interlocutory and
ancillary rulings. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env., 523 U.S. 83, 100 n.3 (1998) (a
determination that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a claim moots any other
challenge to the claim. Indeed, we have no power to decide any ancillary issue if we lack
jurisdiction. See id. At 93-102.) Accord in Beierle v. Colorado Department of Corrections, No.
03-117 4 (10th Cir. 10122/2003)

8
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(2)

The returns of summonses in the removed proceedings were
filed in the original actions. See exhibit "6" attached for just
one docket record showing returns of summonses in a
removed federal case against Eli Lilly. Also attached to
exhibit "5" is a certificate of service showing service of the
removal petition on the name parties.

(3)

Attached hereto as exhibit "7" is the dismissal order entered
by Judge Paul Cassell and affirmed on appeal by the 1Olh
Circuit in November of 2005. As can be seen by this order,

the dismissal was without prejudice.
(4)

EU LILLY would falsely advocate in the Idaho federal action
that HOLLI was declared a vexatious litigant in the California
Courts. Attached hereto as exhibit "8" the California Federal
Docket showing at PACER Doc. 147, the California Federal
Judge
LILLY's request to declare Holli
In
fact no
trial court declared Hom vexatious.

(1)

Holli removed her litigation pending against CNA Financial
Corporation and the Comptons to the Utah Bankruptcy Court
As Adversary Proceeding # 03-P-2336. This case was moved
to District Judge Paul Cassell's court and assigned case no.
2:04-CV-88 PGC. On September 1, 2004, Judge Paul Cassell
dismissed Holli's removed cases against CNA and the
Comptons without prejudice. Attached hereto as exhibit
"9" is this dismissal order. The dismissal was affirmed on
Appeal by the 1ou1 Circuit and the appellate mandate returned
to the District Court in November of 2005.

Idaho Proceedings Re LAHA
(1)

In 2005, Los Angeles Home-Owners Aid filed a federal case
against Hom in the Idaho federal court as 4:05-cv-00126-BLW.
This case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because an involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed against
HOLLI in California in February of 2005.

When the Idaho federal judge allowed intermeddling by the foregoing non-parties
into the Idaho federal litigation against NAR, Inc., the foregoing intermedd!ers would file
false petitions to the Idaho judge claiming that HOLU had tried her claims against these

9
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persons and had lost on the merits, and that HOLLI had been validly declared vexatious
in California trial courts, the Utah Supreme Court and the Idaho federal court. (Noting
that before one can be declared vexatious,

the Court must have jurisdiction over the

Catholic Conference, 487 U.S. At 74-5.).

subject matter.

The record shows that no

vexatious litigant order was issued by the California trial court (refer back to exhibit "8"
attached) or by the Idaho federal court.

Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court and the

Idaho federal court lacked jurisdiction to enter any contempt orders against Holli.

8.

After NAR obtained their illegal and void attorneys fees judgments against

Holli, NAR- a national collection agency, published these void judgments all over the
internet in continuing publications -

thereby causing significant damages to Hom and

other partner's commercial interests. NAR also recorded these void judgments against
Holli's credit report.
9.

Holli

federal court in Idaho.

in

brought

2

The Idaho federal action case no. 4:05-CV-i 27 was

(1) void and vacate : (a) the NAR lien,
NAR Attorneys Fees Judgment,

to :

(b) the March 17, 2004 Utah District Court

and (c) the April 3, 2003 Utah Supreme Court Civil

Contempt Judgment; all under the Declaratory Judgment Act;

(2)

seek remedy under

the Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act against NAR, Inc and her co- conspirators,
and (3) seek treble damages against NAR Inc. under the RICO statute for substantial
injury to plaintiffs economic business interests as a result of NAR's fraudulent conduct.
See Deck v. Engineered Laminates et. al, 349 F.3d 1253 (1 oth Cir. 2003) (authorizing
RICO actions for fraud related conduct that effects economic interests when mails or
wires are used.}.

Plaintiffs S. Walker and Mari Galhardo were business partners with

Plaintiff Holli Lundahl and were therefore also injured.
10.

The Idaho federal action also sought prospective declaratory and

injunctive relief against the Utah Supreme Court
judgment against Holli - under Section 1983.

justices entering the civil contempt

No where in the complaint did Holli seek

money damages against these judicial officials as she knew such action would be barred
by judicial

immunities.

When Holli learned of a

gth

circuit ruling in re

Wolfe v.

Strankman, No. 02-15720 (91n Cir. 2004) which instructed that a litigant suing under a
vexatious litigant statute must sue only the chair of the judicial council in his administrative
capacity as the enforcer of the statute or rule,

10

Holli filed an amended complaint on April
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7, 2006, naming only Utah justice Christine Durham in her administrative capacity.
tendered the amended complaint to the federal clerk who refused

Hom

to file the First

Amended Complaint pursuant to instructions of the sitting federal judge Richard Tallman.
(See supporting affidavit of Holli Lundahl.) In July of 2006, the federal clerk sent Holli a
letter indicating that they were returning Holli's First Amended Complaint because Judge
Tallman instructed the clerks not to file this document; in express violation of FRCP Rule
15(a). Attached hereto as exhibit "10" is the federal clerk's letter.
11.

Immediately after Holli and other plaintiffs submitted their First Amended

Complaint for filing on April 7, 2006, the federal judge sitting on the Idaho litigation as
PACER Doc. no. 19,

issued an OSC directed at Hom Lundahl only to show cause why

the federal court should not declare Holli a vexatious litigant pursuant to the void Utah
Court

March 1
as

Doc. no.

adequate

order after

procedure

that he failed to

an

The OSC was amended to provide for certified mail

return receipt requested delivery of the OSC upon Holli at Holli's claimed Malad, Idaho
address. See Court docket reflecting these OSC notices as exhibit "11" attached hereto.

12.
issued,
tortious

Holli received the OSC at her home in Malad Idaho.

various non-parties invited themselves into Holli's

After the OSC

Idaho federal litigation as

intermeddlers and sought to advance a broad contempt judgment/injunction

against Holli which would bar Holli's prospective litigation against these tortfeasors - given
the prior dismissals without prejudice rulings entered in Hollis prior cases against these
persons in the Utah Bankruptcy Courts.

2

2. The docket record in the Idaho federal litigation shows the following
appearances by tortious intermeddlers into Hollis Idaho federal litigation:
(a)
As PACER Doc. no. 26:
lntermeddlers Eli Lilly, Advanced
Cardiovascular Systems, Pacific Life Insurance Company (PIMCO), GE, Prudential and
Citigroup, collectively filed a petition asserting abusive and criminal litigation practices by
Hom dating back to 1992 when Holli commenced litigation against Eli Lilly, et al. LILLY
falsely claimed that all of Hollis claims against LILLY had been determined on their merits
against Holli. that Holli had been declared a vexatious litigant by the California trial court,
and that ULLY had spent over $1,000,000 in attorneys fees fighting Holli's allegedly
frivolous claims. (One would ask why it would cost $1 million to defeat frivolous petitions
unless in fact the petitions were not frivolous.). Refer back to exhibit
for dismissal
order of claims against LILLY et al, without prejudice.
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13.

Hom appeared at the hearing and argued the following grounds for

removing Judge Taliman from the cause:
(1) mandatory disqualification because Judge Taliman owned upwards
of $250,000 stock interests in PIMCO aka
Pacific Life Insurance Company,
a
complaining intermeddler and joint tortfeasor in Holli's lawsuit against Eli Lilly and
Company. (Refer back to exhibit "5" attached for joint tortfeasors.). Because of this stock
interest, Judge Tallman was barred from sitting on Holli's contempt proceeding as a
matter of law under the Judicial Disqualification statute. See exhibit "12" attached for
Judge Tallman's financial report for 2006. See exhibit "13" attached for information on
PIMCO. Judge Tallman refused to recuse himself.
(2)
HOLLI next argued that not one party to the case had filed a
petition for contempt between the dates of the issuance of the OSC on April 7, 2006 and
the hearing date on May 15, 2006 and therefore the judge lacked jurisdiction under rule
11 to enter any contempt order against Holli. In response Judge Tallman indicated
jurisdiction over
inherent

n~
~
fue
the court had no jurisdiction over the petitions submitted by
Holli complained
the intermeddlers lacked standing to interfere with her litgation
against the NAR defendants. Judge Tallman did not respond to this contention during the
hearing.

(4) In closing, Holli pointed out to the court that the volunteer inter-meddlers had filed petitions containing blatantly false information and that the motive
for doing so was because the intermeddlers knew Hom was going to reopen every one of
her lawsuits dismissed without prejudice during her bankruptcy case and that she had
until November of 2006 to do so. It is clear by Judge TaHman's later produced order, that
this judge had every intention of blocking Holli from ever re-filing any of her suits against
the intermeddlers ..

(b)
As Pacer Doc no. 23, lntermeddler LAHA claimed that Holli
engaged in abusive litigation by invoking the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to
summarily litigate all of her claims in one forum convenient to Holli, the debtor.
{c)
As Pacer Doc. Nos. 27, 28 and 29, the CNA and Compton
Defendants filed numerous corrected petitions asserting that Holli lost her claims against
them on its merits, that these persons feared Holli would pursue litigation against them
again, and that Holli allegedly engaged in service fraud by repeatedly filing numerous
false certificates of services asserting that represented counsel was served with
respective motions. (Refer back to exhibit "9" attached for dismissal order as to CNA, et
al.). Furthermore, Holli maintains a third party fax account and also emails process to
maintain a verifiable record of service. In addition, Holli is well known for videotaping
personal service of process. In fact as Pacer Doc. no. 55 in re USDC-!daho case no.
4:05-CV-460, Holli provided videotapes of all of her services on the defendants. See
exhibit "14' attached.
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Almost two weeks later on May 24,2013, Judge Tallman entered a scathing
and corrupt Memorandum Decision against Holli which tantamounted to a criminal
indictment.
Judge Tallman prefaced his decision
jurisdictional bases'

by first

manipulating

the facts and

for Plaintiff's claims against the NAR defendants and the Utah

Supreme Court justices. Judge Tallman made the following findings

Re The Utah Supreme Court Contempt Judgment
(1) Lundahl v. NAR, Inc., 434 F.Supp.2d@ 856-857 (ID, 2006):
The Court finds that the present case, Lundahl v. NAR, Inc., 4:05-cva blatant attempt to
00127-RCT,
were
as
Lundahl v. Quinn, 67 P.3d 1000, 1001
that it is frivolous.").
further
Lundah!'s
to
collateral
below that
operandi is to re!itigate
in a new
jurisdiction once they have been dismissed
as frivolous.
Judge Tallman was referring to the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt
judgment. As shown in Plaintiff's Motion to attack this judgment, this Writ
action was filed to compel Judge Quinn to address Holli's Notices to submit
for decision. Judge Quinn did address Hollis notice to submit two months
before the Writ Petition was decided, thereby mooting the Writ petition.
Nevertheless, the Writ Petition did not address the merits of the underlying
action and this fact was evident from reading the contempt judgment itself.
Irrespective, the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment suffered
from other fatal jurisdictional defects aside from the fact it had been mooted
two months before the Utah Supreme Court sat on the matter. As argued in
Plaintiffs motion to attack this judgment, it violated the automatic stay and
removal statutes of the bankruptcy code and the contempt judgment was
entered ex parte and without notice to Holli. There was also structural error
in the Judgment because it directed the trial court to enter an attorneys fees
judgment for litigation activities which admittedly occurred at the appellate
level in violation of URCP rule 11 and URAP rule 38.

Re Holli's Idaho Residence Address
(2) Lundahl v. NAR, Inc., 434 F.Supp.2d@ 857 (ID, 2006):
This Court also has reason to believe that Plaintiff is not a resident of
Idaho, given the numerous addresses she has used in this Court and the
fact that Court mail to various plaintiffs in her actions is returned as
undeliverable. See exhibit "17" attached for Oneida County Tax record

13
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showing ownership by Holli of the Malad Property.
Judge Tallman's finding with this respect to Hollis Idaho residency was
remarkable in light of the fact that Judge Tallman caused Hom to be served
with the OSC at her Malad, Idaho residence and NAR attached this
residence to pay off it's void March 17, 2004 Attorneys fees judgment.

Re the 1997 Ninth Circuit Vexatious litigant Order
(3) Lundahl v. NAR, Inc., 434 F.Supp.2d @ 858 (ID, 2006):
In re Holli Lundahl, No. 97-80258, Order (9th Cir. July 17, 1997), the gm
circuit issued an Order to Show Cause, listing nineteen (19) cases which
had been initiated by Lundahl in that court. Of those, seventeen (17) had
been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit concluded that
"Respondent's practice of burdening this court with meritless litigation
justifies careful oversight of respondent's future litigation in this court." Id
Judge
failed to acknowledge
the
pre-filing injunction.
(1)

in 1998
Lundahl in Utah.
One, an arm
into
Eli Lilly's corporate malfeasance
introduced exhibit "1
foreclosure litigation against Holli. The 9th circuit docket as it then existed
bore a non-existent P.O.Box address for Holli which the gm circuit then
claimed to have served notice of the OSC upon Holli. During the Utah
litigation seeking to foreclose on Holli's property, property records were
produced which showed that Holli resided at and owned 2748 N. 930 E.
Provo, UT. See the records extracted from this state litigation as exhibit
"16" attached hereto. Since the gm circuit did not serve Holli with the OSC at
Holli's correct residence address, no notice was given to Holli of the 9th
circuit pre-filing order, thus rendering it VOID. Also, because Holli procedurally defaulted the contempt action buttresses the contention of no notice.
uu-.."c' as it

3.

The 9111 Circuit Contempt/ Injunction Order was Void Because No
Notice Was Served Upon Holli To Give Hom

See WILSON v. NORTH CAROLINA, 169 U.S. 586 (1898) (When the contemnor
denies service of the rule to show cause, the writ must be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction and the rule to show cause, discharged.). See also Peay v. Bell South Med.
Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant only if the procedural requirements for service of process are
satisfied and the exercise of jurisdiction satisfies due process). Also see Ministry of Defense v.
Cubic Defense, 385 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2004) (Citing In re Center Wholesale, Inc., 759 F.2d 1440,
1448 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding judgment void because aggrieved party had not received
adequate notice of the proceedings .) Same in Printed Media SeTVS., Inc. v. Solna Web, Inc.,
11 F.3d 838, 84243 (8th Cir. 1993); SIMON v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY, 236 U.S. 115 (1915)
(United States courts by virtue of their general equity powers have jurisdiction to enjoin the
enforcement of a judgment obtained by fraud or without service. Furthermore, a judgment
against a person on whom no process has been served is not erroneous and voidable, but.
upon principles of natural justice, and also under the due process clause of the Fourteenth and
Fifth Amendments, is absolutely
14
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(2) In addition, the face of exhibit "15" attached shows that the gin
circuit opened an independent action against Holli without any juridical
pleading before the gth circuit court giving that court subject matter
jurisdiction to enter any contempt rule against Holli. This also invalidated
the entire appeal case no. 97-80258 which was in fact unilaterally opened by
the 91h Circuit law clerk Susan Gelmus. 4

4.

The 9th Circuit Did Not Have A Juridicial Petition Before Their
Bar When The Motions Attorney Invalidly Issued A Contempt
Judgment Against Respondent Holli Lundahl; Hence There
Was No Subject Matter Jurisdiction To Enter A Contempt
Order Against Holli

In order for an appellate court to acquire article mpowers, a final judgment raised
by a timely notice of appeal, or a timely injunction appeal must be filed with the appellate
court. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood. 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60
66 (1979).
of
118
921, 139 LEd.2d
392. 107 S.Ct.
318

246 P.
it, and a
is
or not
must fall. So too must a
or sequestrating order
fa!! for other errors of law apparent on the face of the mandatory record, such as showing the
judgment obtained to be at variance with the practice of the court or contrary to well-recognized
principles and fundamentals of the law. Where the face of the record shows that fundamental law
was disregarded in the establishment of the judgment; the proceedings and the judgment will be
rendered null and void for all purposes. ).
Furthermore, in Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 123 S.Ct.
366, 369-70 (2002) the High Court held that "[t]he AU Writs Act does not confer subject matter
jurisdiction on federal courts; there must be an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction in
order to issue a Writ or injunction under the All Writs Act Same in Morris v. T E Marine Corp, 344
F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2003); Hornung v. City of Oakland No. C-05-4825 EMC, (Docket No. 20)
(N.D.CaL 2006) (The All Writs Act by itself does not provide a basis for federal question
jurisdiction.); Retirement Systems v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 386 F.3d 419 (2nd Cir. 2004); Kiay v.
United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir. 2004); In Re Tennant, 359 F'3d 523 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (All Writs Act confers authority to issue writs of mandamus "in aid of the court's prospective
jurisdiction". Hence subject matter jurisdiction must be independently provided by another federal
statute.); U.S. v. Raheman, 355 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2004) (no subject matter jurisdiction in federal
court unless plaintiff's complaint states another federal daim outside of the All Writs Act.)
If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the jurisdiction to render an order of contempt is
also lacking. See also United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 295 (1947) (If
no jurisdiction existed, "then the proceedings were void and the civil contempt citation must be
reversed "in its entirety."}; Magness v. Russian Federation, 247 F.3d 609,619 n. 19 (5th Cir.), csrt.
denied, 122 S.Ct 209 (2001); Followed in Rieser at 1224 (Where a court lacks jurisdiction in a
case, any judgment regarding the case is void. The effect of a void judgment is that it must be
treated as having never existed. A void judgment cannot be recognized by anyone, but must be
entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to
the void judgment It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place .... All
proceedings founded on the void juclgment are themselves regarded as invalid and ineffective for
any purpose.). See also Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1987)(void
judgments can be attacked at any time and in any proceeding where credit is sought to be given
to the void judgment) .
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(3) Also, it is well established that
LILLY had orchestrated
Holli's brutal assaults in 1995 by IRS officers and HCA hospital staff, and
that together these assaults put Holli Lundahl into a coma. It is also well
established that these IRS officers subsequently charged Holli with federal
assault crimes to explain the seriousness of Holli's personal inJunes.
Subject to these fabricated charges, Holli was placed in the MDC in Los
Angeles in a comatose and paralyzed condition until she could be tried on
the charges. Holli's intake medical record at the MDC showed that Holli
was paralyzed and in a coma when she was registered into the medical unit
at the MDC. See exhibit "18" attached. (Holli later brought suit on the
foregoing assault claims. The action was removed to the bankruptcy court
and dismissed without prejudice by Judge Paul Cassell in 2004. See exhibit
"23" attached for the docket record and dismissal without prejudice order.)
Nevertheless, Twenty-one (21) out of the Twenty-two (22) notices
of appeals referenced in the gtn circuits unserved OSC, were filed while
Holli was in a coma in the MDC and awaiting the ability to
tried for the
Hom was
jails

did not
to the gth circuit court
from filing or
records,
of
dismissed
Holli's notices of appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because they
were not based on a final judgment and because no other notarized IFP
papers were submitted by Holli to obtain waiver of filing fees. (This should
have been the first clue that Holli did not execute the Notices of appeals.).
Holli has always maintained that Eli lilly forged Holli's name to the multiple
notices of appeals in order to extract an ex parte and unnoticed pre-filing
order against Holli - having been unsuccessful at doing so at the trial level.
(Refer back to exhibit "8"attached PACER Doc. no. 147 showing this failed
attempt.). It is well established that forged process voids proceedings based
thereon. 5

5.

The Notices of Appeals Supporting The 9th Circuit Contempt I
Injunction Order Were Forged In Respondent's Name Thereby
Rendering Them Void Ab lnitio and Invalidating The Resulting
Contempt/ Injunction Order By The gtn Circuit Court

It is well settled that a document which has been forged is void ab initio. See In re
Orosco, No. 87-1933 (9th Cir. 1988) (forged document is void ab inito). In addition, any document
based on a forged document is likewise void. See In Re Abboud, BAP No. 99-033 (10th Cir. 1999)
citing to Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 US 726 (1946) (judgment is procured by fraud is void ab initio.).
See also Weber Meadow-View Corp. v. Wilde, 575 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah 1978) (where the
record showed subterfuge, devious means, or collusion which prevented a party from fairly
appearing before the court, any resulting judgment is void and must be vacated.); ln re
KOUGASIAN v. TMSL, INC., 359 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2004) (Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
give credit to a judgment obtained by way of extrinsic fraud and fraud upon the court. Citing
Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 80 (1878)). "If the court "finds that fraud played a part in
obtaining a judgment, it will deprive the judgment of any enforcement effect. " McDaniel v. Traylor,
196 us 416, 423.

16
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(4) Finally, the gin circuit vexatious litigant order could no longer be
enforced under California law because vexatious litigant orders are time
limited to 7 years and at the time Judge Tallman purported to enforce this
Accordingly, Judge Tallman could not
void order, it was 9 years old. 6
use this order as a basis to execute another vexatious litigant order in the
Idaho federal litigation.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the gt11 circuit pre-filing order was void ab initio
and could not support Judge Tallman's May 24, 2006 contempt injunction against Holli.
Re The Criminal Fraud Charges Advanced Against Holli

(4) Lundahl v. NAR, Inc., 434 F.Supp.2d @ 858 (ID, 2006):

(1
1
217 (1
Brown, No.
Order {D. Idaho April 7, 2006);
Home-Owners Aid, Inc. v. Lundahl, No.
WL 1140649 (D.
May 13, 2005); Lundahl v. CNA Ins., No. 20010845-CA, 2003 WL 22145999
(Utah App.2003) .
Affidavit of J. Kevin West, No. 4:05-cv-00127-RCT at 2-3 (Docket No. 30)
{noting that Plaintiff signed numerous certificates indicating that service of
process had been made when West did not actually receive the documents
and pleadings); Affidavit of Kent A. Higgins, No. 4:05-cv-00127-RCT at 2
(Docket No. 31) (claiming that a document with a forged signature was filed
in a District of Idaho case).
Footnote 2 : Plaintiff has employed numerous aliases in her past litigation
including, but not limited to, M. H. Telford, Marti Telford, Holli Lundahl, H.
Lundahl, and Marti Lundahl, and Holly Mattie Telford. 7 See, e.g., Telford v.
Brown, No. 4:05-cv-00460-RCT, Order (D. Idaho April 7, 2006). This Order
shall apply to Plaintiff even if she improperly proceeds under one of her
current or future aliases. It will also bind all persons acting in concert
with her.
From 2006 through 2009, Holli would be prosecuted criminally for the foregoing
6. In Wolfe v. Strankman, No. 02-15720
Cir. 2004), the ninth circuit
opined that Wolfe remained on the vexatious litigant list for seven years and on April 19,
1999, Wolfe's name was removed from the list, and the prefiling order against him was
rescinded based on the limitations period set out under the California vexatious litigant
statute.
7. In the Idaho litigation, Judge Tallman found without any evidentiary support
that Holli Lundahl aka Holli Telford was also Marti Lundahl aka Marti Telford.
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fraud and forgery allegations cited in federal judge Taliman's May 24, 2006 contempt
injunction - under the federal perjury statute.

exhibit "19" attached hereto for 302

FBI report admitting to this perjury prosecution.
Wyoming chief federal judge William Downes presided overc allc of Holli's
criminal prosecutions.

Judge Downes refused to allow Holli to represent herself and

ordered representation by the public defender's office. Judge Downes also kept Holli in
the federal prison system as a pre-trial detainee for a period of 3 years while the multiple
criminal cases were pending, in part to: (1) ferret out Holli's alleged prosecutions under
multiple alias names constituting interstate identify fraud,

to force Holli to undergo

(2)

numerous medical examinations which confirmed or invalidated the injuries Holli claimed
to have sustained at the HCA

in

at

of 1

of IRS

in
as asserted in
"1

From 2006 to 2007, federal public defender Robert Steele communicated with
Plaintiff Marti Lundahl via telephone and in writing to obtain defense evidence rebutting
the charged crimes against Holli.
written communication
communication,

from

See exhibit "1" attached to Marti Lundahl's affidavit for

FPO Steele.

As shown

in

FPO

Steele's written

Steele admitted that one of the primary purposes of the criminal

prosecution was to verify Holli's injuries sustained from the 1995 assaults while in custody
of the HCA hospital in orange county, California. (See attached hereto as exhibit "20",
the PACER docket no. 238 in re USA v. Holli Lundahl, case no. USDC-Utah 2:06-CR693 showing that the FDP's office subpoenaed these records on Holli.).
Marti responded

to FPO Steele by providing the requested records, list of

witnesses, a letter from her private doctor, and a demand that Marti be permitted to testify
on Holli's behalf concerning Holli's 1995 witness tampering claims against Eli Lilly, et al..
In her demand letter,

Marti also contended that LILLY and other tortfeasors in Holli's

RICO cases had attempted to witness tamper with Marti in April of 2006, given to very
suspicious circumstances surrounding Marti's near fatal 2006 auto accident by a hit and
run driver operating a 5 ton Hummer without license plates and that ran over the top of
Marti's

hyundai crushing Marti's body inside her small car.

concurrently submitted affidavit in

to this court's

18

the whole of Marti's
3 OSC

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 19 of 118
~

Marti was never given the opportunity to testify because Holli's criminal cases
were dismissed effectively with prejudice upon findings that no probable cause existed
that Holli

committed any the charged and supplemented

crimes.

See exhibit "21"

attached for docket record showing the dismissal order, requiring return of all of Holli's
seized properties and directing that the USA pay for Holli's commercial flight back from
the Federal Medical Center at Carswell Texas to Utah. Holli was finally released from the
FMC in April of 2009. Attached hereto as exhibit "22" is the final dismissal order entered
in all of the federal criminal cases.

Re Conclusion That Holli's Litigations Activities Are Abusive

v.

names
purports to invoke.
number and content of the filings indicate the harassing and frivolous
nature of Lundahl's claims. See De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148.
Marti asserts that the favorable prosecution of the federal criminal proceedings
in Utah from 2006 through 2009, established as a matter of fact and law that Hom did not
engage in any of the crimes or abusive litigation tactics for which she was charged by
Judge Tallman in his May 24, 2006 Injunction order.
2009 [ex. "1" attached to Marti's affidavit],

(See FPO letter to Marti in April of

and admitting that the government was

prosecuting Holli for the crimes alleged in Ta!lman's May 24, 2006 Memorandum
Decision.). Therefore,

not only did TALLMAN lack subject matter jurisdiction over the

contempt proceedings at hand,

his entire order was a RICO instrument based on

complicit fraud of the volunteer intermeddlers.
exhibit "1" attached, PACER doc. no. 20,
Marti,

Furthermore, the docket record shows at

that the OSC was issued directly to Holli, not

and therefore Marti Should not be bound by the void Idaho injunction order

because she had no opportunity to contest the order at the time it was entered.
doctors letter attached as exhibit

(See

to Marti's affidavit establishing that Marti was in a

coma in Utah Valley hospital at the time the OSC was issued and the hearing on the
proceedings were allegedly conducted.). "A nonparty will not be bound by the injunction,
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and, if she has had no opportunity to contest its validity." See Alemite, 42 F.2d at 832
(declaring that a decree which purports to enjoin non- parties "is pro tanto brutum fu!men,"
and must be ignored).

ARGUMENT
The Idaho Federal Contempt /Injunction Judgment is void ab lnitio as to both
Plaintiff Marti Lundahl and contemnor Holli Lundahl on the following legal grounds:

(1)

In

v.

, 11 ldaho 572,

83 P.

956 (1905) :

held that a stranger to the proceeding can not obtain a contempt order) followed in State
v. Bettweiser, Docket No. 32083 (Idaho. App. 2006). In Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714 [24 LEd.
565] (1878), the High Court held : "an OSC must be based on the acts or omissions

of the party named in the complaint and as related to the merits of the action."
"Sanctions must be based on the acts or omissions of the represented party or counsel as
well as the legal merits of the pleading at bar." Zarsky v. Zurick Mgmt, 829 S.W.2d 398,
400 (Tex. App. Houston [14 1h Dist.] 1992, no writ) TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN.§
10.005 (Vernon 2002).
In the Idaho federal contempt proceedings, not one party filed a petition to
contempt Holli in relation to the subject matter or merits of the complaint before the court.
A review of the docket record after the April 7, 2006 OSC issued,

reveals no contempt

petition was filed by a party to the case. Therefore, the OSC was based upon volunteer
intemmeddlers contempt petitions ; all whom had a substantial motive to commit fraud
in their petitions because Hom had the statutory right to reopen her lawsuits against all of
the volunteer intemmeddlers.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are procedural in nature and do not
provide substantive rights.

See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 ("The Supreme

Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules
20
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of evidence" but "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.").
The goal of Rule 11 to deter baseless filings must be effectuated within the limits of the
Rules Enabling Act's grant of authority. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S
384, 393, 110 S.Ct 2427, 2454, 11 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990).

The language used in the

Advisory Committee Notes indicates that it is the parties who are entitled to
sanctions, not non-parties.
Several federal courts have considered the question of non-parties seeking
sanctions in a case in which they were not a named party. In Vesco v. Snedecker, No.
02-2181 (10th Cir., 2003}, the 10th circuit offered the following analysis:
Attorney Livingston filed a motion under Rule 11 of the Federal " Rules of Civil
Procedure requesting an "award of sanctions" caused
[the State] Defendants'
abusive filings. We hold that Attorney Livingston lacks
to file a
the order denying
entered in his clients case,
was not a
to his client's action.
to N. Y
972 F.2d
486
Cir. 1992)

to

,..,..,.,\'.,.,~\'

Int'!, 290 F.3d
may not bring Rule 11 motion for
Westlake
Prop. Owners Ass'n v. City of Thousand Oaks, 915 F2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding attorney for party cannot bring Rule 11 motion for sanctions as he is
not a party to the action.); accord in Port Drum Co. v. Umphrey, 852 F.2d 148
(5th Cir.1988 ) . Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 531, 91 S. Ct. At 542 -43. State of
Montana v. U.S. E.PA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9 1n Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
921 (1998); Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 495 U.S.
82, 110 S. Ct. 1679, 109 l.Ed.2d 74 (1990).
The 10th circuit further opined that in N.Y. News, Inc. v. Kheel, 972 F.2d 482,
486 (2nd Cir. 1992), the 2nd Circuit came to a !ike conclusion as Livingston supra.
Quoting:
" Kheel is an attorney who filed an independent action in federal " court
under Rule 11 to attack RICO charges in a complaint alleging his
involvement with a conspiracy scheme. Kheel however was not a named
party in the RICO complaint. The Kheei court held that Kheel had no right
to move for sanctions under Rule 11 . Kheel's remote interest in a
streamlined, abuse-free judicial system was not a "significantly
protectable interest" that gave Kheel standing to inject himself into
litigation making collateral allegations against Kheel. Even if the nonparty asserts the judgment has an adverse effect, the non-party may not
interject himself into litigation that does not plead that person as a party.
Citing Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (Even if a nonparty asserts
that the judgment, or some action taken by the court in reaching the
judgment, has an adverse effect on him, the nonparty is not allowed to
appeal the judgment as the operative pleading does not set forth facts
alleging the non-party's injury sufficient to grant him standing )

Furthermore,

the All Writs Act does not provide authority to enter a contempt

judgment in a case where standing or jurisdiction is lacking

21
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Protection Inc. v. Henson, 537 US 28 (2002) (Citing Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction

v. United States Marshals Service, 474 US 34, 41 (1985) (All Writs Act "does not authorize
[federal courts] to issue ad hoc writs when jurisdiction is otherwise lacking.)); Gullickson
v. Southwest Airlines Pilots' Ass'n, 87 F.3d 1176, 1186 (10th Cir.1996) (rejecting all

Writs Act as independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction to enter contempt orders.);
Renteria- Gonzales v. l.N.S., 322 F.3d 804, 811 (5th Cir. 2002) ("The All Writs Act does not
confer an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction and thus does not grant the
power to enter contempt orders.)
Based on the foregoing, Judge Taliman's contempt order entered into the docket
record on May 24, 2006 as PACER docket no. 38 was void as a matter of law for lack of
in

a

to

of subject matter

is a

matter jurisdiction to
injunction order

Hom or Marti.

sanction can be imposed absent

Standard v.

May
, 74

Ct.768 (1

of jurisdiction".)

(2) The Idaho Federal Court Civil Contempt Judgment Is Void
Because It Exceeded The Limited And Defined Article Ill
Authority Granted By The Juridicial Pleading At Hand
It is well established that the complaint before the court is the juridicial means
by which the court exercises his article Ill powers. See Stockyards National Bank of So.
Omaha v. Bragg, et al., 67 Utah 60, 246 P. 966 (1925) (It is fundamental law that the
petition filed by plaiintiff is the juridical means of investing a court with jurisdiction
of the subject-matter, and that a judgment which is beyond or not supported by the
pleading must fall.).

Also see Gladstone Realtors v. Villiage of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,

99; 99 S Ct. 1601, 1608; 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979) (For a federal court to acquire subject
matter jurisdiction,

the complaint must set forth the defendant's illegal conduct, must

show a palpable injury suffered by plaintiff which is traceable to the defendant and the
challenged conduct alleged in the complaint ; and must set forth competent legal

redress, or the judgment and the proceedings thereon are void.). Followed In Mid-Mile
Holding Trust v. Pro lndiviso, Inc., 131 Idaho, 741, 746, 963 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1998).
In the NAR complant,

Holli set forth the illegal conduct of the defendant parties

named in that complaint. Holli also alleged the palpable injury she and other plaintiffs

22
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suffered fand traced that palpable injury back to the challenged conduct of the named
defendant parties.

See Morris v. TE. Marine Corp., 344 F.3d 439 (5th cir. 2003) (A

denial of due process occurs when the court issues a prejudicial rule outside the
four corners of a complaint to the substantial injury of a party.).

See also Manway

Construction Co. Inc v. Housing Authority of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501 (2nd Cir.
1983) (Held: The claims against the Bank in the contempt proceeding raised new and
unrelated issues not pleaded in the breach of contract complaint between Manway and
the Authority. Accordingly, the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction to
consider the contempt petition presented by the Authority. Ancillary jurisdiction over the
Bank does not hold because there must have been - a transactional relationship -

is
1

by a court

Cir. 1943) ("A

F.2d

100

lacks jurisdiction over

parties or of the subject matter, or that lacks the inherent power to make or enter the
particular order involved, is void.").

See also RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (SECOND)

§1 (1983).
Here,

the claims advanced

by the

volunteer

intermeddlers

were

transactually related in any manner to the allegations of the NAR complaint .

not

Judge

Tallman lacked authority to expand the allegations of Holli Lundahl's complaint beyond
it's four corners.

Because Judge Tallman did so, the entire NAR prosecution was tainted

by Judge Tallman's unlawful usurpation of federal power and the entire action is bull and
void and should be declared as such.

(3)

Judge Richard Tallman Was Actually Biased And Therefore
Committed Structural Error When He Sat On Holli's Idaho
Litigations
A Number of federal courts have held that owning stock interests in the company

who petitions for relief,

mandates immediate disqualification.

6

6.
See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Affiliated Fm Ins. Co., 343 E3d 120, 123 (2"° Cir.
2003)(Chemica! Bank, merged with The Chase Manhattan Bank under merged entity "Chase".
23
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Judge Taliman had a vested interest of $250,000 stock interests in

PIMCO who stood to benefit from Judge Tallman's broad injunction barring Holli from
suing the petitioning parties. Judge Tallman was therefore actually biased against Hollis
interests and therefore barred from sitting on the contempt proceeding.
In addition, Judge Tallman purported to act as an investigating arm for the
complaining witnesses accusing
Judge Tallman's actions,

Holli of multiple

crimes. When Holli complained of

Judge Tallman deferred the matter to the FBI as shown in

exhibit "19 attached hereto and effectively acted as a complaining witness for the future

2006 through 2009 criminal prosecutions brought against Holli.
acted as an investigator instead of an impartial tribunal,

When Judge Tallman

he committed structural error

1

It is

disqualified for
942 (1955).

Here,

is

appearance of bias." ln re Murchison ,
due process requires nullification of

error,

u

to

1

Judge

because he committed structural error by sitting on Holli's cases.

After the merger, the judge, his wife, and a family trust purchased between $300,000of stock in
the merged entity. At a bench trial, the judge rendered a judgment of $92 million for the Chase in
violation of § 455(b)(4). The case was appealed and subsequently remanded for further
proceedings. See 196 F.3d at 377. The judge immediately divested himself of the Chase stock
and, acting under 28 U.S.C.§ 455{f), thereafter conducted the requisite proceedings on remand.
We hold that the divestiture after remand could not cure the past appearance of a disqualifying
financial interest at the time of trial, and therefore reverse and remand to a different judge.). See
also Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., et.al. v. Ntsebeza, et al., No. 07- 919, Supreme Court of United
States. (May 12, 2008) (Because the Court lacks a quorum, 28 U.S.C. §1, since a majority of
the qualified Justices are own upwards of $15,000 stock interests in the corporate
defendants named in the lawsuit, the judgment of the 2nd Circuit is automatically affirmed
under 28 U.S.C. §2109. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2nd Cir., 2007).
7. See In re U.S., 441 F.3d 44 (1st Cir., 2006) (See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). Just as there is a prohibition against a judge "adjudicating a
case where he appears to act as an investigator for the government," Johnson v. Carroll, 369 F.3d
253, 260 (3rd Cir. 2004), there is a prohibition against a judge adjudicating a case where he has
become an investigator against the government. We order recusal of the present district judge
and direct that the case be assigned on remand to a different judge.). See also Yengo, Matter of,
371 A.2d 41, 72 N.J. 425 (N.J.1977) (Respondent considered himself part of the prosecution
structure rather than an impartial judge in re State of New Jersey v. Whitehead. The respondent's
disrespect for law extended to the Constitution and cases decided under it
the United States
Supreme, all of which prohibited the wearing of two hats while sitting as an impartial arbiter over
matters before his court. Removal of Judge Yengo is forthwith ordered.).

24
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(4)

Marti Was Given No Notice of The Pending Contempt
Proceedings,
Are Void As Applied to Marti
The record before this court establishes that Marti was in a coma in Utah Valley

Medical Center's critical care unit when the OSC in the Idaho federal action was issued
and heard.

There is no evidence that Judge Tallman served Marti notice of the OSC

proceedings he conducted on May 15, 2006 at the hospital or at any other loci for Marti.
The power to sanction is limited by the due process clause of the United
States

Constitution.

component needed

See U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV.
to effect

v. Olesen, 74

imposition of

Ct

Jurisdiction is the mandatory

an in personam sanction order.

See

(1954) ("No sanction can

the

personal

are

of

1

proof

an

order as to Marti is

CONCLUSION
For all of the

reasons,

Plaintiff Marti Lundahl

Idaho

Federal contempt proceedings, and in fact the entire case, was rendered null and void
by Judge Tal!man's illegal actions taken wholly without

Subject matter jurisdiction,

without personal jurisdiction, and without any modicum of Due Process. This Court
therefore has a duty to decree void and vacate the Idaho federal injunction,

all orders

entered in that case, and to publish its equity decree far and wi
Dated: March 10, 2013

~
Marti Lun

Certificate of Service
The undersigned certifies that she will electronically served opposing counsel with
the foregoing document and attached 23 exhibits on March 14, 2013 to the following
email address:
Richard Vasquez
Law Offices of Snow, Christainsen and Martineau
10 Exchange
Eleventh Fioor
City, Utah 84111
address:
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MAR f 7 20C~
RONALD F. PRiGE- 5535
PmRs Scorn:LD PRICE
A Professional Corporation
340 Broadway Centre

111 East Broadwzy
Salt Lake City, Utah 841i1
Te!ephone: (801) 32.2-2002
322-2003
for Piaintiff!Counterc!sim Defendants

JUD!CU\L
COURT
!N THE
SALT LAKE
ST.A.TE OF UTAH

ORDER ].1;wAADl1~G ATTORNEYS' FEES AND
DOUBLE COSTS AGAJNST HOLLI

AND

JUDGEM!:NT AGAJNST HOLLI LUNDAHL FOR
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND DOUBLE COSTS

HOLL' U.iNDAnL,

Courri:erda im!P lab tiff,

MARKT. Oi..SDN; OLSCNt\SSOClt,TES, P.C.;

h.rrHoNYC. Tmwru, D.D.s.,

Civil No. 020201658

OLYMPusV18!-.r

DENTAL.AND NAR,
Judg~

Gounterclalm!Defer.dants.

Anthony Quinn

Plalntlff and count2rc!2im defendants'
Fees And Double Costs Against f-1o!Ji Lundahl, And For Other Relief (the

\t

I

Ii
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car;ie before fiie Court for hearing at 8:3C am or: 'Thursday, 1flFebrna;y2004. R.on.s!d F. Price
of the law firm PETERS SCOFlELD PRJCEA Professional Corporation appeared on behalf cf the Moving
Parties. Additionally, counterclaim defendant Mark T. Olson was present. No other persons or
parties were present Thus, Hom Lundahl did not appear. Additionally, defendants Kem Lundahl
and John Behle did not appear and were not represented by counsel.
The

the

memorandum and the affidavit of

that Hoili

in support of the

was
determined

served with

advised

cause

1.

Pursuant to the ruling of. the Utah

67 P.3d 1000 (Utah

Court in the case of Lundahl v. Quinn,

entitled to recover from Holli Lundahl the

that

Parties in connection w!th

responding to, and as a result of, the Petition for &fro Ordinar1 Writ Directed to Judge Anthony
Quinn of the Third Judicial District Court Pursuant to Rule 65B (the "Petition") filed by Hom
Lundahl in connection with this matter, and pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's inst'Uctions in
the Lundahl opinion that this Court determine the amount of those attorneys' fees and double

costs to award and to enter such an award against Hom Lundahl and in !av.or of the Moving

"

Parties, the Court hereby ORDERS that Hom Lundahl shall pay to the Moving Parties the sum

of $4 707 .50 for attorneys' fees which the Moving Parties incurred in cormecilon with responding

2
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W'

against Helli Lundahl.

EYIBE

3
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CERTiflCATE OF SERVJCE

?·

I hereby certify thal on ttie 23l'!I day of Febmary 2004, and on this
day of March,.
2004, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AWAAO!WG ATTORNEYS' FE.Es AND OOl.!BLE
Cosrs AGAINST HoLl.l L!JNDAHL, AlllD JUDGEYENT AGA:NST How LUNDAHL foRATIORNEYS' fas
in the manner indicated to the following:

A~n DOUBLE Com was serv~

Gregory M. Constantino

_:::£... U.S. Mail

Constantino
68 South Main Street, Suire #800

__ Hand Delivery

Sa!H..ake

Utah 84101
530-1333
U.S. Mail

200 East Center

U!Bl'J 84057
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CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY
OF
N.A.R., INC.

File Number C 149341

I, BEN YSURSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho. hereby certify that an
App!ic21tion for Certificate of Authority, duly executed pursuant 10 the provisions of the
Idaho Business Corporation

has been received In this office and is found to

conform to law.

ACCOROlNGLY and by virtue of the authority vested in me by law. I issue this
Certificate of Authority to transact business in this State and attach hereto a dupilcate of
the app!ication for such certificate.

Dated: 23 May 2003

SECRETARY OF STATE

,,.. ,

By

I
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.·-. ------- - ·
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OF AUTHORlTY (For Profit)
,;,·
·~~ If

r

'.:I

(!nstructions Qn Bacx of Application)

~
.

"
.
'

.

""deraigned Coomration appli8' fo. a Ce<tificate of Authmity and

"''"a; fellow"

;J ':(

'; ·

:;~.·~.· ;_;,~"?. ·
U:~;

The name of the corporation is

!

I

N·A·E;tNc.
2.

...

pC· ~:
-~tA~J-'-"a~h.L____________c,_~.L..~ ~

The name which it shall use in Idaho is:

3. It is incorporated under the laws of:
its date of incorporation is:

5.

The address of its principal office is:

/o

w.

N ·A · ]?.~ INC. _

__

·:.....
·

--~~"----L--=--.:.1--"0/ 1y /1qq S

4.

..c..

._,.,..

,

1

·)

r.:;

ir~!Jadu'tl1-/ c;;fr. &lo

6. The address lo which correspondErnce should be addressed. if different from item o. is:
~--/.\ ~ ' ' --r
- - - - - - -·
--Jl'... ~I ·

-

t-t.'-

_l,4. . . -

~ ,µ "· ·

.,

(

C.1. C ,ti'

(._

kt;:~,,:;

5'i:i;J 7_ /:£M~ £ ')/ O()fi1,. /!} '?370&
~.W\e..p , \ UC·f';~- f Pr ±r .ai

7. The street address of its regislered office in Idaho is:.
and its registered agent in Idaho at that address is:

1 '.\

I

I
!
!

8.

The names and respective business addresses of its directors and officers <ve:
Name

-pavi d

Office

~ax.-kn

~ ol 5tJ.Xftv>

Jlil-ttY

,..J

Mod

Address

tr&?/duJ:no ~e~ Ctr. j.J.s4'+Lah vi . ~
Iii u. Pru:1 /o&:vd =?...10 B69"J &. t.J.Sz/.J.:'4k.t ul wo5L/

sewe,wy

13':1q(, 5

~ t,d- fr'f~~

· 1PO E.

:no ic~y {',v. µ. s,.Jtl...ft u.J. ~ 06

Customer Acct # .

Secretary of Stat;;-.;-;e only- -

TypedName:
Capacity:

1JA>Jt.f2 _)# ~
~I~

IDllHO SECRETARY OF STATE

05/23/2003
CK: 57946 CT: 178C75
1 @1118.89 = 188.88
1 @ 28.88 = 28.88

05:00
BH: 64248S
AUTH PRO i 2
CORP SUR WJ

G lY0 3Y I
-

- ---- -···· ---··· - - -

-····- ·--·- -.-

- - -

.... : - -..

-. - - -···--·-·- -
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Utah

Departm~nt

nf Cnmrnen:::e

DJvision of Corporations & Ccmmercial C0 c,;
J.Sll East JOO Suuth, 2nd Flou;-. S..\1. Bo:t l4ti'.'0:i
3d;~

Ai~

Lake Cit}", t:T 3..S: i .i...67D!:

S,cnici C en tu: {3G l) 530-4341)
Toll Fm:: (3"77) S'2 6-J9~4 Cuh R~sid::w
h1 : {801) 530-{j4J8
",..Very Si!e: h!!F : //W)V~'. CO'!"Jm4!rt ~.u~;ih.gO'tJ

8; 22

CERTIFICATE OF EXISrfENCE
Registration Number:
Business Name:

1280211-0130

N.A.R., TNC.

R egistered Hate:
F~ ntity Type:

OCTOBER 14, 1995

Current Status:

ACT1VE

DOMESTIC COLLECTTON AGENCY

The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code of the State of Utah, custodian of the records of
business registrations, certifies that the business entity on this certificate is authorized to transact business and
was duly registered under the laws of the Sta!e oflJtah.

Kathy Berg
Director
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code

Dept. of Professional Liceming

(801) 530-6628

f:\hom~"..i:C'lrp'.cam1non \ternplatc\co_
_n1..:m .wpd

Real Estate
(801) 530-6747

Public Utilit1es

(801) 530-6651

Securities

(801) 530-6600

Consumer Protection

(801 ) 530-6601

:-rvised. 03 ~ i 1 }-0 I mm
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Document Page 2 of 3

Oesc Main

Holli Lumfahl

20!1 K Cen te.r Street

orem, Utan 84Ds7
Attorney Pro Se

ZDOJ

JUN Ig A 11: Ob

UN!'fED STATF.S BANKRUPTCY
llk&~,~~'UGfBAUER
CE.NTRAL DISTRICT Oil' l:'F1N
rcouiu
~
: BANKRlJPTlY ~ti. 'df:.n6di.1IN RE HOLU LUNDAHL

COURT

TRUSTEE ANDRE DlAZ

SSN. Debtor

Tli.E DEBTOR PROPOSF.S TIIE FOLLOWL'liG A..'1El"i"DED CHAPTER l3 Pl,A.,~:

Pursuant to court order dated Junt 11,
the Debtor sh&!l imhmit to th£
in the amount ofS50 pe• nwnth for t!u:
of less th::w 60
d1alms lire paid as
for in the Phn.1.
mi.•·m.::nt$ made to the Tru!i?ee
to eonfirmntion slu1!l he co11trib1.1t'l:'d as<\
cm:itrilmtitm. '.flrn Trustee is 1:fr1h:red to hold the dditi:ir's
further prder of the court,
2. From the
.!IO
the Trustee sfo<l! make
to crediton

1.

no

11.lhH'l'cd claims in the following order 11nd on 11 pro nit.a h8sis for each claim witl.tin
the druis:
A. CLASS A.
payments orifar<od
the Court as 11et forth in
admini!!tr~iive

B.

claims under H USC section 567{2)

, i.!u.:hi.ding
fees and cost.,.
C, CLASS C. _Allowed secured claim!! of the
creditors
with
Interest u indicated below:
NONE
Pur.;ua:it to 11 USC section 506(b} and l32.5{a)(5), the interest netes~acy to
provide these crediion their allowed claims shall be paid from the petition date for
each creditor whose eol!ateraJ value exceeds the claim amoHt; otbenvise, interest

.

shall be paid from. the date the i:onf!rmatfon order is entered by tbe Clerk.
D.

CLASS D.

Allowed priority unsecured claims under section 11 USC section

507(a)(2)-(8) shall bi! paid JOO% with iw inforcst.
.E.

CLASS E. Allowed mmpriority unsecured claims, which shall fodude t:lze
n!lowed claims of al! crcditon not otherwise classified in this Plan, shall be
pald Ill! allowed unsecured cli1ims at the rate of 6% per annum from ti1e date

}'.

Additional provisions Jrnmu.1n! tu 1.1 USC m:tlon 1322(1>): NONE

3.

The trustee is entitled lu ~ fee under section 586( e).
Unless otherwise ordered by the Co.Uri~ all property of the t.'!!tatc shall vc.st in
in the debtor upon Confir:m.Ation.

the confirmation order ill entered.·

4.
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Desc Main

5. Ia 111::.:ordam:e wffh 11 USC ~ectiun 1328(a), upori eompletfoa of the Plan,
The Debtor shall he dlseh.arged of all debts provided for by the Plan or dis11l1-0wed_nnder
scctill.n 11 USC section SIJZ:
- .
-.
6. This .Plu1 provide,~ that creditor.\ will receive 100% ofal1owed or adjudicated
Cbtims, thus providing creditors wid1 a great.er return under tbfs plitn then the creditors
Would receive if the esfatc of the Debtor Wtt) liquidated itnder Chapter 7.
7. During the coarse of these bankruptcy procedfo'gs, the Debtor will he
prosecuting .nu:merow adversary proceedings on disputed claims. Further the Debtor will
be pro,1l'cuting an pending lawsuits listed as assets to debtors estate in these bankruptcy
proceeding11 and NW further object to the lift of any stay order involving a forfeiture of
funds belonging w the dcbfor or otherwise induded 113 gnrnnds 1.11Hfor the ~tay provision of
the bankruptcy cod~

VERiHCATION
Tbe

1.foes

tfalt ta the best of her

'4rm:mnt8 nncl vahies set forth above are true m:id
the comi

clo so.

upon
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LEO Iii fHE
UNITED SHTES

EOLLI LUNDAHL
1?0 BOX 970632
OREM., UTAH 84097-0632
ATTORNEY PRO SE

8ANKRUPTCY

~

co:_

2003 SEP I 5 p 3: 11
\~':LLli\11 C. STILLGEBAUE'R

E-MAIL HOLLILUNDAHL.l@JUNO.COM

CLEKX Of COURT

BY-;:;~~.--::-:-.::-:,-,-

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DEPUTY CLERK
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF UTAB

In :re

BANKRUPTCY CASE NO. 03-21660
EOLLI LUNDAHL
13)

ADVERSARY PROCEEDING NO.
03 p HOLLI LUNDAHL,

Plaintiff,

v.

DOUG MURDOCK, ELI LILLY AND
COMPANY, INC. ,
ADVANCED
CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEMS,INC.

MERRELIN BLAND, JOYCE JOHNSON
PATRICIA WAYMAN, BEVERLY
GILSDORF, CONNIE HARRISON,
EVE CHAPLIN, GTE CORPORATION
NOW VERIZON CO:MMONICATIONS,
PACIFIC MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. ,
KAREN KADYK AND COUNTY OF
RIVERSIDE, DIRECTOR OF THE
STATE BOARD OF CHIROPRACTIC
EXAMINERS VIVIAN DAVIS IN
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND DOES
OFFICERS IN THEIR OFFICIAL
CAPACITIES AND SAN
DIEGO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE JAMES AHLER

Defendants

AMENDED
NOTICE OF :REMOVAL OF THE
FOLLOWING CASES:

UTAH STATE CASE NO. 010902105
AS TO DOUG MURDOCK ONLY;
CALIFORNIA STATE CASE NO. 219124
FORMERLY CASE NO. 214606;
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFOR..~IA
CASE NO. CV94-021 RJT FORMElU.Y
CASE NO. CV94-045GLT; CALIFORNIA
STATE CASE NO. SC03S8381, AND;
SAN DIEGO ADMINISTRATIVE CASE
NO. L-9505197.
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Plaintiff Holli
removal

and

rem.aves

Lundahl

the

5 cf 15

Document 5

hereby

following

this

files

state

and

amended :notice

federal

cases

of

having

common claims or representation:

(1) Utah state case no. 010902105 as

to defendant Doug Murdock only,

{2) California state case no. 219l24

formerly

state

case

no.

214606;

United States District Court

(3)

Central District of California case no 94-021 RJT formerly case no. CV
94-045GLT,
Diego

(4)

SC0398381,

California State case no.

Administrative

case

no.

L-9505197

to

and;

the

United

Court for the Central District of Utah
section 1452 and

:rule 9027.

San

States

to 28 USC

All cases above stated were

to
are

(5)

The removed claims

non-core,

and :non-final
federal

and al.l of the

bear a

Plaintiff

Holli

Lundahl

civil

and RICO claims ,

demand.
DOES

NOT

CONSENT

the

to

final orders or
on
Furthermore because of the nature of
must be

transferred

to

claims .

:removed

the

claims,

all of these

the United States District Court for

further disposition pursuant to 28 USC sections 157{b) (5), (d) & (e).
Due
attaches

to

hereto

the

volume

the

of

the

papers

:relevant interlocutory

process conclusive of the court entering a
the removed cases.

in

the

:rulings

cases,

plaintiff

and other

court

final competent order in

The relevant process is attached in chronological

order:

CALIFORNIA STATE CASE NO. 219124 FORMERLY CASE NO. 214606
1.

Exhibit "l" :

Caption page in California state case no.

219124 formerly 214606 showing the state causes of action sued upon to
include:

Defamation,

Intentional

Interference

with

Contract,

Intentional interference with Prospective Economic Advantage,

z. '

Breach

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 43 of 118
Case

·PGC Document 5

of Contract,

Common Counts,
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[Insurance Bad Faith],

Fiduciary Fraud.

the defamatory communications published and authored by

Following is

by Eli Lilly;

Exhibit "2" :

2.

Decembe.r

9,

Stipulation and Order

1992

signed by the state judge staying the civil action against Eli Lilly

until further notice based upon the pendency of the criminal action.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA CASE NO. CV94-021R.JT FOR..~Y CASE NO. CV94-045GLT
3.
23,

The cri.m.inal act.ion .in favor of Lundahl on

Exhibit "3":

On

1993.

13,

for civil

Eli

action

1994 LmIDAHL filed a

, federal RICO and anti trust

vio1ations in addition to the state l.aw c1aims set :forth in exhibit

law claims under

s~ction

the honorab1e Gary L.
to

d:ism..iss

ba.:.ered.

s federal case was

1367

On March 1, 1994,

claiming

that

law

a motion

claims

were

ti.me

Judge Gary Taylor granted in part and

On April. 25, ·1994 ,

denied in part LILLY' s

state

plaintiff's

LILLY

motion

to

The federal

dismiss.

court found

that none of plaintiff's claims were time barred and therefore denied
the

motion

Li11y' s

to

motion

diSll!.iss
to

on

this

ground.

dismiss

with

leave

The

to

federal.

court granted

a.mend ordering LUNDAHL to

plead her fiduciary fraud claim with more particularity.
attached

is

a

true

and

correct

copy

of

the

court's

Exhibit "3"
written

order

issued on April 25, 1994.

4.

Exhi.bi t

"4" :

The May 19 /

1994 default entered against

defendant Eve Chaplin and supporting documentation.

5.

Exhibit

"5":

Gary

Taylor's

ruling

dismissing

the

corporate entities without prejudice for lack of standing as not in
existence at the times alleged in the complaint.
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6.
filed

a

Exhibit "6":
status

thereto

'-PGC

was

report

all

On August 22,
in

the

of

J04~age

Docurnent 5 Filed 08/

support

of

1994 plaintiffs submitted and
a

registered

7 of 15

status

state

conference.

court

Attached

criminal

process

Exhibit "6" attached hereto is a

supporting the federal complaint.

true and correct certified copy of the top page to the

status report

and supporting certified state court documents.

7.

Exhibit "7":

On November

3,

the state court in

1994,

case no. 219124 entered a permanent stay order on the state case until

resolution of federal case number 94-045GLT.
certified copy of the

"7" is a

order.
On October 17,

~n tered

Ex:hibi t

1994 the federal

that LUNDAHL was the

an order

to all
that

hea1 t:h ca.re cl.aims bi:U.ed to El.:i

LILLY would not be

any matters which were or could

have been

LUNDAHL' s
imprisorunent
LU1""DAHL' s

and

favor.

contract,

malicious
court

The

bad

faith,

prosecution

and

left Lundahl' s

claims

in

intentional interference

with prospective economic advantage and anti

disposition.

de£a.mation

trust claims for

later

See a true and correct certified copy of this order is

attached hereto as exhibit "8".

9.

Exhibit "9 11 :

The action was subsequently transferred to

the federal judge Robert Timlin just appointed to the bench.
Timlin was a

state appellate justice sitting on Lundahl' s

state criminal. action when Lundahl filed a
the

grounds

upwards

of

appearing

of

Brady

$240, 000

before

his

violations.

in

Judge

stock interests

court.

Seven

(7)

in

writ

o~

habeus corpus on

Timl.in

the

defendants
after

transferred to the new and conflicted federal court,
a

under1ying

Robert

months

Robert

also

the

owned

companies

case

was

LILLY/ACS filed

counterclaim seeking to :retry the criminal case in. the civil forum

in violation of Judge Gary Taylor's October 17, 1994 order.

Attached

hereto as exhibit "9" is and true and correct copy of the face page of
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the Counterclaim filed into the court :record en April 23,

1995.

NO

SUMMONS was ever issued on the counterclaim. which was in fact a cross
complaint filed in violation of Gary Taylor's order and FRCP rule 13.

10.
the

Exhibit "10":

County

criminal

o:f

During discovery issued on May 12,

Riverside

case

was

and

Kadyk

dismissed

attested

because

under

LILLY' s

oath

1995,

that

witnesses

the

lacked

creditability and the county felt i t would not prevail on the criminal

charges before a jury.
copy of this

response.

11.

documents were obtained from the

Exhibit "ll":
LUNDAHL' s

OOL

and insurers
of

CNA.

Exhibit "10" attached is a true and correct

of Eli LILLY

the

to include

Life A:t;surance

GTE,

United St.at.as,

in

revealed

that

o:f

action.

J.

Robert

and

these

Later

Timlin

had

vested

stock

affiliates and CNA.

Exhibit "12":

On September 4, 1996 in violation of the

law of the case doctrine,
the

federal

the

interests in GTE.
12.

the

America,

of

Attached hereto are true and correct

responses

in

to vested interests

criminal. trial and

alternative

a

L:ILLY filed another

summa.:r:y

judgment

motion to dismiss or

motion

re-arguing

matters

previousl.y determined by the Honorable Ga.ry t.aylor on April 25, 1994

1994 in Lundahl' s

and October 17,
TIMLIN found that
that LUNDAHL' s
survived

favor and overruled these orders.

LUDNAHL was not an assignee of the ACS Health plan,

claims were time barred and that the only claim that

summary

judgment

was

LUNDAHL

malicious

prosecution

claim.

See exhibit "12" attached for a true and correct copy of this order.
13.
Riverside

state

Exhibit
and KADYK

criminal

"13":

On June

30,

1997 because

the County

of

testified through deposition testimony that the

case

was

dismissed

because

LILLY' s

employee's

statements to Riverside County and Kadyk lacked credibility [which"was
the

same· as

therefore

the

saying
county

the

statements

detenuined

that

5.

and

reports

they

were

would. not

false]
prevail

and
on

a
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criminal trial, Judge Robert did not reach the probable cause issue on
the malicious prosecution charge and instead found that the criminal
action

was

not

favorably

te:z.::m.inated

to

LUDNAHL

it

because

was

dismissed by the people before i t was tendered to a jury fo:r a jury
verdict.

See Robert Timlin' s

ruling entered on June

30,

1997 as

exhibit "13" attached hereto.
14.
LILLY' s

On May 8,

Exhibit "14":

first

amended

Judge Tim1in dismissed

1998,

counterclaim

against

Holli

Lundahl

with

order as exhibit

See certified copy of this
"14" attached hereto.

15.
a

Exhibit "15":

Timlin entered

On October 6,

Belli

default

Lundahl

on

the

amended

firat

on

Holli Lundahl with

s,
not

1998 and
to the action,

served process and not

o:f alter ego 1 s

and

t.o Holli Lundahl .

"15" attached for default judgment.

16.

Exhibit

believing them to be final.
a

LUNDAHL

"16":

appealed

these

judgments

On August 26, 2002 during the pend.ency of

2002 bankruptcy case filed by Holli Lundahl the 9th circuit entered

an order finding that no final judgment had been entered because Judge
Timlin had not ruled that the underlying action was finally disposed
as to all parties and claims,

had not te:rm..inated the litigation with

prejudice and had not determined who won the action.

The 9th circuit

dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
See exhibit ''16" attached for 9th circuit order.

LUNDAHL prepared a

proposed finci.1 order on October 21,

2002 for purposes of appeal. and

pursuant to the appellate mandate.

Judge Tim1in :rejected LUNDAHL' s

:final order and forwarded the order hack

to LUNDAHL on Ocother 24,

2002 due to his actual bias conflicts with the case.

2003,
federal.

On January- 31,

LUNDAHL :filed this bankruptcy case which stayed the California

proceedings

in

light

of

the

counterclaims

being

pursued
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against LUNDAHL.

The federal

4 Page 10 of 15

and state cases were removed to the

bankruptcy court based upon an extension granted by Bankruptcy Judge
Judi th Boulden after an erroneous dismissal of Lundahl' s

bankruptcy

case in June of 2003.
SAN DIEGO OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS CASE NO. L-9505197
17.

To obstruct the California federal action,

Exhibit "18":

LILLY contacted LUNDAHL's licensing Board in March of 1995 to confirm
action taken

Ltih"!.lAHL.

the board indicated that LUNDAHL had had

since it's issuance.

,

1995 the San

to LILLY's
admi:nis t.ra t i ve

criminal
as

current and clear license

Office of Administrative

a time barred,
action

action was

same

June of 1991

San Diego Office of Administrative hearings
the

the

with

:from December 1990

At the outset,

1995,

Sae exhibit "18" attached for letter.

On

and

On March 11,

case

commenced out of

no.

the

L-9505197.

subject matter

jurisdiction of this adm.i.nistrative office pursuant to the Government
Code

section

11508 (a)

as

LUNDAHL

only had a

co-owned

office located in Los Angeles California and was a
state of Utah, County of Utah.

Lundahl timely filed

a

included

notice

of

defense

which

claims

interstate

.residence of the

that

the

San

Deigo

Administrative Offices lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction
over LUNDAHL and the action was further barred by affirmative defenses
of

res

judicata 1

collateral

estoppal,

judiciai

estoppal,

accord,

satisfaction, release, waiver, unclean hands and equitable estoppel.
19.
Diego
appear

Exhibit "19":

Office
in

of

San

On

Administrative
Diego

County

September 4,
Hearing
for

the

1995,

after the San

sent Lundahl

a

Administrative

subpoena

to

Hearing

by

criminally using the contempt. powers of the state through the issuance
of

a

subpeona

ordering

LUND"AHL's

appearance

out

of

jurisdiction,

LUNDAHL filed a statutory pre-emption against. the San Diego Law judge
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assigned to hear the case re-iterating the office' s
matter

jurisdiction.

See

"19"

exhibit

lack of subject

for

attached

pre-emptory

challenqe.

20.

Exhibit "20 11 :

On September 8, 1995 LUNDAHL supplemented

the pre-em.ptoxy challenge in exhibit ''19'' supra when she learned that

AHLER

was

formerly

of

counsel

to

LILLY's

law

attorney's

offices

representing LILLY in the above stated federal action and that AHLER
owned

of

affiliates

$210,000

and LILLY' s

obtained

in

stock

interests

in

LILLY,

insurer also liable for any

LILLY
LUNDAHL

LILLY in the above stated California fecieral
Exhibit "21":

21.

office and took LUNDABL to the out

of
and

affirmative

other

defenses which AHLER set of£ until i t was time for LUNDAHL to
her case in

appearance day

with

LILLY,

insurers,

continued to be forcefully detained for

to day until

OTA,

GTE

and

September 27,
PACIFIC

LJ:F.E 1

1995 when AHLER conspired

the

latter

three

LILLY 1 s

to expire LUNDAHL as a party opponent and steal LUNDAHL' s

evidence,

and

felony assaul.t

state.

LUDNABL

chief.

when
so

that

failed,

that LUNDAHL' s

to

fal.sely

charge

LUNDAHL

with

defense would be defaulted to the

These persons procured LUNDAHL's false .imprisonment in federal

jail for the most part of S months while AHLER continued to prosecute

the

administrative

representation,
l.acking in

action

defaulted

without

LUNDAHL

LUNDAHL' s

on proceedings

presence

that

were

and

totally

jurisdiction and barred by numermous affirmative defenses

and entered a
and finding

decision on October 6, 1995 revoking LUNDAHL' s license

LUNDAHL guilty of the sa.me fraud crimes

in

the

state

criminal

forum

on

adjudicated in

July

Lundabl's

favor

23,

1993.

Moreover,

LUNDAHL was never served notice of the decision nor was-she

aware that the proceedings were continuing without her representation
while she continued to be detained in federal

jail.

On January 1 7 ,

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 49 of 118
Case 2:04-cv-

1996 LUNDAHL was

88-PGC Document 5 Filed 08/0

:released from

4 Page 12 of 15

On January 31,

jail.

1996 LtJNDAHL

learned of the administrative decision when LILLY filed the decision
in the above stated federal action in support of a motion to dismiss

under

the

of

doctrine

collateral

On

estoppal.

February

S,

1996

LUNDAHL filed an administrative appeal by way of a verified ex parte
application for a de facto writ of mandamus [California requires that

the mandamus petition be filed within 30 days of the entry of the
decision]

to

the

L'ONDABLS' verified

22.

"21"

for

forth the defenses.

Ex.hi.bit

Court
fox

See exhibit

void decision.

"22

11

:

in its

denied the de facto
filed.

writ of mandamus
was

vo:id as

a

matter

of law.

The

credit to a void

was also void as a :matter of law as
administrative

UTAH STATE CASE NO. 010902105
23.

Exhibit

"23":

In

Nove1'1l.ber of 1999,

sister were involved in a car accident.

to

have

rendered.

treated

pl.aintiff' s

sister

Plaintiff

and he:r

Murdock fraudulently claimed

when

no

such

treatment

was

Plaintiff's sister assigned the false debt to plaintiff who

then brouqht an action against Murdock for RICE/RICO and unlawful debt
collection practices.
Law offices

of

Snel.l.

Murdock did not appear and was defaulted.
q.nd Wilner we:re

filed an unserved motion

to

vacate

then

The

retained by Murdock and

the default and to

dismiss

the

action fraudulentl.y arguing that plaintiff sued this doctor under the
Utah Malpractice act when no

such cause of action was stated.

The

trial court dismissed the action based upon the .fraud committed by
this

law office.

See exhibit

"23" attached for
'

dismissal order.

copy of

the void

-

'.I'his same law office is now representing LILLY in

the big case above stated and has committed similar void acts.

q,
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Document 5

08/
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REMOVED CONTEMPT CASE INITATED BY LILLY AND GTE

24.

Exhibit

During

''24":

the

prosecution

federal case no. CV94-045 changed to case no. 94-021,

of

California

L!LLY's counsel

fabricated a false subpoena and thereafter charged LUNDAHL with having
In March of

fabricated the false subpoena and committing forgery.

1995, TIMLIN certified a criminal contempt order against LUNDAHL based
upon

unsupported

demanded

facts
trial

a

LILLY's

as
under

18

USC

section

Lundahl
402

and under

BRADY

GTE was

that the

of the false

to carry

with a certified letter

GTE's
3, 1995 and sent to G'l'E's
by certified mail bearing certified receipt no.

Z 174 324 396.

See

exhibit "24" attached.
25.

Exhibit "25":

The Subpeona sent to GTE by LUNDAHL via the

certified mailing clai.med by GTE was a st.ate subpoena and furthermore
the document was not received by GTE until February 6,
days after G'.rE processed the fal.se federal subpeona.

1995,

three

See exhibit "25"

attached hereto for state process served on GTE.
26.

Exhibit "26 11 :

This is the false federal subpoena hearing

GTE's legal dept's stamp date of February 3, l995 on it's face.
27.

Exhibit "27":

GTE claimed that the records were sent to

the court under seal in violation of BRADY because of the privacy act.
2B.
Exhibit "28":
The process was returned to GTE and never
claimed by plaintiff because the process
t issued by plaintiff.
See exhibit "28" for returned process.

Dated:

September 9, 2003
Attorney Pro Se

/D.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that she gave notice of this removal
to the following attorneys represented in the following pleadings:

The Law offices of
Morris, Polich and Purdy
1055 W. Seventh Street, 24th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90017
&

3410 E. Fourteenth St.
Riverside, CA 92502
General for the

~tate

Of California and Utah
1350 Front St.

Utah

General's Of£ice
South

s:r..c,

Utah 04114

I!,
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-------~--

~

w
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Exhibits/
tta hm t
to thi
hv n t
s ann d.
Please see the
case file.
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Cvf/ECF - California Central District

.,REFER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
(Eastern Division - Riverside)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE#: 5:94-cv-00021-RT

Demand: $0
Case in other court: Santa
8:94-cv-00045
Cause: 42: 1983 Civil Rights Act

Hom Lundahl

c

Date Filed:
Date Tenninatcd: l
Demand: Both
Nature of Suit: 440 Civil
Jurisdiction: Federal

Holli Lundahl
Center St
UT
PRO SE
Francis C PizzuHi
Francis C Pizzulli Law Offices
718 Wilshire Blvd
Santa Monica, CA 9040 l
3 l0-451-8020
Fax: 310-458-6156

LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE N011CED
Jerry L Steering
Jerry L Steering Law Offices
4063 Birch Street, Suite JOO
Newport Beach, CA 92660
949-474-1849

Email: jerrysteering@yahoo.com
TER.l'JINATED: 0712111994
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
Donald R .Johnson

DO
TER.lv1INATED: 0910411996

represented by Donald R Johnson
If\ PRO PER
27365 Jefferson Ave

Other

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 55 of 118
CV!!ECF • Caiiforni:! Central District

275 East Olive Avenue
CA 91502
818-238-5702
Fax: 818-238-5724
Email: chumiston@ci.burbank.ca.us

LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald L Ridge
Morris Polich and Purdy LLP
1055 West 7th Street Suite 2400
Los Angeles, CA 90017-2503
213-417-5117
Fax: 213-488-1178
Email: dridge@mpplaw.com

LEAD ATTORlvEY
ATIORl\fEY TO BE NOTICE.D
Laine T
Peterson & Ross
333 South Grttnd Ave
Suite !600
Los
CA 90071

213-625-3500
LEAD ATTORNEY

Advanced Cardiovascular ,v.,u,,.,,., Inc
A

G Brazil
above for

TER.lvflNATED: 0113011996
Ll..'AD ATTORNEY

A ITORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carol Ann Humiston
(See above for address)

TERMINATED: 0113011996
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald L Ridge
(See above for address)

TERMINATED: 0113011996
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laine T Wagenseller
(See above for address)

TERMINATED: 0113011996
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATIORNEY TO BE NOTJCED
Defendant

file://IC:tusers/E!ham/Desktop/L"SDC-94%20CV%2002!'%20Dockethtm[lil3i20 !3 ! l :33:3 i PY!}
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c:vVECF

~California

Central ]istrict

Connie Emano

Anthony G Brazil
above for

LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORXEY TO BE NOTICED
Carol Ann Humiston
(See above for address)

LEAD ATIORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald L Ridge

(See above for address)
LEAD ATIORNEY
ATIOR.NEY TO BE NOTICED
Laine T
above for

LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORivEY TO BE

Lori Pivo
Deft:ndm1t

J E Holmes , Ill

Karen

CA 92502
909-682-5550
Email:

LEAD
A 1TORlvEY TO BE N011CED

Connie Harrison

represented by Anthony G Brazil
(See above for address)

LEAD AITORNEY
AITORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carol Ann Humiston
(See above for address)

Ll:.,"'AD AITORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald L Ridge
(See above for address)

LEAD AITORNEY
ATFORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laine T WagenseHer
(See above for address)

LEADAITORNEY

file:///C/Csers/Elham!Desktop/CSDC-94%20CVo/u2002 ! '%:WDocket.htm[J! l 3/20 l 3 l l ;33:3 ! P),,1}
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AITORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Merrelin Bland

represented

G Brazil
(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE 1VOTJCED
Carol Ann Humiston
(See above for address)

LEAD AITORNEY
AITORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald L Ridge
(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

LEAD ATTORiVEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

G Brazil

LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE
Carol Ann Humiston
above for

LEAD ATTORNEY
ATIORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald L Ridge
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
A1TORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laine T Wagenseller
(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY
AITORIVEY TO.BE N01ICED
Defendant
Beverly Gilsdorf

represented by Anthony G Brazil
(See above for address)
LEAD A11'0RNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE N011CED

Carol Ann Humiston
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY

file://iC/lisers/Elham/Desktop/1jSDC-94%20CV%2002i %20Dockethtm[lll3/2013 11 :33:31 PM]
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C::V!iECF - Cal.ifornia Central District

AD'ORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald L
above for

LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laine T Wagenselier
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Patricia Wayman

represented

G Brazil
(See above for address)
L!'AD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carol Ann Humiston
LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEJJ

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laine T
above for
LEAD AnuRNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eve Chaplin
TERMINATED· 1212311996

represented by Fiona G Luke
Roberts & Morgan
1770 Iowa Ave
Ste 210

Riverside, CA 92507-5980

909-682-2881
Email: fluke@cc.sbcounty.gov
TERMINATED: 1212311996
LEAD ATTORNEY
An'ORVEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
Riverside County of

represented by J E Holmes , Ill
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORlvEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
Does

f;le:i//C!Users/Elharr:JDesktop!USDC-94%20CV%2002 l %20Docket.htm[l/l3i2013 l 1:33 31 PM]
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Central

above for
TERA1INATED.· 0712111994
LEAD A1TORNF,Y
AnORNEY TO BE N011CED

Lundahl Chiropractic foe

represented

.Jerry L Steering
(See above for
TERA1INATED: 07/21/1994
LEAD AnORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE' NOTICED

Counter Defendant

Roes
1-200

03/ll/1994
RETURN OF SUMMONS and proof of service executed upon defondant
03/1411994)
03/11/1994

RETURN OF SUMMONS and proof of service execuied upon defendant Eve Chaplin on
2/10/94 (krpa) (Entered: 03/14/1994)

03/l lil 994

RETURN OF SUMMONS and proof of service executed upon defendant Advanced
Cardiovascu on 2/10/94 (krpa) (Entered: 03/14/1994)

03/11/1994

9 ·RETURN OF SUMMONS and proof of service executed upon defendant Riverside Cty of
on 2/10/94 (krpa) (Entered:

03111/1994

' RETURN OF SUMMONS and proof of service executed upon defendant Karen Kadyk on
'2!!0i94 (krpa)
03/14/1994)

03/l 1/l 994
03/11/1994

RETCRN OF SlJ\1MONS and proof of service executed upon defendant Patricia
on 2116194 (krpa)
03114/ 1994)
l 2 . RETl;R;-.; OF SLI.\1MO?\S and
0311411994)
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C3/J J/l 994

w

13 RETURN OF SUMMONS arid proof of service executed upon defendant Connie
on 2/9/94
03/\4/1994)

. 03/l

upon defencant

~krrelin

Bland on

· C3/22/l 994

15 EX PI\RTE APPLIC.k.\TI01'i by plaintiff llolli LundahL plaintiff Donald R Johnson! plaintiff
Mission Trail Medica, plaintiff - Mission Trail Medica, plaintiff Lundahl Chiropractic to
continue hrg on dfts' rntn to dism ; LDGD ORD (krpa) (Entered: 03/2811994)

03/2211994

6 MEMOR.t\NDUM of Pl A by plaintiff Holli Lundahl, plaintiff Donald R Johnson, plaintiff
Mission Trail Medica, plaintiff - Traii Medica, plaintiff Lundahl Chiropractic in support of
motion to continue hrg on dfts' mtn to dism [15-1] (krpa) (Entered: 03/28/1994)

03/22/1994

ex parte

04/11/1994

plaintiff Holli Lundahl, plaintiff Donald R Johnson,
- Mission Trail Medica, plaintiff Lundahl

+: 1 ~-

.,.~........

Trail Medica,
(ruiz) (Entered: 04/l

04/15/1994

24 Rply mem of p/a in suppt ntc by defendant Eli Lilly & Company, defendant Advanced
Cardiovascu, defendant Connie Elliano, defendant Karen Kadyk, defendant Eve Chaplin to
motion to dismiss [3-1] (ruiz) (Entered: 04/21/1994)

04/25/1994

25 MINUTES: granting motion to continue hrg on dfts' mtn to dism [15-1], GRANT in part
DENY in part motion to dismiss w/lv to amd, as the fraud elm & th denial of ext of contract
Gary L. Taylor

0511911994

26
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IN THE UNTIED STATES COURT FOR THE

4

v :,1 '

CLER!(

DISTRIC~

HOLLI LUNDAHL,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

VS.

"""',,..,..,,,,,..., Ymcieoomg No. 03-2402
MURDOCK, et

Case No. 2:04 cv 88 PGC

Defendants.

to withdraw the reference to the

on

January 28, 2004. The Bankruptcy Court ruSJrmssea Ms. Lundahl's underlying bankruptcy case on

the matter to t.1-ie Fourth District Court in Utah. The court will interpret these pleadings as an
appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's ruling dismissing this case without prejudice.
Ms. Lundahl filed a notice of appeal on January 5, 2004, and on February 3, 2004, the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed her appeal for failure to prosecute.
On January 28, 2004, Ms. Lundahl filed the pending motion to withdraw the reference.
The court dismisses this proceeding for three reasons: (1) failure to properly complete service;
(2) failure to properly prosecute her appeal; and (3) because the Bankruptcy court correctly
dismissed this adversary proceeding.

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 63 of 118Case 2:04-cv-0~8-PGC Document 7 Filed 09/01/0~age 3 of 4

Bankruptcy Court's Ruling

The Bankruptcy Court properly dismissed Ms. Lundahl's adversary proceeding in this
case. Once the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the underlying bankruptcy proceeding, it lacked the
jurisdiction to hear this adversaryproceeding. 3 Notably the Bankruptcy Court dismissed this
proceeding without prejudice, and this court does as
to

court
the motion to

at the Tenth

The court DENIES the

The court DEN1ES

cmut

case

SO ORDERED.
DATED this

Jfr_ day of ~;004.
BY THE COURT:

T2ft)
ParliG:'Cassell
United States District Judge

3

See Smith v. Commercial Banking Corp., (In re Smith), 866 F.2d 576, 580 (3ro
1989); in re Statistical Tabulatin Corp., 60 F.3d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir. 1995); Quemer v. Quemer
(Jn re Querner), 7 F.3d 1199, 1201-02 (5th Cir. 1993).
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tsh

United States District Court

for the
District of Utah
September 3, 2004

* *
Re:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK

* *

2:04-cv-00088

True a..~d correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mailed
by the clerk to the fellowing:

Holli Lundahl
PO BOX 833
L:l!i.d:I, trr
84043
• Curtis J. Drake
SNELL & WILMER LLP

15 W SOUTH TEMPLE STE 1200
GATEWAY TOWER W

SALT LAKE CITY, UT

84101

Andres' Diaz

313 BOSTON BUILDING
EX~GE PL
SALT LAKE
UT 84111
Helene Huff
US BANKRUPTCY COURT
84101

EMAIL
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CvL'ECF California Cemral District

,REFER

CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the CENTRAL
(Eastern Division - Riverside)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE#: 5:94-cv-00021-RT -CT

Date Filed: l 0/18/1994
Date Terminated: l 0/06/1998

Case in
court: Santa
Cause: 42: 1983 Civi!

8:94-cv-00045

C Pizzum
Francis C Pizzul!i Law Offices
718
Santa
CA 90401
310-451-8020
Fax: 310-458-6156
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jerry L Steering
Jerry L Steering Law Offices
4063 Birch Street, Suite 100
Newport Beach, CA 92660
949-474-1849
Email: jerrysteering@yahoo.com
TERlvfINATED: 0712111994
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Donald R Johnson
DO
TERMINATED: 0910411996

represented by Donald R Johnson
IN PRO PER
27365 Jefferson Ave

file:///Cj/Osers/Elham/Desktopr1JSDC-94%20CV%2002l %20Docket.htm[ J!l 3/20 ! 3 l l :33:3 l P:..fj
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146 ' ORDER on Appll to Withdraw as Cnsl of Record
06/2

l Timlin (mco)

to by plaintiff
06/09/1995

145

ORDER - It is ord that GTE preserve til her final concluion the telephone records of
Merrelin Bland for months 1/1191to4/4/91; GTE may file obj to this ord by 6/22/95; if
GTE files no obj by 6/
this ord becomes final by
Robert J. Timlin (mco)
06/21 /1995)

147

MINUTES: Defis ACS, Inc., Eli Lilly & Co., Connie Elliano, Connie Harrison, Merrelin
Blank, Joyce Johnson, Beverly Gilsdorf, & Patricia Wayman's mot to declare Holly Lundahl
a VEXATIOUS LITIGANT is DENIED. Crt GRANTS the ACS defis' req to take judicial
ntc of certain docs; Crt denies pltfs oral argument on mtn by Robert J.
CR: n/a
Modified on 09/20/ ! 996
06/21/1995)

06/20/i995

Lundahl to
MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Holli Lundahl in support of motion for
reconsideration of compelled prod of income tax retns [132-1] (le) {Entered: 07/05/1995)
157

SUPPL MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Holli Lundahl in support of motion for
of 5/8/95 discv ord [ 129-1] (le) (Entered: 07/05/1995)
and reconsideration by plf (FWTI TO CRD)

LODGED/PROPOSED Order remot fr
(le) (Entered: 07/05/1995)
LODGED/PROPOSED Order re osc
07/05/1995)

hid 4/10/95 by plf (FWD TO CRD) (le) (Entered:

AMENDED COMPLAINT [29- l] by plaintiff Holli Lundahl, plaintiff Donald R
Johnson, plaintiff Mission Trail Medica, plaintiff - Mission Trail Medica, plaintiff Lundahl
Chiropractic;
Co of Riverside
Micheal
jury '"'"''"'""''"'
07/06/1995)

Lundahl not to engage in

l 1:33:31 PM]
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IN THE UNITED STATES

2rxJ+

. ZIMMER CL

co~~-~s. TIIB DISTRICT~

.. . :CEN'IRA:LDIVISION

HOLLI LUNDAHL,
Plaintiff,

CNA FINAl.'JCIAL

Case No. 2:04 cv 84 PGC

on

28,2004. The
December

2003,

adversary proceeding on December 22, 2003, remanding

the matter to the Fourth District Court in Utah. The court will interpret Ms. Lundahl's pleadings
as an appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's ruling dismissing this case without prejudice.
Ms. Lundahl filed a notice of appeal on January 5, 2004, and on February 3, 2004, the

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed her appeal for failure to prosecute.
On January 28, 2004, Ms. Lundahl filed the pending motion to withdraw the reference.

The court dismisses this proceeding for three :reasons: (1) failure to properly complete service;

(2) failure to properly prosecute her appeal; and (3) because the Bankruptcy Court correctly
dismissed this adversary proceeding.
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Case 2:04-cv-00084-PGC

Document 5 Filed 09/01/04 Page 3 of 4

Bankntptcy Court 's Ruling
The Bankruptcy Court properly dismissed Ms. Lundahl's adversary proceeding in this
case. Once the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the underlying bankruptcy proceeding, it lacked the
jurisdiction to hear this adversary proceeding. 3 Notably the Bankruptcy Court dismissed this

aswe1L
to Continue or

court while she

On

court

no

good cause.

The court
court DE~'IBS the

SO ORDERED.

$..pf#

DATED this~ dayof~t, 2004.
BY THE COURT:

k!O~
Paul G. Cassell
United States District Judge

3 See Smith v. Commercial Banking Corp., (In re Smith), 866 F.2d 576, 580 (3'd Cir.
1989); in re Statistical Tabulatin Corp., 60 F.3d 1286, 1289 ('f'h Cir. 1995); Querner v. Querner
(Jn re Querner), 7 F.3d 1199, 1201-02 (5"~ Cir. 1993).
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United States District Court

for the
District of Utah

September 3, 2004

* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * *
Re:

2:04-cv-00084

True and correct copies of the attached were either :mailed, faxed or e-mailed
the clerk to the
Holli Lundahl
PO BOX 833
LEHI UT 84043

Brent O.
HATCH JAMES & DODGE
10 W BROADWAY STE 400
SALT LAXE CITY, UT S4101

Huff
US BA:NKRUPTCY COURT
'
84101
W.A.IL
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of Idaho (LIVE
CIVJL DOCKET FOR

Lundahl et al v NAR Inc. et al
Assigned to:
Richard C. Taliman
Case in other court: Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 0656436
Cause: 18:1961 Racketeering (RJCO) Act

Date Filed: 04/08/2005
Date Terminated: 08/01/2006
Jury Demand: Plaintiff
Nature of Suit: 470 Racketeer/Corrupt
Organization
Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Holli Lundahl

Hom Lundahl
P 0 Box168

m

PROSE

S \Valk.er

S Walker
68 West 100 North

v
NAR foe

Mark Olson
Defendant
Olson and Associates PC
Defendant
Olympus Dental

Defendant
Anthony Tidwell
Defendant
Ronald Price

represented by Ronald Price

6/17/2012
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_
Price. (AttRchments: # l Exhibits A-B# ~Exhibit
!-0# l Declaration of Ronald F. Price)(ja,) (Entered: 04/28/2005)
05/04/2005

05113/2005

rage

j

or ''1

:! Exhibit

2 ORDER denying l Motion

Leave to Prcceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiffs
shall pay the filing fee of $250 within 30 days of the date of this Order before
this matter shall be allowed to proceed further. Signed by Judge Larry M.
Boyle. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses
listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by ja,)

lO

RETIJR.~

MAIL undelivered as to S. Walker re: 2 Order (ja,)

ORD ER that this matter is referred to the Clerk of Court for reassignment to a
District Judge. Signed by Judge Larry M. Boyle. (caused to be mailed to non
Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic
by
)

07128/2005

07/28/2005

07/28/2005

is
Tallman, United States Circuit Judge, for the Ninth Circuit Court
resolution of the entire case. Ail motions shall be decided on t'1e
record.
B.
Wirunill. (caused to be mailed to Holli~---""..... "'
Box 833,
Utah 84043. (non
at l'1c addresses listed
on the Notice of Electronic Filing

re

02/10/2006

~

RETUR.i"J MAIL undelivered as to S. Walker re: 17 Order (ja)

04/07/2006

1.2

ORDER Show Cause Hearing set for 5/19/2006 0 l :00 PM in Boise, 1D before
Honorable Richard C. Tallman .. Signed by Judge Richard C. Tallman. (caused
to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice
of Eiectronic Filing (NEF) by jg,) (Entered: 04111/2006)

04/13/2006

20

DOCKET ENTRY ORDER- AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING - Please
be advised that the date and time of die Order to Show Cause hearing has been
changed from May 19, 2006 at l :00 p.m. to Monday, May 15, 2006 at 1:30
p.m. at the James A. McClure Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse in Boise,
Idaho. Please make note of the new date and time. Signed by Judge Richard C.
Tallman. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses
listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by shh) Modified on 4/14/2006:
served by certified mail retrun receipt requested on Holli Lllndahl PO Box
Lehi, UT 84043, Article #7099 3220 0004 6891 7137(jlg, ).

fi ic:///C:/Users/Elham/Desktop/DktRpt. pl.hlm
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Show Cause Hearing set for 5/15/2006 l :30 A:Vf in

ID before Honorable Richard C Tallma.'1. (caused to be mailed to non
Participants at the addresses listed on the :i\ctice of Electronic
0,iEF) by dkh,) (Entered: 04/1412006)
04/1912006

R.ETUR.i\i MAIL ur.delivered as to S. Walker re: 19 Order, Set
Deadlines/Hearings,, (jg,) Additional attachment(s) added on 4/20/2006 Gg, ).

04/20/2006

RESPONSE TO INV ITATl ON TO SUBMIT INrOIUJATION REGARDING
HOLLI Ll.NDAHL'S VEXATIOUS
(Entered: 04/2112006)

04/21/2006

LITIGATJONb~(dkh,)

RETUR."l\! MAIL undelivered as to S Walker re: 2l Notice of Hearing (jig,)
(Entered: 04/24/2006)
as to S Walker re: 20

05/08/2006

\\Tong p<lf image was attached. Attorney to re-file the correct document. Clerk
sealed the document because h contained
this case. (jlg, )
05/08/2006

05/08i2006

infon1,ation not related 10

~iE?v10R.bu"JDUtv1/BRlEF

re
Set Deadlines/Hearings,,, 20
Notice of Hearing filed by Jef~Q(mpton The Compton Defendants', the
Strong & Hanni Defendants' an~oint Memorandum in Support of
Entry of Vexatious Litiganl Order Against Holli Lundahl (REFERENCE CASE
NOS. 06-14 and 05-145). (Attachments:# l Affidavit of Joseph N. Pirtle in
Support of Entry of Vexatious Litigant Order Against Holli Lundahl & Ex. A
& B#;? Affidavit Exhibits C-G)(Evett, Joshua)
MEMORAi'\JDUM/BRlEF re l2 Order. Set Deadlines/Hearings,,, 20 Order,,,

28 Memorandum/Brief (generic), Memorandum/Brief (generic),
MemorandumJBrief (generic),
Notice of Hearing filed by Jeffrey Compton
The Elam & Burke Defend.ants' Memorandum in Support ofEnfly of Vexatious
Litigan! Order Against Holli Lundahl (REFERENCE CASE NOS: 06-14 and
05-145). (Evett, Joshua)
05/08/2006

AFFlDAVIT of J. Kevin West re 12. Order, Set Deadlines/Hearings,, filed by
Paul C. Hess, Amber Allen and Beehive Credit Union. (Werth, Randall)

fiJe:///C:/Users/Elham/Desktop/DktHpt.pJ.htrn
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FINA:.'\"CIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

Page 5 of 8

Tanrnan, R:.:hard C

\ 7II. r.:.rv~STME~TS

and 1'R USTS

-income,

YfJfue~ trans1.1c:icms (inc!1td(.>; :hcs::.:;fth.: .'lptJit,";(: iJ!ld :ltpc:ufe!If c/ti!;Jren. See ,"Ip. 3.J-6/J!iffi!iJrg ins!r:;r.::itn:s.)

NONE (iVo reportable income) assets or trar.sacticns.)
1

A.

Description of Assets
{including tr'J:St assets}
Place IM{X)" after ea.:h a-sset
exempt from prior dis.cfosure

~

( tJ/4/

I

Prudential Retirement Funds:

- ' GJ)1JCJO

(JP.,f

:1.ffrhfJ(J?J -P1N1 l1~

I

, 3.

- Dodge & Cox Stock Fund

I

T

N

PiMCO Tota! Retum lnsil. Fund

,

1

None

M

I

I I

T

!
M

T

L

T

I

1

14.

- Hotchkis & Wiley Small- Cap Value Fund
~Euro

5.

!

Pacific Growth Fund

Union Bank of California. checking &.

, 6.

savings a<:cts

i

Seattle City Credit Ur.ion, checking and
savings accounts:

1.

J

!

I
II

K

T

J

T

J

T

T

A

foterest

A

Interest

A

!nterc.";t

K

None

0

'

..

j s.

Washington Mutual Bank checking &
savings accts

!

I 9.

I
I

Vanguard Group Funds:

I

i

I

lO.

- V•ngu.arrl 500 lf1de:<

l l.

.. Vanguard Explorer

12.

- Vanguard Socia! index

I'3.

I
I

M

T

T

- Vanguard GNMA

L

T

• Vanguard High-Yield Corporate

K

T

L

T

M

T

I

I !6.

I

I

- Vanguard Total Bond Marl<ef Index

I

I!7.

I

!

• Vang:.iard lntemational Growth

Aetna Univel'Sll! Life lns (See Note, Part

None

!

I

I

v

J

!

i. Income Gain Coda:
(Su Cuh.1mns Bl antl: 04}

.2.

Va!u~

CO>Gi:t
(See C.0Jun-m1 C1

~nd

J. Value M:c1hOO Coaes
{Sec Column Q)

DJ}

A"'$ t.000or1<3$S
F "'-"S.50~00: - l I00,000
J "'$ l 5JJOO or les:s
N •$"..50.001 - rnlil.OO<l
n ""ru,ooo.mH .. sso.000,000
0"'App.rainl
U""B®k V;llm.•

I

Ii

I

B •S 1,00 I • $2,500
G •Sl!lC,001 - Sl,000.000
K •!15.001 • Sl0,000
0 •llOQ,COI • ll.000.000
R -.(:m:t {Re:i.l Esl:i.tc Only}
v ....O!h1:r

C =S2,$01 • Sl,000
HI •Sl ,000,001 • $3.,00D.000
L•SlMO! • $100.0W
?! •Si.000.001 • :>.l,000.000

s

I
I

I
I

"'

I
'j

i
i

'

I
K

I

Iis.

I

I

i
i
i

I

I
I

r
!

I

I
I

I

I

I
I I
I
I
I
II

I
0 ~ss.001 -Sll.OUO
H2 "'M~ !htm s.s.ooa.noo
M ...stco,oo 1 • sz:m,ooo
f''.1..,Sl,000.COl - SJ.5.000,0CO

II

I

I

I
I
I

I

i

Il !4.

I

'

I
T

I

!

I

i

I

T

M

I

j

I
I

iI

!

I

I

1

I
I

E •lll,001 • ll-0,000

I

l

£..-... .. f :u

••
••
••
•

:ot.J•

••
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F'INANC!AL DISCLOSURE REPORT
Pagr: 8 of S

4/6/20G7

TaHm:'m, Rich;ml C

IX. CERTIF1CATION.

•
•,.•
,.

! certify ihal s!l inform:ttion give.~ 2bove (includlng \nformotton ptrt2lnin~ to my spouse and minor or dependent childr~u. if ~ny) is
accurntc, t."'lJe_ anc! enmplcte :o th~ btSt o!m)I knowledge and beli,f, and that 2ny Information not reported ,.as witbhtld becouS<e it met ippiioblc statutory
proYi:loru permitting aQIHi!sclosur~.

~

! further ;;ert!fy th:at earned lnenme from ont5i1e emplayment nnd hoM~ri11 and tll~ ai:i:tplantc ~f ~lfti whidi have been repurtcd 2re in
compliance with the provbion• ofS {J,S,,C. app. § 50! et. 1"4, 5 U.S.C. § 73$3, ~ nd Judl~Jai Cant.rent< rtg;ibti<m5.

..,
•
- ~w t

••
••

NOTE; A.NY IND!YIDUAL V.110 KNOWINGLY AND WTLFUU. y l!ALSfFTf:'.5 OR FAILS T.O FILE rnrs REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL
ANJ;) CRIMINAL SANffiONS (S U.S.C. app, § 104)

~

~

~·

~

...

~·

•...
•

•
...
•
..._.

·.·
.· ·

···• .

~ ··

Ccmmircee on Financial Disc;iom:ire
Administrative Office of the Urjted States Courts
Suite 2·301
One Columbus Circle, NE
L_--~~hingtmi, D.C. 20544
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Servicer Evaluation: Pacific Life
Insurance Co.
Servicer Analysts:

Thomas Merck. New Yon: (1 l z12-438·2547: mcrnas_merck®srandardandpoors_com
Mark! Goldberg, New Yoi: (1i212-438· 77:19: marfu;oldbe;g@standardand:-0ors,corn
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Pacific Life Backgrou nd Information
Pacific Ute was founded in i 868 :n San Francisco. Its first president was Leia rd Slanfora. who was later a
BROKER IJl:JSCONOUCT
i!~OICEl!AGE

Fll™S

INVESTMENTS
·-----.,-~~ ~~-·,,,,..,_.,.,., ,-.__,,

Cei1fomia Sen;:itcr. Stanford also founded Stanford Universlry, Vii1it:h was bailed cut financially by his widow

__

SOC/\

alter his death.

Pacific Ufe sur;ived San Francisco's great earthquake in 1 &09 when an office manager thought to remove the
firm's bearer bonds as he left ttle bvikling. The stru cture was then :eveletl by fireflghlert as a firebreak. ,A Les

••
•
•·· .·
••
••

Angeles based life insurance compa ny had j usl been acquired arid lh!! firm's headqu2fters were ihJs muve;i tc

that city.
CONTACT US

As ctict ott:er such fums for iax breaks. Pacific Life became a ·mutual' lite company, owned bY its shareholders .

relocated to Newport Beach. Its seashore image is now built aroonc a m\!ing humpback wha!e. in 1997, P2d!c

(300) 259-9010

!97l, Pacific life !aunelled PIMCC as an ln:::§:§trn§lnt

mp1.cyee., bene fi! p!ans, erniowmenis'.ami 10~11cations. Through a reverse. mer~er in 1!!9~ •. PiMCO A~iS<.Jre

[

Padf.c.Ufe has acquired a m.1mber.of se"..vrilies broker-dealer firms, includ ir.g Florida-nas1:c Muh1a! SeNica

~

•

,.,.
w-··,

~

~: ·· ·

moresentatlves, Les Angalel!--based Associated Securities Corp.,

wilh 340 representatives aNJ Beverly Hills-based M. L Stem I?< Company with 140. it also acquired majority
interest in Unite-:i Planners' Financial Ser11ices of America, an A rizona-based broker-dealer with 3~0

CONNECT

representatives. in 19911, ii acquired Tower Asset Management, il fee-based investinent advisory

~rm.

Sorrento

Pacil\c Financial ber...ame ye! another piece of 1hl! puzzle

~··

~.

alt¥triihon dollars .

· Corpcrnlion, ser11!cing Oller .:MOO

if.

•

mat~l!lillll subsidiary wh1Cll Offers services ttJ

became a pubiiay tr.icied company. pnmali!y managmg !1xea·m(;l)me secuntcs; wrrer.t!y •t 1s lotli! of mm~t

'?•'(';., .

'.

Life ronverteti back from a mutucl to a corporate structure bf issuing steel< lo !)<llicyhok:lem. Unlike many other
life Insurance lirrns wh1cl'l have reverter: form the mutual structure. Pacific Life it has not at this time gone ;M:llic.

9-::

i---··'·

After celeb'1!f111g its 1O-Oth arm i11ersar1, ·Nitrl a keynote sp eoch by GO\l!l;!nor Ron al::! Reagan. ttie company soon

CONTACT US

These, arid tither sewrities firm $Ubsldiar!es. came to be operated unde r common management through

P~cit:c

Sel8ct Group LLC. a alvisicn of Pacific Ute. However. in March 2C07, ilwas an11<Junced 11\ai rapic:ly growing LPL
BROKER M!SCONOUCT
W!iimipresentllrt!on and

Omissioru.

UmsufulbH!ty

OYm'COn.,,,ntmlon

c1tiimins
Fallure

to Ex«ll'llf Tractet1

financial Services. a nearby La Jolla tiasati Tirm, was acquiring three of Pacific Life insurance Company's
broker~alers--Muil.lal

Ser; ice Cotp-0rati0n, .Associated Flr<ar<Cial Groop, and Waterstcme Financial Group.

Coliective!y, !hese three

broker-deal~

have 2,200 1'inancial advisors s<ervirg retail clients and $353 mlHon in

revenues. It wa s said this would Increase LPL to 1O,OOO ]?.;'.Q,~&!:l;. lM company's gc.al prior lo an !PG.

Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas LTD LLP Law Firm

Faih..ire to SUpiHVi.s~

Our la-w firm represents lnstitvtior:"1 <mct individual investors nationwide Wirh slgn !tlamt losses in tlieir ;:icrifolios,

l>tll!acl'I e f ? romise1Contract

retirement plai\S and irweatmenl aa:oor.J;>. Our attorneys am:! staff nave more tt>.an 100 years or ccml)ffied

tlruch cl fld uc!ary Duty

e:x~}0r\ence in the securities industry and i~t ~urifes iaw, Se"Veta! of our fawye~ served for yea!'$ at Vice

l&.<11>1in Ac~rrt Abu~"

Pre'Sident or Gompli<!nce Officer af brokerage firms.

·R~tntlor; 'liof:nlww
tJna11ttlom md Trndl11g

Each !;,wyer and staf! memwr of our fam is devoted to assisting investors to recover losses caused by
unsuhabi!ity, over-wncentratian, fraud. misrepresentation, $1lll-dea!ing, unauthorized lradei: or other wrongful
acts . whether intentional or neg !igenl Each attorney at ouI firm has experience representing !rwestcra in

secur!faas arbi!iatkm clairns andfor!aws uits. We have handled more than lhous<rnd cases against hundreds of
large and smell brokerage f.rm$. including .igains! He lns urance sutisidiaries.
Cail us at {!lOO )259·901 oor comact u> tr:rough owr Website la arrange a1refl con fldenii<ii consultat:cn with an
attomey to discuss your ex;:~e nces Will', an investment advisor e< t:rancial llrm which res~tted in losses.

Additional Information:

Pacific Life Sued over Variable Annuities

.....,..,,,..,..,....,._____,,_,cas-e- 2:'12=cv~-oo28&SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 86 of 118

w

Outfook
The outlook is stable for the prirnary and special senicing ra;:kings. The company's rdatively steady operations and
µroceclu:-es and loan management practices support our opinion that the company will 1ike!y remain a competet:t
commercial mortgage service!'. and asset manager.
The outlook is negative for the master servicing ranking reflecting a lack cf any master servicing activity involving
imcractions with a subservker for nearly a 24-month period. Should this trend continue it may be necessarf to bring

the ranking more inline wirli those of similarly arranged platforms.

Profile
Pacific Life provides commercial real estate finance and investment expertise to its life insurance, investmem, and
annuities businesses, as well as to its private-party and securitized mortgage loan-servicing clients. As of June 30,

2011, the company .h.ad 77 employees involved in primary, master, and special servking operations monitoring
roughly 50{) loans in its commercial real estate portfolio with an unpaid principal balance (UPB) of approximately
$7.8 biHion.

[

Paci~i~

~n

mo~gage

Life is active
.l.oan servicer of both CMBS and r_rivate '.n.vestment portfolios. The company began
servicmg for thml-party private cllents in the 1970s and was an early pamcipam m the CMBS market.
Table 1

Total Primarv And Master Servicing l'crtfolia Statistics
6/36Pil11 12/3112IJ10 12/3'!/200l} 12131/2008 12/31/2007
. Tar.al vo!ume (mil S}
iatol loans !mt)
~. .

M1111Wilr Mmci~ only
Tcrtal \!Olume lrnit $)

~ . ····.

f •····

Total leans (no.)

t.

A>y. loan size !mil. Sl
Subservirers (no l

~

483

5.612.30
468

16.1

14.1

0
0
0
0

0

41.7

0
0

2

4

4

209

11 .B

14.1

0

1

2

2

O

0

0
0

0

0
0

6,S/S.20

6,572.50

5.89350

473

435

440

15.3

13.4

47

55.5

iotaJ maste;tptima!1jortfo1JE_delin~encies (% nf llO. of leans}
3H'i0~ ·•
Cl.41,
a
O
.

..
r·

•

7.76-UQ

..

5Hl9 cays

~;\;.f

o

0.43

0

D.43

041

Gll5

a
0

--~.~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~·

!vianagement And. Organization
Our subranking for 1mmagement and organization is STRONG.

:~1>>

3
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Multiple Documents
Select the document you wish to view.
Part

Description

1

Main Document.

(
9 pages

Exhibit VHS Tape in
expando file in clerks
office

44 pages

Exhibit 9 • 22

47 pages

View A!l

or

Download All '.

100 pages

'•"·.

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 89 of 118

,,,,,,,

'-'

15

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 90 of 118

.._,

y

l'~C..l.~

Docket She.ci fo: 97-8C·:::S!

..... •<" :· ..... ,;~- .

..,.: .' .

..:..1

•• • 0

Genera I Docket
US Court of AppEals for the Ninth Circuit
.::.p;,e~ls

::-: c:!
•i '::

Dc:;ket

~:

Si-SC2.!.S

c..

dahl v.
~.rc:n:

?al

Centr2l Dis:rict c! Ccli!o=r:ia,

~s

Mgele:s

type inforl!lation:
ll misc

:o

tnull}

3)

lnull)

~strict:

0973-2 :
Fiied: ••1••1••
~te order/judgment: ••1••1••
tt8 NOA tiled: ••1••1••

a~e

tus: not applicable

·-·-·-:-\
~~N'.l'Cpni
J!oll.i Lundahl

cases:

1

·

P.O. !Soll 13?1 ·
Orem, U'I' !1'405'1-137 :;'

_,
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l"SC.4~

Dcd:el Snee: fer 9:'-80:5&

Fi:ed c.:Cer
..
, . __ . _, <~•I:;.. ·
Hcl:i Lundat.l, js c:::dered to re£Fc~d and Ehow cai:se witilin
:4 cays of tte e.1try of this erder why this ct ~hould nor
enter the fcllcwi!l9 pre-filing review cnier •••• (see.c•file
!o::: l'llCl"ll in!o.) ..•. respon11111 to o:rr:!er T.o show t:ai:.511l due
<

6/26/97;

I HC'?l'CNS)

.,

[97-802311] h:k;>)

Order filed (HOt.iona .Aty; SG) ••. i\e.spnc:lt. l:uu; fll:iled to

re.spend to the c:r:der to 111bov calll!e. Punrw11:1t to the 6fl2
order, the !ollc.'11'.ing Pll:-Fll.Im; Jlnll"I Oii.tl!!l IS EEJU2f
Dl'!'llED •••••• (SH csf.ile)....... ! Proeedl:lnlly 'l'1:u:m.nat.ed
Without. Judicial Action; l)ltfault. ) l97-SC2581 lclq>)
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Selected docket entries for case 97-80258

Document Descri tion

Filed

lpage!

Docket Text

J

'10rdcr filed (Motions Aty: SG) ... Respn<lt has failed to

l07/i711997 l

espond to the order to show cause. Pursuant to the 6il 2
rder, the following PRE-FILING REVIEW ORDER lS
1,HEREBY E'l\/TERED...... (see csfile)....... (Procedurally
I
!Terminated Without Judicial Action; Default. ) [97-80258]
1(CKP)
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~Wi fT-f- ~ l.t~~cw:r
vD-M~ Ofth;vt,

t&+er

ts no+ tf\

tep[)fteJb ~

fzi-r ~ (hrtu.d-.

fhie-+1!~ ()(tier

/).)ct..$

atlof'~

fu-l 'IA.lc;.,

~tt41.

buJ- Is

C91rl&-

ac.+lW-ily

efl.kY,ei:{

lo{ Mi0t1s

...,

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 93 of 118

..-

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 f'.=iled 03/18/13 Page 94 of 118

REAL PROPERTY OWNER NAME SEARCH
Owner Name

Serial#

LUNDAHL, HOLLI

2c-05g-cn~o

(110)

LUNDAHL, HOLU

20:05~.00~C

(110)

1994NV

LUNDAHL, HOLLI

2C·G59.GD: r;

(110)

1992-1993 2748 N 930 EAST- PROVO

LUNDAHL, HOLLI T

:O:OS9-.0003

(110)

1985-1991 2748 N 930 EAST· PROVO

LUNDAHL, HOLLI T

'.20:C59: 0003
20:059:00~ 1

(110)

2748 N 930 EAST· PROVO
1984
1992·2003

LUNDAHL, HOLLI T

Tax District Years Valid

(110\

This page was created on 3!1412013 6:53:54 AM

Property Address

1994-1996 2748 N 930 EAST- PROVO
2748 N 930 EAST· PROVO

.
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Case 03-02082

....,,

~ Filed 06/27/03 Entered ~3 11 :57:43
. . . . .mental Document Page 19 o

Pagel of I

,t:.C,,unty Online Records

REAL PROPERTY OWNER INFORMATJON

Serial: 52:029:0071
~ LUNDAHL, HOLLI TELFORD
Malling Address: 2748 N 930 EAST PROVO UT 84604

Property ••·

Years Valid: 2000
Tax District.:
1.10
Acre$: 0.30
. Property code: 100

4139 N DEVONSHIRE cm PROVO UT 84604

T~OQ. ~scrlptiqi_~n~ for. lftgJl..Q.99.ol~

LOT 71, PU\7 a, SHERWOOD HILLS SUBD. AREA .30 ACRES.

3 Year Tax History
Assessed Value Taxes
Year Market
1999
227,367
1?9,0$2 1404.46
1oos
227.367
1348.69
~25,Q5Z
1997
227,367
1Z5.052 1441 .47

Adjustments

m

rs2:029;0071 ;200{;

MainM!l!ll,I
Comments or Concerns on Value/Appraisal ~r'' Pfflce
Documerrtl/OWne-r/Pam:~

Add~~hMgef9rTall

Info Reoorder' ir. Offi('.;e
NO!ioe
·-·
.-

This page wag ~led on O'i/OJ.12000 at 7:48:-12

Desc

($1,177.M)
{$552.00)
$0.00

Payments
$226.88

$796.69
$1 ,441 .47

Balance
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00

--·--·····

-··- --
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H COUNTY TAX NOT~

lJ¥

D

-fAH COUNTY 1REASURER '.,_;
DUPUCATE TAX NOTICE

Q,cd<J>i:c lO =-=iYe I

JWZ~bcm:I.
(firm

(111:1- ftlle)

Pin #
Serial #

Pay Online@utah..gov/propta:t

D

0820440
52:029:0071

Tax District#
110
Property Class
RS
2001 Amout Due l.------$0.,...,......@_,

52:029:0071
LUNDAHL, HOW TELFORD
2748 N930E
PROVO VT 84604-4378

~ 1liis pcrliao willi JCl"l"maU J*)'rl>!2IL
llm.m tis portian 1la-yom-J11Ctt'lio1. YClll' c:a:elod cl!ed<will he your-~

. UTAH COUNTY TAX NOTICE
SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION
UAKEamat PAYABLE TOUJ.'AH rooNTY'IllAWi1.ml
100 EAST CHNl'ER. St1l'IE 1200. n.ovo. urAH Wl06-3159

DUPLICATE TAX Nona:
~-- fli'lAN. l, 2001

LUNDAHL, HOW TELFORD
2748 N930E
PROVO UT 84604-4378

Pin#
Serial #

0820440
52:029:0071

Tax District#
Property Class

110
RS

2001 TAXES

$1,508.54

Adjustments
-$1,259.05
Total Payments
$249.49
2001 Amout Due ,....----$0,..---.@-.

J>ropor!yDes<ripiion(Dal. w 1q;p11 ~)

OT 71. PLAT B,. t>HERWOOD HlLLS SUBD. AR.RA..30 ACll.ES.

~ Addrea

Type
Res Real Est
Res!mprov

4139 N DEVONSHIRE OR.PROVO UT 84604

Valne of Property
Ttµ:able Vrune Market Value
38,972
)05,690

70,859

192,163

Distribution of Genend Tues

*Effective
Tax Rate
0.000193
0.000569
0.000193
0.001500
0.003280

. TuingUWt
ASSE
CNTY

CUWD
PROV

PR.SD

Tu:Rat.e

Amount

0.00035&
0.001053
0.00035&
0.002776
0.006071

$50.87
$149.63
SS0.87
$394.47
$862.70

0.010616

$1,508.54

-

Totals

144662

263~

·o.oos13s

I
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s
HOLU LUNDAHL
OLD HWY 191
MALAD ID 83252

MALAD ID 83252
COMPANY

R

PO
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~

mus .. ~RJ><~TioN ;s FOR OFFlOAL AND MEDICALLY cp, Yi:J'lllAL usE nN',
-----\
r---------'--~---"
'IT'-L NOT llE RELEASED TO L'NAUWORtU:D. wsf.
.
1
/ 1- LAST NAME-FIRST NAME-MIDJ::LE NAM:O
:l. !U:G"iSTB .. ow.is
.- ~ -----------\

j

1

(u.;..JJ)IJ-J..fL.

f/o[...Lf

'URPOSEOF EXAMIN>.TION

1-----

1

I

14. D

I
J

-_651'!:1_.~/2-,

LUNDAHL

HOLLI TELFORE

IS. SiA7""cl.lE?>'T OF E.XAM!NEE'S PWENT HEALTH AN" lJ/F /0/05-27-1956

HT/51<1
WT/140
CUSTODY/IN

IL_ _ _ __
17. HA VE YOO EVER (!'kiu, rhu:A: tt>di I_,)

IJSPL\'N

05151-1 i2
HP./.9N

EY/Hl
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W'
FD<~02

(Rtv. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BU.READ OF I\'VESTIGATION

Date of investigation

12/H/2006

----·

---~-

On December 11, 2006, detective Schwartz was
telephonically interviewed at his place of ei."ltployment, Oneida County
Sheriff's office regarding Holli Lundahl's claimed residence at 10621
S. Old Highway 191, Malad City Idaho 83252.
After being advised of
the identity of the interviewing Agent and the purpose of the
interview, Detective Schwartz provided the following information:
Detective Schwartz advised that he had visited Holli ,·s
alleged residence at 10621 s. Old Highway 191, 11.alad City Idaho to
verify any occupancy of the residence for purposes of the upcoming
bail appeal hearing and to support the competency of an earlier filed
contempt judgment entered against Holli by federal judge Richard
Tallman in June of 2006 barring Ho11i from filing any cases in the
state of Idaho on the. alleged grounds that Bolli did not own or
reside at the real property situs address 10621 S. Old Highway 191,
Malad City Idaho. Judge Tallman had asked us to investigate into
perjury charges against Ms. Lundahl.
Detective Schwartz admitted that he interviewed the
county tax assessor who reported that no residence existed at this
address, and further, that no hornesteaq_exemption had ever been
recorded to obtain property tax benefits for a residence property.
Detective Schwartz then visited the property in support of a
prospective perjury· prosecution prompted by Judge Tallman. Detective
Schwartz reported that there Wa:s indeed an old farm hoUBe and ham
located at Lundahl's claimed residence address but that Lundahl could
not have been residing at the property because there ~as no power to .the building.
Detective Schwartz reported that he could not enter
or see into the residence because the windows were completely covered
and all accesses were locked.
Based on detective Schwartz's report
that no power existr.ed t,o the. building, an additional perjury charge
was submitted. .
'
·,
·

lnvestigation on

.

12/14/2006
____

Salt Lake

Utah ·

-----al - - - - - - - - - - -

49-SU-62776

Sonja Sorenson:eva

------------

12/14/2006

...............-......._.
••
ng:~~~m11Q•ms~

~~~
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Document

~~ps:7;~2~tg~~~~~~~ ,,E~J1-~i~B~RJt.$~~3s 1301444S 1139-...

..,.,

CJA,.

US District Court Electronic Case Filing System
District of Utah (Central)
CRJMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE#: 2:06-cr-00693-WFD-1

Case title: USA v. Lundahl

Date Filed: 1010412006
Date Terminated: 01121i2009

Assigned to: Judge William F. Downes
Defendant (1 J

Hom Lundahl
TERM/NA TED: 01121/2009

represented by D. Bruce Oliver
180 300
#210
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101-1218
(801) 328-8888

s

w

TERM/NA TED: 0411012007
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Retained
Mary C. Corporon
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
(SLC)
36 S STATE ST STE 1900
PO SOX45340
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
(801 )532-3333
Email: mcorporon@vancott.com

LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: CJA Appointment
Robert L. Steele
UTAH FEDERAL DEFENDER OFFICE
46 W BROADWAY STE 110
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
(801 )524-5877
Email: robert_steele@fd.org

TERMINATED: 0511512007
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Public Defender or Community
Defender Appointment
Pending Counts

Disposition

None
Highest Offense L.~ve! {Q~
None
Terminated Counts

Disposition

18: 152(3) CONCEAL ASSETS, FALSE OATH AND
CLAIMS BRIBERY/False Bankruptcy Declaration
(1-2)

Al! counts dismissed without prejudice per
government motion

18:1519
DESTRUCTION.AlTERNATION,FALSIFICATION
RCDS FED INVESTIGATION/False Bankruptcy
Document
(3-5)

1of2

All counts dismissed without prejudice per
government motion

CM/ECF - U.S. Distriti~§rfjJJ2-cv-00280-SWS

w
18: 152(2) CONCEAL ASSETS, FALSE OATH AND
CLAIMS BRIBERY/Faise Bankruptcy Oa:h
(6-7)
!:iliJ.h~st

Ail counts dismissed without prejudice per
government mction

Offense Level {Terminated)

Felony
Disposition

£g_mplaint§.
None

Plaintiff
represented by Barbara Beamson
US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (UT)
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 00000
(801 )325-3230
Email: barbara.beamson@usdoj.gov
TERMINATED: 1211812006
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

USA

Cy H. Castle
US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (UT)
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 00000
(801 )325-3214
Email: cy.cast!e@usdoj.gov
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark Y. Hirata
US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (UT)
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 00000
(801 )325-3239
Email: Mari<.Hirata@usdoj.gov
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Fi!ed

#

06/2312008

238

Docket Text
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William F. Downes: Competency Hearing as to Hom
Lundahl held on 6/23/2008. Ms. Lundahl is present, with counsel. The court meets with counsel, in
chambers. The court takes the bench @ 9:30 a.m. and hears statements from counsel. Fv1,rt"''~""'_.....-...,__
received, testimony is taken. Ms. Corporon requests access to defendant's medical records
Orange County, California. Ms. Corporon is directed by prepare and submit an order. The
defendant be transported (via direct flight) to Carswell, Texas for a ful! medical exam, with a report due
thirty days after defendant's arrival. Mr. Castle to prepare order. After an outburst, Ms. Lundahl is removed
from the courtroom. The court finds defendant is not presently competent to stand trial. (Audio CD of
proceedings is retained in the Clerk's Office.)Attomey for Plaintiff: Cy Castle, AUSA,
for
Defendant: Mary Corporon, Esq. Court Reporter: Laura Robinson. (tab) (Entered: vo••.t:01Lu•voJ

PACER Service Center

2 of 2
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CJA,

US District Court Electronic Case Filing System
District of Utah (Central)
CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE#: 2:06-cr-00693-WFD-l

Case title: USA v. Lundahl

Date Filed: 10/04/2006
Date Terminated: 0 l/21/2009

Assigned to: Judge William F. Downes

Defendant (1)
Holli Lundahl

TERlvflNATED: 0112112009

represented by D. Bruce Oliver
180 s 300
#210
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
84101-1218
(80 l) 328-8888

w

TERJvflNATED: 0411012007
LEAD ATTORlvEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Retained

Mary C. Corporon
VAN COTT BAGLEY
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
(SLC)
36 S STA TE ST STE 1900
PO BOX 45340
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 8411 !
(801 )532-3333
Email:
mcorporon@vancott.com
LEAD ATTORllfEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: CJA Appointment

Robert L. Steele
UTAH FEDERAL
DEFENDER OFFICE
46 W BROADWAY STE 110
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
(801)524-5877
Email: robert_steele@fd.org

TERlvlJNATED: 05/1512007
LEAD ATTORNEY

https://ecf.utd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?44617016883483-L_ 1_0- l

CM/EciC-C\§~_~bt:ftrft'h~9~g.sws
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ATTOILYEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Public Defender
or Community Defender
Appointment

Pending Counts

Disposition

None
Highest Offense Level (Opening)
None

Terminated Counts

Disposition

18:152(3) CONCEAL ASSETS, FALSE OATH AND
CLAIMS BRIBERY/False Bankruptcy Declaration

All counts dismissed without
prejudice per government
motion

(1-2)
18:1519
DESTRUCTION,AL TERNATION,FALSIFICATION
RCDS FED INVESTIGA TION/Fa!se Bankruptcy
Document
(3-5)

All counts dismissed without
prejudice per government
motion

18: 152(2) CONCEAL ASSETS, FALSE OATH AND
CLAIMS BRIBERY/False Bankruptcy Oath
(6-7)

All counts dismissed without
prejudice per government
motion

Highest Offense Level (Terminated)
Felony
Complaints

Disposition

None

Plaintiff
USA

represei;ited by Barbara Bearnson
,
US ATTORJ.'JEY'S OFFICE (UT)
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 00000
(801 )325-3230
Email: barbara.beamson@usdoj.gov

TERlvf!NA.TED: 1211812006
LEAD ATFORlvEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cy H. Castle
US ATIOR.t"l\JEY'S OFFICE (UT)

https://ecf.utd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?44617016883483-L_ l _ 0-1

Gvl!EcF~E~s~dfsiRYt-~~t~P-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 109 of p~~e 3 of 3
W'

SALT LAKE CITY, LjT 00000
(801)325-3214
Email: cy.castle@usdoj.gov

LEAD ATTORXEY
ATTORNEY TO BE JVOTICED
Mark Y. Hirata
US A TTORl"\JEY'S OFFICE (UT)
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 00000
(80 l )325-3239
Email: Mark.Hirata@usdoj.gov

LEA.DATTORNEY
ATTOR1VEYTO BE NOTICED
Date Filed

#

01/21/2009

266

Docket Text
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William F. Downes: Motion
Hearing as to Holli Lundahl held on 1/2112009 re 264 MOTION to Dismiss
Case Without Prejudice filed by USA. The Court questioned the USA on the
timeliness and reasoning behind the motions. The Court also expressed
concern over any of the defendant's property seized by the government. The
USA stated that any property seized from the defendant was NOT done at the
request of the USA. The government also reported that it believed the
property was seized by the state ofidaho.The Court will issue an order for the
defendant's release later today, and will also enter, sua sponte, an order
directing the USA to pay for the return of the defendant to Salt Lake City via
commercial airline. The Court also requested M. Corporan to advise the
defendant's family of her release and to remind the defendant of Court orders
in place that restrict her filing any Court documents w/out permission in the
District of Utah, and possibly the District of Idaho. There are no such
restrictions in Wyoming at this time. Attorney for Plaintiff: Cy H. Castle,
Attorney for Defendant: Mary Corporon, CJA. Court Reporter: Jamie
Hendrich.(Time Start: 9: 11 a.m., Time End: 9:31 a.m., Room Judge Downes
Chambers.) (ce) Modified on l/21/2009 to modify whom the attorneys
represent ( ce). (Entered: 01/21/2009)

I
I

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt
Client
Code:

PACER
Login:

IDescr1ptwu
Billable
Pages:

Report

Search
Criteria:

2:06-cr-00693-WFD Starting
with document: 266 Ending with
'rlnrp~a~+· 266
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Case

2:06-cr-006~WFD

Document 267 Filed

01i21i~Page 1of2

United States District Court
- - - - - - For The District of Utah, Central Division - - - - -

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HOLLI LUNDAHL,
Defendant.

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case Nos. 06-CR-00693 WFD &
07-CR-00272 WFD

ORDER DISMISSING CHARGES WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND ORDERING THE
IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE DEF EN DANT

This matter comes before the Court on the Government's Motions to Dismiss
filed in each of the captioned cases. Having considered the motions, and having heard
argument on the matter, the Court FINDS and ORDERS:
The Government's motions to dismiss are GRANTED; the charges against Ms.
Lundahl are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. The Government is instructed to
immediately release Ms. Lundahl from custody and provide her with access to any
property which may have been seized pursuant to her federal indictments.
The Court further orders that Ms. Lundahl's counsel, Mary Corporon, shall take
all reasonable steps to notify Ms. Lundahl's family members of her release. Ms.
Corporon shall remain appointed as counsel pending Ms. Lundahl's successful release

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 112 of 118
Case

2:06-cr-OOG~vVFD

Document 267 Filed

01/21/~Page 2 ol 2

from custody and return of property seized pursuant to her federal indictments. Ms.
Corporon shall move this Court to be dismissed from her obligation at such time as her
appointment is no longer necessary.

lt is so ORDERED.
DATED this 21 st day of January, 2009.

Honorable William F. Downes
Chief United States District Judge
Sitting by Special Designation

-2-
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US District Court Electronic Case Filing System
District of Utah (Central)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE#: 2:04-cv-00089-PGC

Lundahl v. Robbins, et al
Assigned to: Judge Paul G. Cassell
Demand: $0
Case in other court: US Blacy Dist UT, 03-21660
US Bkrcy Dist UT, 03-0240 l
USCA l 0th Circuit, 04-04236
04-04236
Cause: 28:0157 Motion for Withdrawal of Reference

Date Filed: 01128/2004
Date Terminated: 09/0112004
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 423 Bankruptcy
Withdraw!
Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Petitioner

Holli Lundahl

represented by Hom Lundahl
139868
CACHE COUNTY JAIL

E-3
1225 W VALLEY VIEW STE 100
LOGAN, UT 84321
PROSE

v.
Respondent
Brian Robbins
Respondent
Source One Mortgage Services
Respondent
California Franchise Tax Board
Respondent
March Fong Eu
Secretary ofState and successor in
interest
Respondent
Gerald Rosenberg
Commissioner in his personal capacity

Respondent
Eli Liny

https://ecf.utd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?741229175125359-L_ l _0-1
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·
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Page 2 of 3

Respondent
l:NITED STATES OF AMERICA
Respondent
Internal Revenue Service
Notice Party
Bankruptcy Clerk's Office

represented by Bankruptcy Clerk's Office
US BANKRUPTCY COURT 84101
Email:
UTB_ Appeals@utb.uscourts.gov
PROSE

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

01/28/2004

I

Certification of transmission of bankruptcy reference assigned to Judge Dee
Benson. No filing fee required. Report to the US Distr. Ct Regarding Plaintiff's
Motion for Withdrawal of Reference. (kla) (Entered: 01/29/2004)

01/28/2004

')

~

Motion by Holli Lundahl to withdraw the reference (kla) (Entered: 01/29/2004)

02/03/2004

Memo of recusal of Judge Dee Benson (kvs) (Entered: 02/03/2004)

02/03/2004

Case reassigned to Judge Paul G. Cassell (kvs) (Entered: 02/03/2004)

02/06/2004

l

NTC ofrecusal of Judge Dee Benson and reassignment to Judge Paul G.
Cassell. cc: atty (kvs) (Entered: 02/06/2004)

03/03/2004

4

Notice of filing re: Certified Copy of Order from the USBC District of Utah
Remanding Adversary Proceeding. Bankruptcy case no. 03-21660, Adversary
Proceeding no. 03-02401. (tsh) (Entered: 03/03/2004)

09/01/2004

i

Order denying [2-1] motion to withdraw the reference signed by Judge Paul G.
Cassell, 9/1/04 cc:atty (tsh) (Entered: 09/0312004)

09/01/2004
09/30/2004

09/30/2004

Case closed per order 5 (tsh) (Entered: 09/03/2004)

2.

Notice of Appeal by Holli Lundahl ; Fee Status: NOT PD ; appeals to the
USCA for the Tenth Circuit from the Order Entered: 09/03/04 (asp) (Entered:
10/01/2004)

. 8 Motion by Holli Lundahl to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal (asp)
(Entered: 10/04/2004)

10/01/2004

7

Notice of appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA: [6-1] appeal; appeal
pkts mailed to counsel record (asp) (Entered: 10/0112004)

10/20/2004

2

Notice of Docketing Appeal Letter from USCA Tenth Circuit Re: [6-1] appeal
USCA NUMBER: 04-4236 (asp) (Entered: 10/21/2004)

l 0/28/2004

10

Certified and transmitted record on appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals: [6-1]
appeal ; transmitted original court record Consisting of documents l-10. (asp)
(Entered: 10/28/2004)

https://ecf.utd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?741229175 l 25359-L_J
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DtS\R~CTATTOEFS DISTRICT
·

l:f(l ~:?

_1

p 2= 5ll

..

SEP - 1 200;

, ..

8¥MARKUS B. ZIMMER, CLERK
~

,

IN THE lJ1'.1TED STATES C_OURT-B)R THE DISTRICT OF lrr AH ,
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HOLLI LUNDAHL,
Plaintiff,

vs.

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

Bankruptcy Case No. 03-21660
Adversary Proceeding No. 03-2401

BRIAN ROBBINS, et al.,

Case No. 2:04 cv 89 PGC

Defendants.

Ms. Lundahl filed this motion to withdraw the reference to the Bankruptcy Court on
January 28, 2004. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed Ms. Lundahl's underlying bankruptcy case on

December 19, 2003 and this adversary proceeding on December 22, 2003, remanding the matter
to the Fourth District Court in Utah. The court will interpret these pleadings as an appeal of the
Bankruptcy Court's ruling dismissing this case without prejudice.
Ms. Lundahl filed a notice of appeal on January 5, 2004, and on February 3, 2004, the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed her appeal for {ailure to prosecute.
On January 28, 2004, Ms. Lundahl filed the pending motion to withdraw the reference.
The court dismisses this proceeding for three reasons: (1) failure to properly complete service;
(2) failure to properly prosecute her appeal; and (3) the Bankruptcy Court correctly dismissed this
adversary proceeding.

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 117 of 118
Case

2:04-cv-0~9-PGC

Document 5 Filed

09/01/0~age 3 of 4

Bankruptly Court's Ruling
The Bankruptcy Court properly dismissed Ms. Lundahl' s adversary proceeding in this
case. Once the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the underlying bankruptcy proceeding, it lacked the
jurisdiction to hear this adversary proceeding.3 Notably the Bankruptcy Court dismissed this
proceeding without prejudice and this court does as well.

Conclusion
The court DENIES the motion to withdraw the reference in this case as untimely (#2-1 ).

The court DISMISSES this case without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

DATED this li±_day of g2004.
BY n:.E~OJT:

WI

Paul G. Cassell

United States District Judge

3

See Smith v. Commercial Banking Corp., (Jn re Smith), 866 F.2d 576, 580 {3rd Cir.
1989); in re Statistical Tabulatin Corp., 60 F.3d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir. 1995); Querner v. Quemer
(In re Querner), 7 F.3d 1199, 1201-02 (5 1n Cir. 1993).

Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page118ofll.8-_ _ _ _ _
Case

2:04-cv-0~9-PGC

Document 5 Filed

09i01/0~age 4 cf 4
tsh

United States District Court
for the

District of Utah
September 3, 2004

* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK
Re:

*

*

2:04-cv-00089

True and correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mailed
by the clerk to the following:
Holli Lundahl
PO BOX 833

LEHI, UT

84043

Helene Huff
US BANKRUPTCY COURT
84101
EMAIL

4

·. •' https://ecf.otd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?735130744491139~ ...

CM/ECF - U.S. District Court:utd

CJA,C:LCJSE:'D

US District Court Electronic Case Filing System
District of Utah {Central)
CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE#: 2:06-cr-00693-WFD-1

Case title: USA v. Lundahl

Date Filed: 10/0412006
Date Tenninated: 01/2112009

Assigned to: Judge William F. Downes
Defendant (1)
represented by D. Bruce Oliver
180 s 300
#210
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101-1218
(801) 328-8888
TERMINATED: 04110/2007
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Retained

Holli Lundahl
TERMINATED: 0112112009

w

Mary C. Corporon
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
(SLC)
36 S STATE ST STE 1900
POBOX45340
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
(801 )532-3333
Email: mcorporon@vancott.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: CJA Appointment
Robert L. Steele
UTAH FEDERAL DEFENDER OFFICE
46W BROADWAY STE 110
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
(801 )524-5877
Email: robert_steele@fd.org
TERMINATED: 0511512007
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Public Defender or Community
Defender Appointment
Pending Counts

.Disposition

None
Highest Offense Level (Opening)
None
Tenninated Counts

Disposition

18:152(3) CONCEAL ASSETS, FALSE OATH AND
CLAIMS BRIBERY/False Bankruptcy Declaration
(1-2)

All counts dismissed without prejudice per
government motion

18:1519
DESTRUCTION.ALTERNATION,FALSIFICATION
RCDS FED INVESTIGATION/False Bankruptcy
Document
(3-5)

All counts dismissed without prejudice per
government motion

i(

1of2
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I,

https://ecf.utd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.p1?735130744491139-...

• ' CM/ECF - U.S. District Court:utd

18: 152(2) CONCEAL ASSETS, FALSE OATH AND
CLAIMS BRIBERY/False Bankruptcy Oath
(6-7)

All counts dismissed without prejudice per
government motion

Highest Offense Level CTenninated)
Felony
Disposition

Complaints
None

Plaintiff
represented by Barbara Beamson
US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (UT)
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 00000

USA

(801 )325-3230
Email: barbara.beamson@usdoj.gov
TERMINATED: 1211812006
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cy H. Castle
US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (UT)
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 00000

(801 )325-3214
Email: cy.castle@usdoj.gov
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark Y. Hirata
US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (UT)
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 00000

(801 )325-3239
Email: Mark.Hirata@usdoj.gov
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
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238 I Minute Ent_ry_f-or_p_ro_c_e_e_d-in_g_s_h_e-ld-be-fo_r_eJu.dge W111iam.F. Downes: Competency Hearing as to Holli

!
i

l

!

I from the courtroom. The court finds defendant is not presently competent to stand trial. (Audio CD of

i

!

!

L-----~--·

l

!

! chambers. The court takes the bench@ 9:30 a.m. and hears statements from counsel. EvidencP~·~-...... :

i received, testimony is taken. Ms. Corporon requests access to defendant's medical records fro HCA in
i Orange County, California. Ms. Corporon is directed by prepare and submit an order. The court o
I defendant be transported (via direct flight) to Carswell, Texas for a full medical exam, with a report due

j

I
i

i Lundahl held on 6/2312008. Ms. Lundahl is present, with counsel. The court meets with counsel, in

l

i thirty days after defendant's arrival. Mr. Castle to prepare order. After an outburst, Ms. Lundahl is removed !
j
i proceedings is retained in the Clerk's Office.)Attorney for Plaintiff: Cy Castle, AUSA, Attorney for
·
i Defendant: Mary Corporon, Esq. Court Reporter: Laura Robinson. (tab) (Entered: 0612_312008)

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt

!.PACER

:Login:

!Client

Code:

r~~~c~;ption: ~=~-~~I~:~~
!Billable--· 2
;Pages:
1

2 of 2

l~ost:
I

____J
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DOB:·-·
HOLU LUNDAHL

1havebeenasked10 do !U1 aviluation on Holly Lundahl because of high blood~
heart is.socs, and maligna[rt lryparteasio.u.

An EKG was per:fomled. She has left atrial enlargancnt and~ mial
contractions.
l was also authoriud to do a stn:ss test on the treadmill if it W118 CO!ltrahldicated. Ber
blood pressure today contniindic:ates this fi:om baing done.
This is a woman who ha a put medical history of a m}~al iu:fmUio:niu 1995.
Allegedly a drug caused it She had CVA•s in2007 and.20081• She has bad breast
and skln C11llccr as wen. Su also has a histoiy of ph)Siall 1m1ma wbieh ~~ hfl1"
spinal cord and gave be:tpar:alysis for awhile.

She 1ias had a masu:ctmny, two back smgc08*. two hip w:rgeliea, and acme~ of
gastric surgery.

She doe:s have qBsodes of clu:st discomfort. This is 1ooated. in tho~ sabstema.1
ami. with zadiatio.u towards the 'left aido of tho chest mi into tho ld arm. The sewrity of
this varies.. The strongest feds like lactic acid wouJd fccl Wilm yon haw ovtr wmted a
muscle. It will last sommerc between 10 and 30 minutes. Nitroglycerin may tdievc it .
after about 20 minutes.
··
·

If sho waila quickly, she will get out ofb.reatb. mllly fiat. Sho wW. lwvo • n qxi$0deG ot
orthopnea. She has a few episo&s of PND. She does not. l:.a've a supine c:ongb.
Slic dDes have episoc'U:s of palpitatiOils.

AddilioMl s;mptoms are that she does have bad eyes and h« vision tslda to be bluay.
She always fccl3 cold. It almost sounds like abo l:uls some foon o(hypoglyce:mi&. lf she
eats cvmy couple ofbou:rs me does much better. She develops charlie horses at Digbt.
She has difficulty .in gencml with sleeping.
·
She has had high blood pn:ssuro fur a fair period oftim8. One of the lowest~

was about 190/115.

Her cum:ot medications incl:ade li.slnoprJ 10 mg bid. aml.odipine 10 mg bid, and aspirhl 1
tablet tid. At one time aho was on h)'d.roclilorotbiazide and clonidine. She 1:w not been
on hydralazine. She has not been an !l betA-bloc.ker. Other than the amlodipine. she has
not b«n llll a.cal~ blocker.

On exam±tlatio:n. her wcigtt is 143 pi:nmCs. s~ i:J 5 fu<rt ~\-,,-:.hes tar!. H.!'!tblood pr~
'W!S230/l 10. H~ pulse ''W3S 140 ~~t ~with ~es. She sb.(l";)ed no CMl~osis
ey::i have :no comea1 arcus. Tnere is an abtomla1 light tcfla :from the mta:ics.. They arc
all visibly narrowed with si~ AV nicking. I do r.ot ace hemc:ic::ha,p or emdates.
Tb.ere is no jugular venous disb:ntion ~# Supine it is 4 an. Hem:spha:llo:cs ~
unlalx:ired and cleerto !':1-,r,ultation. Sb~ docs bKve an S4 gillop. No rub. no bruit3.
The femcral3 and pedals axe 1-2+ bilaterally. 'l'hen is nee BDkle ~ Her left foot :is
cooler than the right. GI eum was um:crnmbble with no masses m tmdcrncsa, and no
hepatosplenomegaly. Her gait is unremmtable. The digits and nails show no clubbing or
cyanosis. The skin is warm and dry although tho lcdt root is cooler. No signs ofvetlOUS ·
st.ams. She is alert and orl«rted. No dysartl:iria. She comprehends and understands. Mood
i!Ild affect arr. calm.

EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT:
1.
Hypertec.sion. She cectai:nly bas high blood pressmc. Today her blood pressure is
230/110. At 1h!.t 1~, I think it is unsafe for her to undergo and exercise stracis
test.

2.

Shorf:ru:.ss of breath. She has sigoiiicam shortness of breath whee she erxerts
herself veiymuch. She also has some subtle symptoms when she is mpino. She
will get a little bit of orthopoea and PND from time to time. She does not have
much pcriphcral edema. It ia mostly at the llOCk line. I think hta' shortness of

~th is related _to cardia<? factot3. V~Y.with ~le wi~ aev~ hypert~Oti.,
tbctr t.nd masrolic prc:ssurcs ;ue so hign that tlllS ~e 18 trails:tcm:d Dacit tO the
lungs and a pulmonary capillary wedge pte8SUf$ ~. mi it causes significant
~:1.!il.bratb 'fhusltmllldlllm.m~h.er_~ ffimug~YP~..
fuilure. I bc1iave this is diastolic heart £Ulurc.

3.

Status post CVA. It seems like the major problem that she ball with this is related

4.

to he.r visu81 system.
Frequent pnmature l!:l:rial contractiutts.

To sm::nnarizc I bt.i:ieve she do~ heve congestive heart fD.ililre related to diastolic~function,
and is FunctiOllal Class .!!-Ill She contim.ws to have ~ere hypertension.

Kim.I.

Ji4~·W,fAGc
FACC ·

Caxdiovascular M
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11"'.l'S Message Print - Mci;:sage Inquiry Display Dialog Box

lla.nk: .l>.medca Pint CU

D.ate: 06/0S/ll 18:01:25

Me!isage Status: PlmM
Seq Nuln1 201106000lll00

J!elated Seq Nunl: 201106-00031200
Pay >letbod: nt> output
Y.ie$sage m: moe11
Date Recvd: 03/01/2011 13:19:57
Value Illlte: 03/01/2011
Sender:
Amount:

l2t377S16
$«,214.77

Debit info -1\.ocount: 2os12,0'
Name:
BAANO! Wlll! GL
AC!drl:
1\CCOIDTTING DEl?'r
Mdr2:
~ CENTlm
Addr3:
Addr4:

Credit fofo -Account: 324371516
~ CHJIBB l!JIHK,

Name:

:NA

Jlild:rl:
Addr2:
Addr3:

Adc'b:t:
Advice:
Category:

'l'l!lJ,..'El

Dept:
DEP'l'l
Lineisheet1

T:raneode: IXll'tEGTIC

Create

~late•

Message 'l'ext:

Sndr Info
l<lsg 'fype
IMAO

{1500}02

p +

{151011000

"1Rount

{1520!20ll0lOlLtB74L!ICOOO~S3
(2000 000000421477

Sender DI

{ 3100 324.377516*

Sndr Ref
Rcvr DJ:
Bwl Fune

{3320 2oi10,00031100•

Ell!."'F

{3~00 }111000614~

(lfiOO}Cl:I!.•

{4200)1)()440002020•
LlliEB11RGE:R (jlOO;;:r.R :SIAIR SAMPSON I..l.I>*

{4320}0S7460SC107675S7«

(sooo}mosuo•

~~-

~Cl:ll.'3:'KJI.·

{5100}D24555120-1*

HOU.r TELl'ORD"
10621 S EXGHHAY 191•
MllLAO CTTr•

ID S3252"

/1

' .

-·-·.
-~-v AMERICAflRST
CREDIT U.NIDN

HOLLI TEtFORO

106215 OLD WIY 191
MAI.AO CITY, ID 83252

To the clerk of the court:
Plea5e find attached the wire transcript of America First Credit Union identifying the wire transfer to the
law offices of UnebargerGoggan Blair Sampson, UP ofTyler, Texas in March of 2011 in the amount of
$4,214.n as credited from the Loan Proceeds of America First Credit Union Member, Holli Telford.
If YoU have any further questions please feel free to call.

~~
Lead Teller
America First Credit Union-North Logan
(435}792· 7520

P.O. Box 9199 •Ogden. Utzoh 84409 • 1.800.999.3961 • www.emericetirst.com

r .l./- f/

Un:uUI - ~ unpuw uw or :swc

Holl Telford <hollltelford@glhaR.ll'OllP

-----------------··---·--·the original deed
4 messages

Deborah MHlng cDeborah.Mllllna@ltbs.com>

Tue,Apr19,201'l at 11:37 AM

To: HolTelfoof <hollitelford@gmai.com>

Hi Holli,
l did adually mail the original bill of sale and Dd on propmy 'jou pwciwed at the Mardi sale.
The post office rctumcd the envelope back. Will you pleuc wmy JOl'r mailing addras?

Tivmksalotl

Deborah Mfllng
Area Manager
Linebarger, Goggan, Blair and Sampson, LLP
1517 W. Front street, Ste. 202
Tyler, TX 75702
903;697-2897 x.2121
903..§il-2402 fax
~rah mllJingO!gbs com

-----------~--CONflDENJJAUJY STATEMENT

-- --·-----

-··-

This transmission may be: (1) 8Ubjed to the A!fMleY-Cllent Privtlege, (2) an attorney worlc product. or (3)
striclly confidential. If you a111 not the intended recipient of this massage, you rmy not disdose, '°11. copy «
dlsseminale this information. If you have recelWld this in error, please reply and nolify lhe sender (only) and
delete the message.. Unauthorized inten;eptlon of this e-mail is a violation of federal c:rill'inal law.
HoNI Telford <hollltefford@umall.com>
To: Deborah Mllltng <Oeborah.Milllng@lgbs.com>

Tue, Apr 19, 2011 at 3:32 PM

s. Old Hwy 191
Malad City Idaho 83252
what address dld'you mail it to? Please brward me the returned envelope so lhat I mtf/ take Issue wilh the
postal l'll!fYice if.they are reb.lmlng mall di!eded to mB. Also I have not niceived 1he executed deed of trust
on Ille Kelley Sr. !nt that I purchased, and 1he county slil shows ttiat 1he p!Opel'ty Is in the name of 1he
original owner. Can you see where this is too? Thanks. Hell
send to:

106~1

IO""'"'i "'11-i

Holl! Telford <hollttalfonl@gmall.com>
To: Deborah Miffing <Deborah.Ml!ling@lgbs.com>

Tue, Apr 19, 2011at10:14 PM

·:

.. ,' . .:

·......

.· ..

document for insurance
2 messages

T-, . . . 2011 .t 12;3S ...

Dellorah ...... <~1111111.......1.c;om>
To: Holli Telford

<holl~com>

Holli,
The document will be c:oming ftom Charlene Fugler at our office and when you acknowledge that you have
n:ceil'Cd lhe document. l will put the original in the mail.

Thanks.

Deborah Miing

>lea Manager
lilebqet. Goggan. Blair and Sampson. LlP
1517 W. FR>rt Street, Ste. 202
Tyler. TX 75702

903-597-2897 x.2121

903-597-2402,.
debQmh.mi!ing@lgbs.com

--- ·-·

~---··
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CONPP"!'T'ALITY ITAD"''HT
This transmission may be: (1) subject IO lhe Allorney-Cl'lent Pri11!1ege, (2} an attomey wen product, « (3} &tridly confidential. If
you are not the intended recipient of this message, you may not disclose, print, copy «~le 1his inl'«malion. If you
haw receM!d ttlis in emir, please reply and notify the sender (only} and delete the message. Unaulhortzed intereeptlon of 1hi$
e·mai is a violation of federal aiminal law.

-----·--· -----··.

---

Holll Ttllt'onl <hollBlllrertlellftlllLC9111>
Draft To: Deborah Milling <Oeborah.Millng@lgbs.eom>
Please do not pul lhe original In the mal I.JI

.,.., , . , .. 2011 Ill 2.'17 ...
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THE STATE OF TEXAS

§

COUNTY OF SMITH

§

2011

00031847

REDEMPTION DEED

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that SMITH COUNTY, TYLER
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, CITY OF TYLER, AND TYLER JUNIOR
COLLEGE, by and through its duly elected officials ("GRANTOR") as authorized by
Section 34.05, Texas Property Tax Code, for and in consideration of the sum of
TWELVE THOUSAND, SIX HUNDRED, EIGHT DOLLARS AND 36/100
($12,608.36) AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, in hand
paid by PA UL W. KELLY (GRANTEE") the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged
and confessed, has conveyed and quitclaimed and by these presents do convey and
quitclaim unto said grantee all right, title and interest of the SMITH COUNTY, TYLER
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, CITY OF TYLER, AND TYLER JUNIOR
COLLEGE, in the property herein conveyed, acquired by tax foreclosure sale heretofore
held in Cause No.22,107-C, styled Tyler Independent School District vs. Paul Kelly, Et
Al, said property being described as:
BEING 0.43 ACRES PART OF THE J. CAUBLE SURVEY, AS DESCRIBED IN
DEED RECORDED IN VOLUME 1551, PAGE 735, ON INSTRUMENT FILED
OCTOBER 30, 1975, AND FINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE FILED FEBRUARY 19,
1993, CAUSE #92-2532F, SMITH COUNTY TEXAS, AND BEING FURTHER
IDENTIFIED ON THE TAX ROLL AND RECORDS OF SMITH COUNTY UNDER
ACCOUNT NUMBER 100000020600013090.
This conveyance is made and accepted subject to the following matters to the
extent that the same are in effect at this time: any and all rights of redemption,
restrictions, covenants, conditions, easements, encumbrances and outstanding mineral
interests, if any, relating to the hereinabove mentioned County and State, and to all
zoning laws, regulations and ordinances of municipal and/or governmental authorities, if
any but only to the extent that they are still in effect, relating to the hereinabove described
property.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said premises, together with all and singular the
rights, privileges and appurtenances thereto in any manner belonging unto the said PAUL
W. KELLY, his heirs and assigns forever, so that neither SMITH COUNTY, TYLER
JUNIOR COLLEGE, AND TYLER INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, and any
person claiming under it shall at any time hereafter have, claim or demand any right or
title to the aforesaid premises or appurtenances, or any part thereof.

- 1-

Grantee accepts the property in "AS IS" condition and subject to any
environmental conditions that might have or still exist on said property.
Post judgment taxes and taxes for the current year are assumed by Grantee.
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, the taxing authorities
I ;i,
day of
presents to be executed this the

erein have caused these
_ , 2011.

SMITH COUNTY for itself and the STATE OF

Joels;µ._
TEXAS

~

-

SMITH COUNTY JUDGE

STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF SMITH
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared The
Honorable Joel Baker, County Judge, of the State of Texas, County of Smith known to
me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and
acknowledged to me that he executed the same for the purpose and consideration therein
expressed and in the capacity therein stated.

Given under my hand and Seal of Office this

l_tJlt .

~Aa,/t~c(
NOTARY PUBLIC, in and forthe STATE
OF TEXAS, my commission expires:

(Seal)

-2 -

/

~

day of

9M~

Grantee: PAUL W. KELLY
1618 WOLFORD
TYLER TX 75702

Return to: Perdue, Brandon, Fielder, Collins & Mott, L.L.P
P.O. Box 2007
Tyler TX 75701

-3-

Filed For Record in:
S.ith Count\11 Texas
On Jul 20r2011

at 11:09A

ReceiPt

~:

Recording:

58~711

Doc/Hui. : 00031847

24.00

Doc/T\tPfi!I
Recordinss - Lnnd
OePUh - Cher!!l Clll'dind

l hereb!I certih tho.t this

instru.ent

WGS

filed and dul!I

recorded in the Official

Records of S•ith CountYr Texas

Ko.ren Phi 11 i PS
Coonh Clerk

Smith County Appraisal District -Account Detait 2012

· Click to Yiew Miw

Pagel ofl

C!jck to Print Thjs Wjndqw

Electronic Online Protest
2012 ownership Data

~itv:

[)43056
100000020600013090
iCRLlYPAUL W
1618 WOLFORD
tl.inl:
TYLER

175702

State:

rx

0000

PIN#:
iAcconnt:
Owner:
Address:

tlAol:
Deed lnfonnation

Book:
Pue:
Recd.Date:
Recd. Info:

71200.011
!DEED 31847
Jurlsdicttons/2012

SMIIB COUNTY
TYLERISD
SCESD#2

Est Taxes
$45.2~

$191.9~

$11.8..

For Actual Tax Levy contact Gary Barber Tax Assenor/Collector at (903> 590-2920. Tax amounts shown
are Estimates Dl'l!Dared bY Smith Countv Annralsal District

8

JUSTIN LYNN
RET AILEH/B ROKEH,/INST ALLER

TDHCA LICENSE# MHDRET00035729

5215 SANGER A VENUE
Facsimile (254) 399-0160

Post Office Box 7067
Waco, Texas 76714-7067
Telephone (254) 399-0399

Email justin@lvnnprop.com

April 1ih, 2010

Re:

Purchase of Manufactured Home
1994 Patriot/Heritage Park
TEX0503873/7 4
PTX1966A/B

Dear Ms. Teleford:

Please accept this letter as receipt of payment for the manufactured home described above. Your wire
transfer has been received and applied. Attached you will find an Application for Statement of Ownership
& Location, which needs to be signed & notarized. Please scan and e-mail back signed document, retain
a copy for your records and return the original to the Post Office Box listed above so it can be properly
recorded with the State of Texas. Also attached, is the signed purchase agreement by both parties, as
well as the Texas Title Detail Information Sheet, giving you information about the home that is vital to your
insurance company. If you should happen to have any questions, please give me a call or e-mail me at
your convenience. Thank you for your time and concern in this matter. Your business is greatly
appreciated.

Justin Davis Lynn
Retailer/Broker /I nsta Ile r

Enc. 4

'=1l'U='

MEMBER COPY

AMERICA FIRST
AFCU MEMBER WIRE TRANSFER
DATE4/12J10
MEMBER NAME._ _ _ _ _ _

TELFORD

ACCOUNT#7322829

IDENTIFICATION (PICTURE}#STEVE.________ OTHER -'C'-'T-'-1_ _ _ _ _ __
WIRE TO {Institution name)INDEPENDENT BANK

BANKABA#

1119

IS BANK ONLINE?_Y_ __

1632

6

______.,.___ FEES$ _,,8=.o=o_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

$AMOUNT '

BY ORDER OF .. _

·(eG·ORD-

PHONE# 469-522-9725

--"'"'~~~~----~

TELEGRAPHlC ABBREVlATlON.-"JN""D"'"P'-"'Bl.>.K.....
M...,Coi.:~w.IN.,.i,N,_,.E._,_Y_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
DESTINATION BANK INFORMATION (CREDIT TO) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
N<lme & Acaiunt Number

JUSTIN DAVIS LYNN 1000049450
Address

PURCHASE PATRIQT/HERITAGE PARK MANUFACUJRED tJO,,_,_M=EJ=---~~--AddrSl>S
AddNlSs

(FOR FURTHER CREDIT TO) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Name & Aci::ovnt Number

Address
Address

PREPAREDBYK~~C~-------
APPROVEDBY~---~-------------------

MEMBERSTG

I TRANSACTION
SHARE TRANSFER
DECREASE ACCT.

ACCT.#

SUFFIX ' AMOUNT

FOLt

ACCT.#

TRANSACTION

OTHER
! GENERAL
I LEDGER
1

i 4120

7

, WRTSF
i

1----~---+~~----+---~~---i

SHARE TRANSFER
DECREASE ACCT.

+u

4120

IFE~

I

OTHER
GENERAL

I LEDGER

I 4610

j

110100

I
4610 1440900

I AMOUNT

DESC.

1-- ~
f 10010

11i~111111111111~1m
11m rn1
'IRWIR'

I

